Cogan v. Cass Avenue & Fair Grounds Railway Company
Decision Date | 23 December 1902 |
Citation | 73 S.W. 738,101 Mo.App. 179 |
Parties | RICHARD COGAN, Respondent, v. CASS AVENUE AND FAIR GROUNDS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.--Hon. S. P. Spencer Judge.
REVERSED.
Judgment reversed.
Boyle Priest & Lehmann, Geo. W. Easley, Lon. O. Hocker and Walter H. Saunders for appellant.
On the disputed points, the testimony is overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant. One witness for plaintiff himself says that no bell was rung. Six witnesses of the defendant say that the bell was repeatedly rung while the car was approaching Fourteenth street. This point was immaterial, however because plaintiff states that he twice saw the car before he reached the track. In any view of the case, the positive testimony of six witnesses is worth more than the negative testimony of one, the most interested witness in the case. Sanders v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 411; Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621.
A. R. Taylor for respondent.
(1) How can a court without any more knowledge of the operation of street cars than a layman, without any more knowledge than a layman as to how to cross a railroad track, undertake to substitute its judgment for that of a jury upon these questions? The law by entrusting this duty to a jury has clearly denied it to the court. Is it upon the theory that a court is more intelligent or more fair than a jury? Convince the source of power of this fact and they will probably amend their constitution and change the law, but until so convinced, the rule prescribed by the sovereign will ought to be observed. (2) Let the court determine the law and advise the jury what it is, and let the jury determine the facts, and apply the law. This is the genius of our judicial system. This is the flower of the law in full blossom. No court has the right to disregard it on the ground that a jury mistakes the facts. There is one corrective restraint, alone, provided by the law--the power of a trial court to award one new trial on the ground that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence. And a conclusive answer to this contention is that the power that made the law and makes officials to administer it, has thought fit, through the history of this country and its mother, in the law, to prefer to entrust this function to a tribunal other than the judge. (3) The practice of courts usurping the functions of the jury has produced a great part of the confusion of decisions which all must admit to exist. This it is that terrorizes trial courts and makes their duty of properly determining what the law is so uncertain and arduous.
--Plaintiff had a verdict and judgment in the circuit court in this action for injuries sustained by him in a collision in June, 1899, with a street railway car operated by the defendant company. He began his action before Justice Cullinane, and on appeal the case was tried anew with the result of a finding and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $ 550. Defendant then prosecuted this appeal after taking the necessary steps for that purpose.
Plaintiff's case, as stated by him as a witness, discloses that he was a man of about fifty-six years at the time of the mishap in suit. He was engaged in hauling for one of the electric power companies, and was on his way from home to work, driving a two-horse team in a wagon, almost empty, at about 6:20 a. m., June 21, 1899. The collision took place at Fourteenth and Carr streets in St. Louis. Plaintiff was driving south on Fourteenth street and the car which hit his wagon was moving east on Carr street. The day was bright and clear.
Plaintiff's own story of the affair, or the material feature of it, had better be given in his own language as it appears in certain passages of his testimony as follows:
The foregoing quotation is from plaintiff's direct examination. On cross-examination he made the following further statements:
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