Hughes v. DiSalvo
| Decision Date | 25 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97–144.,97–144. |
| Citation | 729 A.2d 422,143 N.H. 576 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Susan HUGHES v. Giacomo DiSALVO. |
Ruth P. Gulick, P.A., of New Hampton (Ruth P. Gulick, on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Scott A. Trendell, of Plymouth, by brief and orally, for the defendant.
The plaintiff, Susan Hughes, appeals a decision of the Superior Court (Fauver , J.) denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, see Super. Ct. R. 73, after the jury found that she violated the Consumer Protection Act, see RSA ch. 358–A (1995 & Supp.1998), and awarded damages to the defendant, Giacomo DiSalvo. We reverse.
The following facts appear in the parties' agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff acquired and began occupying property in New Hampton as her primary residence in February 1987. She unsuccessfully attempted to sell the property in the late 1980s. The plaintiff relocated in July 1991 and began renting the property in September 1991. Between September 1991 and June 1994, three different sets of tenants rented the property.
The plaintiff placed classified advertisements in newspapers to rent the property. From August 1994 to June 1995, the plaintiff rented the property to the defendant under a "Lease and Sales Agreement." During the defendant's tenancy, the plaintiff was employed as a school teacher in Moultonborough. The lease and sales agreement was not handled by a real estate broker but was drafted by either the plaintiff or her husband.
The property was rented to different tenants under a similar lease and sales agreement from August 1995 to January 1996. Between February 1996 and January 28, 1998, when the parties agreed to these facts, two additional sets of tenants rented the property.
The parties also agreed that the plaintiff's husband and three other persons bought a four-unit investment property and established a real estate trust "[d]uring 1983–1984." In 1984, the trust property was disposed of and the trust was terminated.
The plaintiff filed an action in district court for non-payment of rent. The defendant requested a jury trial and filed counterclaims alleging, inter alia , violation of the Consumer Protection Act, see RSA ch. 358–A, and the Unfair Collection Practices Act, see RSA ch. 358–C (1995 & Supp.1998). A jury trial was held in superior court. The jury found, inter alia , that the plaintiff had engaged in unlawful trade or deceptive business practices, and awarded the defendant $100.00 in damages under the Consumer Protection Act. The jury further found that the plaintiff used unfair, deceptive, or unreasonable collection practices and awarded the defendant $600.00 under the Unfair Collection Practices Act.
The plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that RSA chapters 358–A and 358–C were inapplicable. The court agreed that RSA chapter 358–C did not apply because "one who acts in the ordinary course of business does so as part of regular business dealings, and not as an isolated act, such as in this case." The court held, however, that the Consumer Protection Act "clearly extends to lessors of real property ... and thus to the landlord-tenant relationship ... [because] tenants are among those for whose benefit the Consumer Protection Act was passed." The plaintiff appeals this decision.
The applicability of the Consumer Protection Act involves a matter of statutory construction, and we begin our analysis by considering the plain meaning of the words of the statute. Gilmore v. Bradgate Assoc. , 135 N.H. 234, 237, 604 A.2d 555, 556 (1992).
In Chase v. Dorais , 122 N.H. 600, 601, 448 A.2d 390, 391 (1982), we noted that the statute applies to "persons engaged in trade or commerce." Although the Consumer Protection Act "is a comprehensive statute whose language indicates that it should be given broad sweep .... it is not unlimited in scope." Roberts v. General Motors Corp. , 138 N.H. 532, 538, 643 A.2d 956, 960 (1994). We previously rejected the contention that all transactions should be included within the scope of the Act in Chase , noting that "[s]uch a reading would remove even isolated, non-business sales or contracts from the realm of contract and sales law and subject them to [the Consumer Protection Act]." Chase , 122 N.H. at 601–02, 448 A.2d at 391.
To determine whether the Consumer Protection Act applies to a particular transaction, we analyze the activity involved, the nature of the transaction, and the parties to determine whether a transaction is a personal or business transaction. See Begelfer v. Najarian , 381 Mass. 177, 409 N.E.2d 167, 176 (1980).
The plaintiff rented and attempted to sell her former residence through a lease and sales arrangement. The plaintiff agreed to...
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Table of Cases
...2014), 969 Hughes v. Abell, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), 799 Hughes v. Abell, 867 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2012), 802 Hughes v. DiSalvo, 729 A.2d 422 (N.H. 1999), 1010 Hukic v. Aurora Loan Services, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64629 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2007), 209 Hundred East Credit Corp.......
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State Consumer Protection Laws
...not apply to fund-raising relationship between college trustees and alumni because relationship is private in nature); Hughes v. DiSalvo, 729 A.2d 422, 424 (N.H. 1999) (holding that the NHCPA did not apply to isolated real estate transactions between two individuals); Chase v. Dorais, 448 A......