Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F.
Citation | 729 F. Supp. 187 |
Decision Date | 25 January 1990 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 85-0421-F. |
Parties | Cruz PEDRAZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts |
Frank R. Saia and Edward V. Leja, Springfield, Mass., for plaintiffs.
Burt Ballanfant, Shell Oil Co., Houston, Tex., Robert Leonard and Barry Ryan, Springfield, Mass., for defendant.
Before the Court is defendant Shell Oil Company's ("Shell") motion that this Court certify an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on Shell's argument that plaintiff Cruz Pedraza's ("Pedraza") claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Pedraza has filed an opposition to Shell's motion.
Also before the Court is Shell's motion to dismiss this lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that any state law claims of the plaintiff are preempted by explicit federal health standards. Pedraza opposes the motion to dismiss, and has asked this Court to either strike Shell's motion or defer judgment until trial. As Shell's motion to dismiss based on preemption is dispositive, the Court will turn its attention in that direction first.
The first mention of the defendant's preemption argument was made in Shell's objections to United States Magistrate Ponsor's recommendation that Shell's earlier motion for summary judgment be denied. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., C.A. No. 85-0421-F (D.Mass. March 15, 1989). Before the Magistrate, Shell argued that summary judgment was appropriate because the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff, and also that Shell was entitled to use the "sophisticated user" defense under Connecticut law. In objections subsequently filed in this Court, Shell claimed that it had also argued that Pedraza's state law claims were preempted by specific Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") standards regarding exposure to epichlorohydrin ("ECH").
After carefully reviewing Shell's briefs before the Magistrate, this Court concluded that preemption had not been argued below, and held that Shell had waived the preemption argument by failing to raise it earlier. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 724 F.Supp. 1, 3-4 (D.Mass.1989).
In a separate motion filed December 15, 1989, Shell agrees that it did not raise the preemption argument before the Magistrate, and that this Court, sitting in an appellate capacity, was justified in not addressing it at the time. However, Shell disputes this Court's ruling that the preemption argument is waived, arguing instead that preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived. As the plaintiff himself concedes, Shell's view is accurate. See International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 398-399, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 1916, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986) ( ). The Court now turns to the substance of Shell's preemption argument.
The gist of Shell's argument is that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq., expressly divests this Court of jurisdiction over state law "failure to warn" claims by establishing federal standards which serve to preempt state authority. Upon review of the material submitted by Shell, the Court finds that this position is well supported.
Id. at 248, 104 S.Ct. at 621 (citations omitted).
In this case, it is clear that Congress did intend to occupy a significant portion of the occupational health and safety field. This intent can be derived from the words of the Act itself; 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Assertion of State standards in absence of applicable Federal standards. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 6 29 U.S.C. § 655.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 1901.2 ( ). As one court has noted, section 667(a) "has consistently been interpreted by OSHA and the courts to bar the exercise of state jurisdiction over issues addressed by the OSHA standard...." N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. State of N.J., 653 F.Supp. 1453, 1464 (D.N.J.1987).
However, as is also evident from the language of 29 U.S.C. § 667(a), Congress did not intend to wholly supplant state regulation, since allowance is made for any state law or regulation pertaining to areas for which no federal standard has been promulgated. See, e.g., Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1984) (...
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Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co.
...predicated constitute state regulation in the field of occupational safety and health which must yield to OSHA. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 729 F.Supp. 187, 188-89 (D.Mass.1990). The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution operates to preempt state laws which unduly interfere with ......
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