Housing Auth. v. PA CIVIL SERVICE COM'N

• Decision Date: 30 April 1999
• Citation: 730 A.2d 935,556 Pa. 621
• Parties: HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the COUNTY OF CHESTER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

730 A.2d 935

556 Pa. 621

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the COUNTY OF CHESTER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 29, 1998.

Decided April 30, 1999.

John Spangler, West Chester, for Housing Authority of Chester Co.

Frederick C. Smith, Jr., Edward J. Bohan, Harrisburg, for State Civil Service Com'n.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CASTILLE, Justice.

This Court granted review of this matter in order to decide whether the Commonwealth Court erred by holding that the State Civil Service Commission ("Commission") has standing to enforce the veterans' preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act, 51 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101 et seq., at its own initiative; and whether the Commission erred by determining that the Housing Authority of the County of Chester ("Housing Authority") violated the Military Affairs Act when it refused to offer the job of Executive Director 3, a civil service merit system position, to the lone veteran candidate among the group of the three highest ranked certified eligible candidates. For the reasons that follow, we find that the Commission has the authority to enforce the Military Affairs Act at its own initiative, that the Commission correctly determined that the Housing Authority violated the Military Affairs Act by selecting a non-veteran candidate to fill its Executive Director position under these circumstances, and that the relevant provisions of the Military Affairs Act comport with the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Commonwealth Court.

In February of 1993, Fredrick Brown, then-Executive Director of the Housing Authority, resigned.¹ In May of 1993, the Housing Authority requested the Commission to open an examination for the vacant Executive Director 3 position. Troy L. Chapman and John J. Fitzgerald both possessed the minimum experience and training requirements and were tested for the position of Executive Director 3.² Chapman, who is not a veteran, passed the test with a score of 82.00. Fitzgerald, who is a veteran, passed the test with a score of 91.00, including ten (10) additional points added to his raw score as required by the Veterans' Preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act. See 51 Pa.C.S. § 7103(a).³ Chapman and Fitzgerald, along with five other candidates who had previously taken the exam, appeared on the Certificate of Eligibles list for the position of Executive Director 3.⁴ On April 13, 1995, the Commission issued this list to the Housing Authority.⁵ Both Chapman (the "non-veteran") and Fitzgerald (the "qualified veteran") were within the "Rule-of-Three" on the Certification of Eligibles.⁶ On July 3, 1995, the Housing Authority appointed the non-veteran to the position of Executive Director 3.

Subsequently, the Commission initiated an audit of the Certification of Eligibles. On August 11, 1995, Steve Shartle, the Commission's Chief of Technical Assistance and Audit, informed the Housing Authority's Director of Operations, Bertha Dantzler, that the non-veteran's appointment was not in compliance with the Commission's regulations or the veterans' preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act. Specifically, Shartle informed Dantzler that if an available veteran is within the Rule-of-Three, the veteran must be granted appointment preference.⁷ On August 28, 1995, Dantzler replied by letter that the Board of Directors of the Housing Authority believed that the non-veteran's appointment did not violate either the Military Affairs Act or the Civil Service Act, and that the non-veteran was far more qualified to be the Executive Director of the Housing Authority.

Subsequently, pursuant to 71 P.S. § 741.951(d), the Commission convened an investigative hearing to determine whether the appointment of the non-veteran was in compliance with Pennsylvania law.⁸ By adjudication and order dated May 17, 1996, the Commission concluded that the Military Affairs Act mandated that the qualified veteran be offered the Executive Director 3 position and that the Act permitted the appointment of a non-veteran only if the qualified veteran declined the position. Accordingly, the Commission ordered the position to be vacated and further directed that an offer of employment be made to the qualified veteran.

The Housing Authority filed an appeal from the Commission's order to the Commonwealth Court, contending first that the Commission had no standing to enforce the veterans' preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act sua sponte,⁹ and second that it had erred by interpreting the Military Affairs Act to require that the qualified veteran be offered the position at issue. On March 12, 1997, the Commonwealth Court reversed the Commission's order directing the job to be offered to the qualified veteran, determining that while the Commission had standing to enforce compliance with provisions of the Military Affairs Act sua sponte, the Commission had erred by interpreting the Act to require the Executive Director 3 position to be offered to the qualified veteran. Specifically, the Commonwealth Court determined that under Brickhouse v. Spring-Ford Area School District, 540 Pa. 176, 656 A.2d 483 (1995), the Housing Authority could use its own criteria to determine whether a veteran possessed the threshold "requisite qualifications" for the Executive Director 3 position such that he would be entitled to veterans' preference under 51 Pa.C.S.A. § 7104(b)(see fn.7, supra). On December 19, 1997, this Court granted allocatur.

I

The first question which we must resolve is whether, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Legislature may confer standing upon the Commission under the Civil Service Act to enforce sua sponte the veterans' preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act. Traditionally, in determining issues of standing, this Court has looked to the federal courts' interpretation of Article III of the United States Constitution.¹⁰ Under Article III, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over matters in which a "case" or "controversy" has not been presented. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)

.¹¹ The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the words "case" and "controversy" to mean that the federal courts may entertain suits only where a plaintiff alleges a particularized, concrete injury to himself which is causally traceable to the complained-of action by the defendant and which may be redressed by the judicial relief requested. Id. Where a so-called "injury-in-fact" to the plaintiff is lacking, the federal courts may not entertain jurisdiction, notwithstanding express statutory authorization, for to do so would be to violate the mandate of Article III. See Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 578,

112 S.Ct. 2130 (while statute can broaden the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing, it may not deviate from the traditional Article III requirement that the party seeking judicial review must be the party who has actually suffered the injury); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)(Congress cannot statutorily erase Article III's standing requirements by granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing); Chicago Steel and Pickling Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1011, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)(questions of Article III standing must be addressed before questions of whether the statute authorizes a cause of action).

An agency would arguably have standing to sue in federal court under Article III if it brought suit to enjoin ongoing or future action which threatened the vitality of the statutory scheme over which the agency exercised authority. In that case, the agency would be alleging a sufficiently concrete harm, since the very existence of the agency is tied to the vitality of the statutory scheme which it oversees. Cf. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980)

(EEOC has statutory authority to sue to enjoin ongoing unlawful practices and, concomitantly, to seek relief for past victims of discrimination). Here, however, the only complained-of action occurred in the past, and the only injury which ensued was the injury to the qualified veteran, a non-party to this action. The Commission itself never alleged that it has suffered or will suffer any harm, or that its statutory mandate will in any way be impaired as a result of the complained-of action. Under the prevailing federal precedent, a similarly situated agency would lack Article III standing to sue in the federal courts, notwithstanding any express statutory authorization to enforce the statute sua sponte.¹²

However, unlike the standing requirement in the federal courts, the standing requirement which this Court has traditionally imposed does not ascend to the level of a Constitutional mandate. This Court's jurisdiction is supplied by Article V, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968, which states:

The Supreme Court (a) shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in this court shall be reposed the supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth; (b) shall consist of seven justices, one of whom shall be the Chief Justice; and (c) shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law (emphasis added).

Section 1 of the schedule to Article V further provides:

The Supreme Court shall exercise all the powers and, until otherwise provided by law, jurisdiction now vested in the present Supreme Court....

Significantly, the drafters of the Pennsylvania Constitution did not restrict this Court's jurisdiction to matters in which a "case" or "controversy" has been presented, as did Article III...