Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough

• Decision Date: 08 March 1905
• Docket Number: No. 20,128.,20,128.
• Parties: OLD WAYNE MUT. LIFE ASS'N OF INDIANAPOLIS v. McDONOUGH et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

164 Ind. 321

73 N.E. 703

OLD WAYNE MUT. LIFE ASS'N OF INDIANAPOLIS

v.McDONOUGH et al.

No. 20,128.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 8, 1905.

Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Vinson Carter, Judge.

Action on a policy of insurance by Sarah McDonough and another against the Old Wayne Mutual Life Association of Indianapolis. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Wm. A. Ketcham and Charles B. Averill, for appellant. Guilford A. Deitch, for appellees.

MONKS, J.

Appellees brought this action upon a judgment recovered by them against appellant, a corporation organized under the laws of this state, in the common pleas court of Susquehanna county, Pa. A trial of said cause resulted in a finding, and, over a motion for a new trial, a judgment, in favor of appellees. The only error assigned and not waived is that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. The causes assigned for a new trial which are urged as grounds for reversal are (1) that the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) that the decision is contrary to law; (3) that the court erred in admitting in evidence the transcript of the judgment sued upon.

The certificate to the transcript of the judgment sued upon is signed, “H. F. Manzer, Prothonotary,” and the certificate of the judge is signed. “D. W. Searle, President Judge.” Appellant insists that said transcript was not properly authenticated, under section 458, Burns' Ann. St. 1901 (section 454, Rev. St 1881; section 454, Horner's Ann. St. 1901), and Rev. St. U. S. 1878, p. 171, because the full Christian names of said prothonotary and president judge were not signed to said certificates, and that for this reason the court erred in admitting said transcript in evidence. Appellees contend that, if this insistence of appellant is correct, this appeal must be dismissed, for the reason that the signature to the præcipe filed with the clerk under section 661, Burns' Ann. St. 1901 (section 649, Rev. St. 1881; section 649, Horner's Ann. St. 1901), and the signature to the certificate authenticating the transcript in this case, are open to the same objection. We concur in this contention of appellees. We think, however, that said signatures were sufficient. Wassels v. State, 26 Ind. 30;Vanderkarr v. State, 51 Ind. 91, 92;Collins v. Marvil, 145 Ind. 531, 532, 44 N. E. 487. In Vanderkarr v. State, supra, the statute required that the prosecuting attorney sign indictments, and this court held that it was sufficient if he signed by his surname in full, and his Christian name by its initial. The court said, at page 93: “We think, as a signing by the surname in full, and the Christian name by its initial, is generally sufficient in official signatures, that it ought to be held good in the signature of a prosecuting attorney.”

Appellant next insists that, “even if the transcript were properly admitted in evidence, it fails to show any judgment, and therefore the decision was not sustained by sufficient evidence, and was contrary to law.” The following appears in the transcript of the proceedings of the common pleas court of Susquehanna county, Pa., as the final judgment rendered by that court in favor of appellees against appellant: “Now, April 16, 1901, on motion of Miller S. Allen, the court directs judgment for want of an appearance. By the Court: Whereupon judgment is entered against defendant in favor of plaintiff for the sum of twelve hundred and fifty dollars, with interest from November 14, 1898.” It is shown by said transcript that Miller S. Allen was the attorney of plaintiffs in said cause. It is said in Freeman on Judgments (4th Ed.) § 50, “that whatever appears upon its face to be intended as the entry of a judgment it will be regarded as sufficiently formal if it shows (1) the relief granted; and (2) that the grant was made by the court in whose records the entry is written.” It clearly appears from said entry that the same was intended to be the entry of a judgment, and it shows the relief granted, and that the same was made by the common pleas court of Susquehanna county, Pa., in whose records the entry was written. Such a judgment is sufficient in form. Freeman on Judgments (4th Ed.) §§ 50, 50b, 51; Hartley v. White, 94 Pa. 31, 34, 36.

In the complaint filed in this action in the court below, the following statute of Pennsylvania, in force since 1883, was set out, and was also read in evidence: “No insurance company, not of this state, nor its agents, shall do business in this state until he has filed with the Insurance Commissioner of this state a written stipulation, duly authenticated by the company, agreeing that any legal process affecting the company served on the Insurance Commissioner, or the party designated by him, or the agent specified by the company to receive service of process for said company, shall have the same effect as if served personally on the company within this state, and if such company should cease to maintain such agent in this state so designated, such process may thereafter be served on the Insurance Commissioner; but so long as any liability of the stipulating company to any resident of this state continues, such stipulation cannot be revoked or modified, except that a new one may be substituted, so as to require or dispense with the service at the office of the said company within this state, and that such service of process according to this stipulation shall be sufficient personal service on the company. The term process shall be construed to mean and include any and every writ, rule, order, notice or decree, including any process of execution that may issue in or upon any action, suit, or legal proceeding to which said company may be a party by themselves, or jointly with others, whether the same shall arise upon a policy of insurance or otherwise, by or in any court of this commonwealth having jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, and all writs, rules, orders, notices, or decrees aforesaid, shall be directed to the sheriff, constable or other officer authorized by law to serve similar writs, of the county wherein the same shall be issued, who is hereby authorized to serve the same on any and every person or persons, body politic or corporate, named in said process with said company, either as plaintiff, defendant or otherwise, or who may be impleaded in said action, suit or proceeding with said company found in said county, and either before or after the service on the person or persons, body politic or corporate found in said county aforesaid as may be directed by the plaintiff or person issuing said process or his attorney; and in the absence of such direction, as shall be most convenient, the officer to whom said process may be directed shall, by writing endorsed on, or attached to said process, deputize the sheriff, constable, or other officer of the county where the state agent designated by any company as provided by law to receive service of process for said company may reside to serve the same on him, and in default of an agent appointed by the company as aforesaid then the officer so charged with the service of said process shall, in like manner, deputize the sheriff, constable or other officer aforesaid of the county where the agent, if any there be, named by the Insurance Commissioner, may reside, to serve the same on him, and in default of such agent named by such Insurance Commissioner as aforesaid, then in like manner to deputize the sheriff, constable or other officer as aforesaid of the county where the office of the Insurance Commissioner may be located to serve the same upon him; and each and every service so made shall have the same force and effect, to all intents and purposes, as personal service on said company in the county where said process is issued.” The transcript of the judgment sued upon shows that process in said cause against appellant was served upon the Insurance Commissioner of the state of Pennsylvania. It is insisted by appellant that this statute of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional and void, under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because it denied appellant due process of law. A corporation can have no legal existence beyond the boundaries of the sovereignty which created it, and it can therefore exercise none of the functions and privileges given it by the law under which it was organized within the limits of other states, except by the comity of such states. Railroad v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 81, 20 L. Ed. 354;Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 558, 10 L. Ed. 274;Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 181, 182, 19 L. Ed. 357;Sparks v. Accident Association, 100 Iowa, 458, 464-469, 69 N. W. 678; 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 837. It follows that a state has the power to exclude foreign corporations entirely, or it may allow them to transact business within its limits, imposing such conditions as it may deem proper, provided they are not repugnant to the Constitution. La Fayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (U. S.) 404, 407, 15 L. Ed. 451;Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 652, et seq., 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297;Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41, at page 45, 12 Sup. Ct. 541, at page 542 (36 L. Ed. 338);Orient Ins. Co. v. Baggs, 172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. 281, 43 L. Ed. 552; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369, 24 L. Ed. 853;Railroad v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 65, 20 L. Ed. 354;Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, 20 Sup. Ct. 518, 44 L. Ed. 657;New York Life Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 Sup. Ct. 962, 44 L. Ed. 1116;Sparks v. Accident Association, 100 Iowa, 458, 464-466, 69 N. W. 678;Ehrman v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 471, 1 McCrary (U. S.) 123, 126-129; Maine, etc., Co. v. Cox, 146 Ind. 107, 109, 42 N. E. 915, 44 N. E. 932;Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Burdett, 112 Ind. 204, 13 N. E. 705; 5 Rose's Notes on U. S. Reports, pp. 603-609; Kerr on Insurance, § 23, p. 23; 6 Thompson on ...