Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., s. 83-951

Citation220 USPQ 929,727 F.2d 1506
Decision Date25 January 1984
Docket NumberNos. 83-951,s. 83-951
PartiesRAILROAD DYNAMICS, INC., Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. A. STUCKI COMPANY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Appeal/961.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Ronald L. Panitch, Philadelphia, Pa., argued, for appellant. With him on the brief was Alan S. Nadel, Philadelphia, Pa.

Raymond G. Hasley, Pittsburgh, Pa., argued, for appellee. With him on the brief were Brian W. Ashbaugh, E. Wallace Breisch, Kean K. McDonald and Stephen J. Springer, Philadelphia, Pa.

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge, and NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge.

MARKEY, Chief Judge.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. U.S. Patent No. 3,837,292 ('292 patent), assigned to A. Stucki Co. (Stucki), was held valid and found infringed. Damages were awarded in the amount of $2,182,986. We affirm.

Background

The Invention

Figure 8 of the '292 patent is illustrative:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

A railroad freight car (not shown) has beneath it four side frames 121, each carrying two of the car's eight wheels (not shown). Springs 22, 23 are grouped between the wheels in each side frame and act as shock absorbers. Each end of the car rests on a bolster 118 extending between the side frames at each side of the car, each end of the bolster resting on the springs.

In operation, freight cars tend to rock from side to side, a phenomenon known in the industry as "rock and roll". Severe rocking and rolling can cause derailment.

The '292 patent discloses as a solution to rock and roll the replacement of one of the springs with a hydraulic shock absorber assembly (snubber) 132. A spring 170 holds the snubber normal to the bolster and biases the hydraulic piston rod 154 out of contact with frame 121 when the car is lightly loaded. The snubber operates only when the car is loaded or bounces sufficiently to compress the springs to the point at which the hydraulic rod 154 of the snubber contacts the frame (or, when the snubber is reversed in position, the point at which the rod contacts the bolster).

Claim 1 is representative:

1. In a dampened railway truck assembly selectively operable in loaded and unloaded conditions and having a hydraulic snubber apparatus interposed in a spring group intermediate a bolster member and a side frame member, the improvement comprising: means interposed between said snubber apparatus and one of said members to bias said snubber apparatus out of operative engagement with said

one of said members when said truck assembly is normally operating in an unloaded condition; and said means and said snubber apparatus being cooperable to initiate hydraulic snubbing by said snubber apparatus substantially only when said railway truck assembly is normally operating in a loaded condition, the bias of said means is partially overcome and said snubber apparatus is in operative engagement with both of said members.

Procedural History

Railroad Dynamics, Inc. (RDI) brought a declaratory judgment action against Stucki in 1975, seeking a declaration of patent invalidity. Stucki counterclaimed for infringement.

RDI admitted infringement and the liability issue was tried to a jury for three weeks (May 19, 1980 to June 10, 1980). The trial judge gave detailed instructions to the jury, covering over 51 pages of the record. The jury answered in writing ten inquiries labeled "interrogatories", each of its answers favoring Stucki. The parties agree that the jury's answers amounted to a general verdict in favor of Stucki.

The damages issue was tried to the court from February 9, 1981 to February 20, 1981. The court in an unreported Memorandum established a reasonable royalty of $35.00 per carset (four snubbers) plus 6% interest. On August 25, 1981, the court issued an Order that judgment be entered in favor of Stucki for $1,960,700. Judgment was entered on August 26.

RDI moved for JNOV or for a new trial and objected to inclusion of royalties on certain carsets in the award. Stucki moved to alter or amend judgment by increasing the amount of the award.

Judge Broderick, in a careful and exhaustive Memorandum published at 353 F.Supp. 579, 218 USPQ 618, reviewed all the evidence, and denied the post trial motions of RDI and Stucki (except for correction of a clerical error in the calculation of interest). The district court entered an Order on March 25, 1983 that the August 26, 1981 judgment be corrected, nunc pro tunc, in favor of Stucki for $2,182,986. Final judgment was accordingly entered March 28, 1 1983, or some seven years after suit was filed.

Issues

(A) Whether the judgment entered on the jury verdict is supported in the record.

(B) Whether the district court erred in: (1) submitting a legal issue to the jury; (2) submitting interrogatories to the jury; (3) instructing the jury; (4) failing to declare invalidity for lack of oath or declaration.

(C) Whether the district court erred in determining the amount of damages.

OPINION
Standard of Review--In General 2

It is judgments that are appealed. Because a final judgment issues in favor of the movant, it has been said that "an order granting a motion for JNOV is appealable". Orders denying a motion for JNOV and granting or denying a motion for new trial do not generally result in judgments and are not themselves appealable. 5A Moore's Federal Practice p 50.16 (2d ed. 1983). In those latter instances, the only appealable judgment is that entered on the jury's verdict.

Where no post-trial motions of the type discussed here were filed, and the appeal is directly from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict, review for sufficiency of evidence is extremely limited or non-existent, prejudicial legal error must be shown to have occurred in the conduct of the trial, and the action of an appellate court is limited to affirmance or remand for new trial. See Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 888 (7th Cir.1983); Scientific Holding Co. v. Plessey, Inc., 510 F.2d 15, 28 (2nd Cir.1974). It thus behooves counsel to file non-frivolous motions for directed verdict, for JNOV, and for new trial.

Similarly, where there has been no motion for JNOV under Rule 50(b) Fed.R.Civ.P., and nothing of record that may be treated as such a motion, an appellate court cannot reverse or order judgment for appellant. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947); Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct. 246, 92 L.Ed. 177 (1948); Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952). Moore's, supra, p 50.12. An appeal may not be treated as a substitute for a motion for JNOV that was not made to the district court.

Though it has been said that a district court presented with a motion for JNOV must determine whether there was "substantial evidence to support the verdict", See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed.Cir. 23, 1983), the quoted phrase must not be taken as applicable in the same manner to all issues encompassed in the verdict or in a manner that would disregard the proper placement of the burden of proof. For example, the verdict may be for the patent owner, necessarily implying a conclusion that the patent is valid. The quoted phrase must not be taken in that case as meaning that the district court, in considering a motion for JNOV attacking validity, determines only whether the patent owner had introduced sufficiently substantial evidence to support that conclusion. That approach would, contrary to the statute, 35 U.S.C. Sec. 282, shift to the patent owner the burden of proving facts establishing validity.

Patent owners are never in law required to prove facts establishing validity, though they may when necessary be well advised to prove such facts in rebuttal of a patent challenger's case. When they do, a verdict of validity may be sustained on the failure of the challenger to meet its burden in light of the rebuttal evidence.

The burden placed on patent challengers by Sec. 282 is not undue. There are many grounds for challenging a patent. Challengers often press them all; and challengers win if they establish only one.

When a jury verdict of validity is tested by a motion for JNOV, therefore, the district court must determine whether the patent challenger's evidence met the burden imposed by Sec. 282. If that evidence be such as to have so withstood the patent owner's rebuttal evidence that reasonable jurors could not have concluded that the patent is valid, the motion should be granted. If the patent challenger's evidence fails that test, the motion should be denied.

When the verdict connotes invalidity, a properly instructed jury has necessarily determined that the patent challenger's evidence met the burden imposed by Sec. 282. A district court presented with the patent owner's motion for JNOV would apply the same test, i.e., whether reasonable jurors viewing the challenger's evidence could or could not have reached the conclusion that the patent is invalid.

Respecting infringement, the shoe is on the other foot, for there the burden is on the patent owner. Whether the verdict be for the patent owner or alleged infringer, a motion for JNOV attacking the infringement finding must be tested on whether the patent owner's evidence was such that reasonable jurors could or could not have determined that the claims were or were not infringed.

Standard of Review--This Case

The present denial of a motion for JNOV, though not appealable, is reviewable in connection with the appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict. When a motion for JNOV has been granted, the judgment on review is that entered by the trial judge, not the judgment that would have been entered on the verdict. Whether the motion was denied or granted, appellate...

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