Nieves v. McSweeney

Citation73 F.Supp.2d 98
Decision Date02 November 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 97-12268-EFH.,Civ.A. 97-12268-EFH.
PartiesAngel NIEVES and Rebecca Nieves, Plaintiffs, v. Terrence J. McSWEENEY, Dana Beauvais, Bradley Madge, Arthur Boisseau, Edward Denmark and Town of Ayer, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

James B. Krasnoo, Richard E. Briansky, James B. Krasnoo Law office, Andover, MA, for Angel Nieves, plaintiff.

James B. Krasnoo, Andover, MA, for Rebecca Nieves.

Brian J. Rogal, Law Offices of Timothy M. Burke, Needham, MA, for Terrence J. McSweeney, defendant.

Stephen C. Pfaff, Douglas I. Louison, Merrick and Louison, Boston, MA, for Dana Beauvais, defendant.

Jocelyn M. Sedney, Leonard H. Kesten, Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, Boston, MA, for Bradley Madge, Arthur Boisseau, Edward Denmark, the Town of Ayer, defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HARRINGTON, District Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These motions present two issues for the Court to decide: first, whether any of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and, second, whether conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and, if so, whether the plaintiffs have established such claims. For the reasons stated below summary judgment is granted to all defendants as to Counts I through VIII.

The plaintiffs in this case, Angel and Rebecca Nieves1 ("Plaintiffs" collectively; "Angel" and "Rebecca" individually), seek recovery for damages inflicted when, as alleged in their complaint, the defendants conspired to deprive them of their constitutional rights by arresting them with excessive force and without probable cause, by filing baseless and fraudulent criminal charges, and by maliciously prosecuting such charges. Plaintiffs allege in Counts I and II (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and VI and VII (under 42 U.S.C. § 1985) that the defendant officers of the Town of Ayer Police DepartmentTerrence J. McSweeney ("McSweeney"), Dana Beauvais ("Beauvais"), and Bradley Madge ("Madge") — conspired under the color of state law to deprive plaintiffs' of their constitutional rights by using excessive force in the course of falsely arresting plaintiffs and then by lying under oath in the course of maliciously prosecuting the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further allege that the Town of Ayer ("Ayer") (in Count V under § 1983 and in Count VIII under § 1985) and Arthur Boisseau ("Boisseau"), as Chief of Police for Ayer (in Counts III and IV under § 1983 and in Counts VII and VIII under § 1985), conspired with the other named defendants to deprive the plaintiffs, and others, of their constitutional rights by acquiescing in, and thereby allowing, a pattern of conduct which, among other things, included the excessive use of force at the time of plaintiffs' arrest and the malicious prosecution of fraudulent charges against the plaintiffs

This Court has jurisdiction over Counts I through VIII pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims in Counts IX and XI pursuant to the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only upon a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment the facts must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Borschow Hospital & Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Cesar Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.1996). Accordingly, the facts are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

STATEMENT OF OPERABLE FACTS

On May 12, 1994, plaintiffs were arrested by the defendant police officers McSweeney and Beauvais who were responding to a call regarding a domestic disturbance at plaintiffs' residence. During the course of the arrest a fight broke out between the officers and the plaintiffs resulting in physical injuries to both Angel and Rebecca.2

Plaintiffs allege that the fight and arrest were the result of a conspiracy on the part of McSweeney and Beauvais to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. In furtherance of this conspiracy, McSweeney and Beauvais, with the assistance of officer Madge who had arrived at the site of the arrest after the fight, allegedly then filed false police reports causing baseless criminal complaints to be filed against plaintiffs.

On May 13, 1994, officer Denmark,3 acting as police prosecutor in the Ayer District Court, swore out criminal complaints based upon the information provided by McSweeney and Beauvais. Angel was charged with five counts: (1) assault with intent to murder; (2) assault and battery by dangerous weapon ("shod foot"); (3) and (4) two counts of assault and battery on police officer; and (5) disorderly person. Rebecca was charged with three counts: (1) and (2) two counts of assault and battery on police officer; and (3) disorderly person. Plaintiffs were arraigned on these charges and released on their own recognizance.

On October 25, 1994, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi with respect to the charge of assault with the intent to murder against Angel. Plaintiffs then stood trial on the remaining counts. Plaintiffs allege that during the course of this trial McSweeney and Beauvais perjured themselves in furtherance of the conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. On October 27, 1994, after a jury trial, Rebecca was found not guilty on all charges against her, while Angel was found not guilty on all charges except on the charge of disorderly person.

On October 9, 1997, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint alleging a conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights based upon the above incidents.

DISCUSSION
Statute of Limitations

Any causes of action which the plaintiffs might have had based on the events of May 12, 1994 are barred by the applicable statute of limitations because they did not commence this current action within three years from that date.4 Although federal law does not provide a limitation period for Section 1983 claims, courts apply the forum state's statute of limitations provision for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-49, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1995). Massachusetts law prescribes a three-year limitations period for causes of action such as plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims. See Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38, 39-40 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1063, 112 S.Ct. 948, 117 L.Ed.2d 117 (1992). While federal courts borrow the forum state's statute of limitations, federal law provides the applicable rule for when the limitation period begins to run, or accrue, on Section 1983 causes of action. See Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 3. Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury on which the claim is based. See id. In determining when the plaintiff knew, or should have known, courts look to the common law cause of action most closely analogous to the constitutional right at stake. See id.

"In the context of a conspiracy to violate civil rights, the statute of limitations runs separately from each action constituting a civil rights violation that causes actual damage to the plaintiff." Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 576 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir.1978); see also Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 234-35 (1st Cir.1977) ("Injury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not from `the mere continuance of the conspiracy.'"), quoting Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 303 (9th Cir.1959). The mere continuance of the conspiracy and the subsequent deprivation of other rights does not affect the accrual of the limitation period with respect to a completed object of a conspiracy unless the plaintiff were unaware of the deprivation. See Hernandez Jimenez, 576 F.2d at 404 n. 1 ("If a plaintiff were unable to discover the earlier violations because of fraudulent concealment the statute of limitations could be tolled"). Once achieved and the injury realized, each object of the alleged conspiracy represented a separate deprivation of the plaintiffs' civil rights and, therefore, each object has a separate limitation period.

In the instant case, plaintiffs have alleged one conspiracy to commit two separate objects. The first object of the alleged conspiracy is the excessive use of force and arrest without probable cause which occurred on May 12, 1994 — implicating plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure of their persons, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. The second object of the alleged conspiracy is the malicious prosecution — implicating plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from criminal prosecution without due process of the law and possibly their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of these objects gives rise to separate causes of action.

The limitation period for the conspiracy's first object, namely, the use of excessive force and arrest without probable cause, accrued on the date of the plaintiffs' arrest. Since the plaintiffs were arrested without a warrant, the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims based on the events of May 12, 1994 are most closely analogous to the common law tort of conspiracy to commit false arrest.5 See Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1999). Just as a claim for false arrest accrues on the date of the arrest, see id.; see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,...

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