Stanislas v. Cigna, 95-1333

• Decision Date: 11 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1333,95-1333
• Parties: NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases. Patricia A. STANISLAS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CIGNA and Insurance Company of North America, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 355

73 F.3d 355 NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases.

Patricia A. STANISLAS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CIGNA and Insurance Company of North America, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 95-1333.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Jan. 11, 1996.

Timothy J. Ryan with whom Bradford R. Martin, Jr. and Ryan, Martin, Costello, Leiter, Steiger & Cass, P.C. were on brief for appellant.

Michael A. Davis for appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity case, plaintiff-appellant Patricia A. Stanislas appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellees CIGNA and its wholly owned subsidiary Insurance Company of North America ("ICNA") on a sexual harassment claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B. The district court found that Stanislas failed to comply with the statute of limitations contained in Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, Sec. 5. Our review of the grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we read the record in the light most favorable to the party contesting the summary judgment. See, e.g., Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 991 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.1993).

Stanislas alleged that her immediate supervisor, John A. Cvejanovich, engaged in repeated acts of sexual harassment towards her beginning in November 1990. Stanislas, the office administrator of ICNA's Springfield, Massachusetts, field litigation office, and Cvejanovich, the managing attorney, last worked together on April 26, 1991, the Friday before Cvejanovich departed on a one-week vacation. On that day, according to Stanislas' affidavit, Cvejanovich demanded that Stanislas sleep with him or find someone else who would.

On April 30, 1991, Stanislas reported Cvejanovich's conduct to another attorney in the office, who in turn notified ICNA's area supervisor, John Gilfoyle. On May 2nd and 3rd, two ICNA attorneys, Gilfoyle and Rob Gilbride, investigated Stanislas' claims. Gilfoyle instructed all of the office employees to stay home on May 6th, Cvejanovich's first day back at work; when Cvejanovich reported to work, Gilfoyle confronted him with Stanislas' allegations and offered him the choice of resigning or being terminated. Cvejanovich resigned.

When the office employees, including Stanislas, reported to work, Gilfoyle and Gilbride told them that Cvejanovich was no longer employed by ICNA. The employees were also advised to keep the matter confidential, and they were warned that the legal consequences of discussing the incident would be on the employees' heads.

Stanislas filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") on October 30, 1991, and on June 22, 1992, brought the instant suit in federal district court. This appeal concerns Stanislas' claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, Sec. 4(16A), which makes it unlawful for any employer "to sexually harass" an employee. On that claim, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants because Stanislas filed her MCAD complaint more than 6 months after the last incident of harassment.

Before initiating a court action alleging a violation of section 151B, a plaintiff must file a complaint with MCAD within six months after the alleged act of discrimination. See Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Insurance Agency, Inc., 525 N.E.2d 643, 645 (Mass.1988); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, Secs. 5, 9. "In the absence of a timely complaint to the MCAD, there may be no resort to the courts." Sereni v. Star Sportswear Manufacturing Corp., 509 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (Mass.1987). The last alleged incident of harassment occurred on April 26, 1991, but Stanislas' complaint with MCAD was not filed until October 30, 1991, four days after the six-month cut-off date.

Stanislas challenges this conclusion on three grounds. First, she argues that the district court misconstrued the nature of her claim. M.G.L. ch. 151B, Sec. 1(18) defines sexual harassment as:

Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when (a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment or as a basis for employment decisions; (b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment....

Stanislas argues that while the last incident of "quid pro quo" harassment (as defined in clause (a)) occurred on April 26, the "hostile environment" harassment (as defined in clause (b)) continued until Stanislas knew that the threat of further harassment was removed, that is, until May 6, 1991.

This argument is unavailing. Sexual harassment is defined as "[s]exual...