State v. Hyde

• Citation: 73 S.E. 180,90 S.C. 296
• Parties: STATE v. HYDE.
• Decision Date: 06 January 1912
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

73 S.E. 180

90 S.C. 296

STATE v. HYDE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 6, 1912

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Anderson County; G. E Prince, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Samuel N. Hyde was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed and remanded.

The court charged in part as follows:

"Excusable homicide, Mr. Foreman, is where a man is insane, whether it be monomania, or whether general insanity to such an extent that at the time the act is done he doesn't realize either that it is morally wrong or that it is criminally wrong.

"Every man is presumed, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, to be sane. And when it has once been shown to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has taken the life of his fellow man unlawfully, and he seeks to be excused on the ground that he was insane, whether generally or merely on one subject then the burden of proof as to insanity is cast by the law on him, and he must establish that by the greater weight of the evidence."

Leon L. Rice, for appellant. Solicitor Bonham, for the State.

GARY A. J.

The defendant was convicted of murder, and sentenced to be hanged, and this is an appeal from that sentence.

The facts are thus stated in the record: "This case came on to be heard before his honor, Judge Prince, and a jury in the 1911 fall term of sessions court for Anderson county, and resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder. The defendant was sentenced to hang on October 20th, and execution was stayed by defendant's appeal. The defendant was duly arraigned and pleaded guilty. The court refused to accept the plea, and appointed Leon L. Rice, a lawyer of the bar, to defend the prisoner. The details of the homicide are not disputed, and for the purposes of this appeal a brief statement only will be made as to the homicide. In the dead hours of the night, the defendant stole into the room of his sleeping wife, wherein slept his little sister-in-law, his father-in-law, and his mother-in-law. Turning up the lighted lamp in the room, he began firing a pistol into the body of his wife, three bullets taking effect, and two striking but not mortally wounding his sister-in-law. His father-in-law, in an effort to restrain defendant, was shot in the scuffle and killed. Defendant's pistol was found in the hall empty, and shells, some loaded and some empty, were found scattered around the floor. The state's witnesses testified that defendant said: 'Turn me loose! I am going to kill myself.' And others testified that after he had left the room he asked some one to get a gun and shoot him. The defendant, after committing the awful deed, surrendered himself to the sheriff, and stated that he was satisfied with his little deed; that he had not slept for two weeks; but that he slept well the night of the homicide. He stated that he was sorry he killed the old man, but that his wife was the only woman he ever loved, and her people would not let her live with him, so he decided to end it all. The defendant, by counsel, set up the plea of monomania, or partial insanity."

The first exception is as follows: "Because his honor erred in refusing to present the juror W. W. White, after examination on his voir dire. The error being that the jurors' view as to capital punishment could not affect his right to sit as a juror, when the punishment is in the province of the court."

The case of State v. James, 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657, shows that this exception cannot be sustained.

Furthermore, it was held, in the case of State v. Anderson, 26 S.C. 599, 2 S.E. 699, that where the prisoner completes his jury, without exhausting his right of challenge, this cures any error on the part of the presiding judge, in excluding or presenting a previous juror.

The second exception is as follows: "Because his honor erred in refusing to allow the physicians, who testified that they were graduates of a medical school, and had been for a long time engaged in the practice of medicine, to answer the question of defendant's counsel as to the mentality of defendant. The error being that to require hypothetical questions was to deprive the defendant, of the opinion of an expert witness, on the very point of his defense, that of partial insanity, or monomania." The questions excluded were intended to elicit the opinion of the doctors as to the defendant's mental condition, not at the time they examined him, but at the time of the homicide, and they knew nothing of his mental condition at that time.

The ruling of his honor, the presiding...