Nansamba v. N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc.

Decision Date12 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. 13–1266.,13–1266.
Citation727 F.3d 33
PartiesJanat NANSAMBA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NORTH SHORE MEDICAL CENTER, INC. et al., Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Godfrey K. Zziwa, with whom Alanna G. Cline, Law Office of Alanna G. Cline, and Law Office of Godfrey K. Zziwa were on brief, for appellant.

Eugene J. Sullivan III, with whom Nicole Forbes and Holtz & Reed, LLP were on brief, for appellees.

Before HOWARD, SELYA and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

When litigation goes awry, lawyers sometimes scramble to find a scapegoat. So it is here: having conspicuously failed to protect the record, the plaintiff's lawyers attempt to shift the blame to their opposing counsel. Concluding, as we do, that this diversionary tactic lacks force, we affirm the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts that gave rise to the underlying litigation are chronicled in the opinion below, see Nansamba v. N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 11–11459, 2012 WL 1856950, at *1–2 (D.Mass. May 21, 2012), and there is no need to rehearse them here. We offer instead a brief sketch of the genesis and travel of the case and supplement that sketch with a more detailed discussion of the events upon which the issues before us rest.

In 2002, defendant-appellee North Shore Medical Center, Inc. hired plaintiff-appellant Janat Nansamba as a technical nursing assistant. While so employed, the plaintiff developed hemorrhoids. During the early morning hours of May 7, 2010, she felt ill and left her overnight shift. Later that day, she informed her manager, defendant-appellee Ellen Bova, that she would need time off to undergo a colonoscopy. Three days later, North Shore cashiered the plaintiff. In doing so, it cited performance-related reasons.

The plaintiff repaired to a Massachusetts state court, contending that the defendants had orchestrated her firing in retaliation for her hemorrhoids-induced absences in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. She added a medley of state-law claims. Citing the presence of a federal question, the defendants removed the case to the federal district court. See28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441.

After a period of pretrial discovery and the dismissal of some of the plaintiff's causes of action, the defendants moved for summary judgment on, pertinently, the FMLA claim.1 They argued, among other things, that the plaintiff's inability to show that she suffered a “serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA and its accompanying regulations, see29 U.S.C. § 2611(11); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113– .115, doomed her FMLA claim. The plaintiff opposed the motion, but the district court deemed the “no serious health condition” argument convincing and granted summary judgment. See Nansamba, 2012 WL 1856950, at *5. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state-law claim. See id.; see also28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Final judgment entered on May 24.

On May 29, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration, alleging that certain medical records—her own—constituted newly discovered evidence showing that her hemorrhoids satisfied the FMLA's definition of a “serious health condition.” 2 The saga of these records is of central importance to what next transpired.

During pretrial discovery, the parties jockeyed over the production of the plaintiff's complete medical file. She first produced a set of her medical records on December 13, 2011, responding to a discovery request. The defendants complained that the release form used to obtain those records requested only a “medical record abstract,” not the plaintiff's complete medical file. Four days after this complaint was made, the plaintiff executed and delivered a new release form. Although this form was broader in scope, it still excepted the release of photographs, radiation reports, x-ray reports, and “personal information not related to treatment.”

The new release form instructed that the records be sent directly to defense counsel. But those additional records, when received, did not assuage the defendants' concerns. On February 3, defense counsel e-mailed plaintiff's counsel lamenting that:

We have received part of [the plaintiff's] medical record—but, once again, only part of it.

You will see that—once again—[the plaintiff] has signed the medical release, but specifically instructed the physician not to provide the entire medical file.

Attached to this e-mail were the records that defense counsel had received pursuant to the second release form.

The plaintiff's lawyers did not bother to open or examine the attachment. On February 14, however, the plaintiff executed an unrestricted release form. Using this third release form, the defendants garnered more records in April. What they received, however, did not differ in any meaningful way from what they previously had sent to plaintiff's counsel in February.

This brings us back to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order. In that motion, the plaintiff—not realizing that the records produced in April (after the summary judgment motion had been briefed but before it was decided) were materially identical to those attached to the February 3 e-mail—argued that the April records constituted newly discovered evidence. The district court demurred, observing that virtually all the records on which the motion relied had been e-mailed to plaintiff's counsel on February 3 and had languished in their possession since that time.

The plaintiff did not take a timely appeal from either the entry of summary judgment or the denial of her motion for reconsideration. On November 13, however, she moved for relief from the judgment. In that motion, she characterized her lawyers' failure to introduce the medical records contained in the attachment to the February 3 e-mail as the product of either excusable neglect or fraud. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (3). Reiterating that “no justifiable reason” had emerged to explain the plaintiff's delay in obtaining her own medical records, the district court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

We preface our analysis with an inventory of what is properly before us and what is not. Although the plaintiff endeavors to challenge the district court's order for summary judgment, that challenge is out of time. The plaintiff did not file her notice of appeal until February 22, 2013–more than four months after the district court denied her motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order. Although the appeal period is tolled upon the filing of a timely motion for reconsideration,3 an order disposing of the motion restarts the appeal clock. See Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir.2003). Thus, the plaintiff's notice of appeal was untimely as to both the entry of summary judgment and the denial of reconsideration. SeeFed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (stipulating thirty-day appeal period).

The plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment, filed outside the thirty-day appeal period, did not resurrect her expired right of appeal. See de la Torre v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 13 n. 2 (1st Cir.1994). As we have explained, “an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is not a surrogate for a seasonable appeal of the underlying judgment.” Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002).

Our inquiry, then, is confined to the supportability of the district court's denial of the motion for relief from judgment. Familiar principles guide this inquiry: “relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary in nature and [ ] motions invoking that rule should be granted sparingly.” Id. Finality is an important element in the judicial process, and setting aside a final judgment requires more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword. Such a motion must satisfy a special set of criteria; it is not enough merely to cast doubt on the soundness of the underlying judgment. See Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir.2009).

The criteria for Rule 60(b) relief are well-established. A party seeking such relief must demonstrate “that his motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Because the district court is best positioned to examine these criteria, we review an order granting or denying a Rule 60(b) motion solely for abuse of discretion. See Karak, 288 F.3d at 19.

Against this backdrop, we turn to the substance of the present appeal. Rule 60(b) plots six different paths, each of which may lead to relief from judgment. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(6). The plaintiff tries to traverse two of these paths: clause (1) and clause (3).4 As to both paths, the defendants concede (at least implicitly) that the motion for relief from judgment was filed within a reasonable time and, thus, satisfies Rule 60(b)' s temporal requirement. Our focus, therefore, is on the existence vel non of exceptional circumstances warranting extraordinary relief.5See Fisher, 589 F.3d at 512.

A. Rule 60(b)(1).

We start with the plaintiff's assertion that Rule 60(b)(1), which permits a court to set aside a judgment in cases of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” applies here. The plaintiff trains her sights on the “excusable neglect” prong. In her view, the excusable neglect that occurred here comprises an exceptional circumstance that should justify relief from judgment.

Neglect is not the issue. The plaintiff admits that her lawyers failed to open the February 3 e-mail attachment containing her medical records. She likewise admits that they failed to introduce any of those records in opposition to the summary judgment motion. This is...

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