Ra Chaka v. Franzen

Decision Date18 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. 79 C 3007.,79 C 3007.
Citation727 F. Supp. 454
PartiesRabb RA CHAKA, Plaintiff, v. Gayle M. FRANZEN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Rabb Ra Chaka, Vienna, Ill., pro se.

William J. Scott, William Ristorious, Attorney General's Office, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

ASPEN, District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Rabb Ra Chaka brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sues Illinois Department of Corrections officials for violations of his civil rights which allegedly occurred when defendants ordered a "lockdown" at Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville"), and thereafter placed Stateville under a "unit management system." Ra Chaka, a Muslim, objects to limitations imposed on his religious freedoms pursuant to the change in Stateville's prison management system. This action comes before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses this action in its entirety.

FACTS

Ra Chaka filed this lawsuit five months after Stateville officials implemented a state of emergency and subsequent lockdown at Stateville on February 23, 1979. Pursuant to the lockdown, officials reclassified all inmates into one of three categories (aggressive and predatory types, normalsituational types, and passive-dependent types). After completing the reclassification, defendants separated inmates by those same categories into respective "houses" or units. See Richard DeRobertis Affidavit, Doc. 7, Ex. A., p. 1 ("DeRobertis Aff.").1 Every effort was made to keep the groups from mixing and each unit was under the supervision of its own "Unit Manager." Id. The new "unit management system" was modeled after one already in existence in the federal penetentiary system.

In July, 1979 following the lockdown, Assistant Warden Richard DeRobertis denied a request by Muslim inmates to provide bi-monthly, inter-unit assemblies for the Jumah Prayer service. The Jumah service is the Muslim weekly religious observance mandated by the Koran, the Muslim Holy Book. DeRobertis denied the request as antithetical to the concept of "unit management" because it involved mixing the various "units" or cellhouses. Id. at p. 2. DeRobertis, however, authorized the prison's Islamic chaplain to conduct individual Jumah services at the various cellhouses, at locations approved by the respective Unit Managers. Id. Four days after DeRobertis denied the inter-unit Jumah assemblies (but authorized individual cellhouse Jumah services), Ra Chaka filed this lawsuit.

Ra Chaka alleges that the lockdown and Stateville's subsequent conversion to the unit management system violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment because it limited him in the exercise of his Muslim beliefs. He asserts that defendants violated his first amendment rights when they prohibited him from attending weekly Jumah services. He also alleges that defendants violated his equal protection rights because they failed to provide Muslim inmates with the same amount of funding and religious materials provided to other religious groups. Defendants contend that the issues are moot because Stateville now conducts weekly Jumah services and that, in any event, defendants are shielded from liability by the eleventh amendment.

For a period, this lawsuit was consolidated with another lawsuit, Hakim v. Franzen, 79 C 3124, a class action which plaintiffs ultimately voluntarily dismissed. In January 1980, however, the court vacated the consolidation order upon Ra Chaka's request that he be allowed to proceed separately on his original complaint.

DISCUSSION

A pro se plaintiff's complaint must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Additionally, summary judgment is not appropriate unless there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Egger v. Phillips, 669 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 284, 78 L.Ed.2d 262 (1983).

A. Preliminary Issues.

Stateville currently conducts weekly Jumah services on Fridays. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum, Doc. 70, Ledford Affidavit; Muhammad Affidavit. Additionally, Reverend David Ledford and Agin Muhammed, both chaplains at Stateville, also attest that numerous Islamic Studies classes are conducted throughout the week, (weekly class schedules were attached to the affidavits), and that Muslim religious personnel and materials are also provided to the Muslim inmates. Id. In his responsive pleadings Ra Chaka does not refute these facts. Because weekly Jumah services are now provided at Stateville, as are religious personnel and materials, defendants argue that Ra Chaka's claim is moot.

Ra Chaka's petition for injunctive and declaratory relief is moot regarding his request for weekly Jumah services, because those services are now provided at Stateville. See e.g., Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n. 1, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3224, 106 L.Ed.2d 573 (1989). His claim for money damages, however, allegedly resulting from defendants' failure to provide weekly adequate religious services in the past is not moot. See Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir.1988).

Defendants also argue that they are protected from liability in their official capacity by the eleventh amendment which prohibits damage actions against state officials in their official capacity unless the state consents to the suit. See e.g., Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070-71 (7th Cir.1987). As stated in the caption of his Complaint, however, Ra Chaka expressly sued the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The eleventh amendment does not shield a state public official from potential liability when he is sued in his personal or individual capacity (as contrasted with his official capacity). Shockley, 823 F.2d at 1070. Consequently, Ra Chaka's claim for money damages against defendants in their individual capacities for alleged violations of the free exericise clause and equal protection guarantees are neither moot nor barred by the eleventh amendment.

B. First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause

The first issue is whether, pursuant to its lockdown and subsequent introduction of the unit management system, the defendants' failure to provide weekly inter-unit Jumah services violated Ra Chaka's right to religious freedom as guaranteed by the free exercise clause of the first amendment.

Even while incarcerated, prisoners retain protections afforded by the first amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights, however, are judged under a "reasonableness" test which is less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. This is to insure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials in the conduct of their administrative duties. Id. When a challenged prison regulation impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Siddiqi v. Leak, 880 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir.1989). Four factors are helpful in applying this "reasonableness test": 1) whether there is a rational relation between the regulation and the legitimate government interest behind the rule; 2) whether alternative means of exercising the right exist; 3) what impact accomodating the prisoner would have on other inmates, guards and prison administration; and 4) although not required under the analysis, the absence of ready alternatives is also evidence of a regulation's reasonableness. Siddiqi, 880 F.2d at 909.

Applying the aforementioned factors to Stateville's unit management system, and its prohibition of weekly inter-unit Jumah services, the court concludes Ra Chaka's first amendment claim must fail. The lockdown and the subsequent introduction of the unit management system, relative to the weekly inter-unit Jumah services, were regulations or policies which were reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective namely, prison security.

Stateville is a maximum security prison. Stateville authorities put the prison on lockdown status in February 1979 due to a volatile inmate population. Shortly thereafter all inmates were classified and separated into the various "units" each of which was to remain separate and independent from the others. This unit management system was initiated concurrently with and in response to the lockdown. DeRobertis Aff., p. 1. The new system was implemented to break up Stateville into smaller, more manageable units. Id. As a result, more recreational activities and other services were made available for all residents. Id.

Prior to the lockdown Muslim residents at Stateville were allowed to congregate on each Friday for Jumah Prayer services and on each Saturday for prayer and discussion. Additionally, they were allowed to celebrate Ramadan Fast, another Muslim religious observance. Plaintiff's Response Motion, Doc. 13, p. 3 ("Doc. 13"). Several months following the February 1979 lockdown, however, DeRobertis denied the Muslim inmates' request to reinstate Jumah services as inter-unit assemblies. DeRobertis Aff., p. 2. DeRobertis expressly denied the request because it did not comport with the concept of the newly implemented unit management system. Id. Defendants advised Ra Chaka that the unit management system needed time to prove its usefulness. Plaintiff's Response Memorandum of Law, Doc. 12, p. 4 ("Doc. 12").

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