Pippin v. State

• Decision Date: 30 November 1916
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 905
• Citation: 197 Ala. 613,73 So. 340
• Parties: PIPPIN v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

73 So. 340

197 Ala. 613

PIPPIN v. STATE.

1 Div. 905

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 30, 1916

Appeal from City Court of Mobile; O.J. Semmes, Judge.

James Pippin was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant was charged with killing Charlie Williams. After being examined as a witness for the state, Charlie Tipton was asked, on cross-examination, if he was not then serving sentence on the county road for selling cocaine. The state objected, and the court sustained the objection. While Jim Peterson was being examined, he was asked by defendant "Did you hear Charlie Williams make any threat of a general nature which might apply to Jim Pippin?" And also: "Did you, at any time that morning, warn this defendant against Charlie Williams?" Objection was sustained to both these questions. The witness had formerly stated that he did not hear Charlie Williams make any threat against this defendant. The defense was that Charlie Williams was a bloodthirsty, dangerous man, and was following defendant with a hammer when the fatal shot was fired. The following charges were refused to defendant:

(1) The court charges the jury that it is a well-settled rule of law that if there be two reasonable constructions which can be given to facts proven, one favorable and the other unfavorable to a party charged with crime, it is the duty of the jury to give that which is favorable rather than that which is unfavorable to the accused party.

(19) If there is one single fact proved to the satisfaction of the jury, which is inconsistent with defendant's guilt, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, and the jury should acquit.

(21) In this case it is only necessary for defendant, in order to make out a case of self-defense, to reasonably satisfy you by the evidence in this case that deceased made an attack upon him under such circumstances as to place him in imminent danger, real or apparent, of losing his life or suffering grievous bodily harm, and the burden then shifts to the state to prove by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.

(23) If defendant was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, he was under no duty to retreat unless you believe he could have retreated without increasing his danger or with reasonable safety.

(30) The jury may consider evidence of defendant's good character as a circumstance tending to show his innocence.

(31) The jury may consider evidence of defendant's good character for quiet and peacefulness as tending to disprove his commission of the offense charged.

(33) If you believe from the evidence that deceased was a man of violent character, and that such character was known to defendant, these facts are evidence that defendant reasonably apprehended an attack from deceased.

(34) The defendant had the right to guard himself against a violent, murderous attack from the deceased which he reasonably apprehended.

The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second degree, and imposed a sentence of 25 years in the penitentiary.

William McLeod and David B. Goode, both of Mobile, for appellant.

W.L Martin, Atty. Gen., and H.G. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

ANDERSON C.J.

Selling cocaine is a misdemeanor under our statute, and a conviction for same is not crimen falsi, and does not affect the credibility of one convicted therefor under the terms of section 4008 of the Code of 1907. Gordon v. State, 140 Ala. 29, 36 So. 1009; Smith v. State, 129 Ala. 89, 29 So. 699, 87 Am.St.Rep. 47; Fuller v. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 So. 774; Williams v. State, 144 Ala. 14, 40 So. 405. The trial court did not err in sustaining the state's objection to the defendant's question to the witness as to whether or not he was serving a sentence on the county road for selling cocaine. It is true that the statute has undergone a slight change as it appears in section 4008 in the Code of 1907, by the substitution of crimes involving moral turpitude for infamous crimes, yet we do not think that the offense of selling cocaine involves moral turpitude. This is a statutory crime, not punishable at common law. It is of the description mala prohibita, as there is no inherent immorality in such acts, and its illegality lies only in the fact of being prohibited. Black on Intoxicating Liquors par. 383.

As said in the case of Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark....