St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard

Decision Date06 May 1987
Docket NumberNo. C-5412,C-5412
PartiesST. ELIZABETH HOSPITAL et al., Petitioners, v. James GARRARD et ux., Respondents.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION

RAY, Justice.

The question presented in this personal injury case is whether the physical manifestation requirement remains an element of claims for negligent infliction of mental anguish. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' case because their petition sought recovery for mental anguish damages, negligently inflicted, which were not alleged to have resulted in physical injury. The court of appeals held that this court had previously eliminated the physical manifestation requirement and reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for trial. 708 S.W.2d 571. We hold that proof of physical injury is no longer required in order to recover for negligent infliction of mental anguish and therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

James and Sharon Garrard sued St. Elizabeth Hospital and Dr. H.R. Wilcox to recover mental anguish damages which resulted from the defendants' negligence. The Garrards' second amended petition alleges that Mrs. Garrard was admitted to St. Elizabeth Hospital for the anticipated delivery of her second child. At the time of delivery it was first discovered Sharon Garrard was carrying twins. A male infant was born alive and healthy, and a female infant was stillborn. The attending physician and Mr. Garrard agreed to have an autopsy performed on the stillborn infant. However, no autopsy was ever performed. Instead, the body of the infant was delivered to a mortuary and disposed of in an unmarked, common grave without the knowledge or consent of either parent. The Garrards allege specific acts of negligence committed by St. Elizabeth Hospital and Dr. Wilcox, the pathologist. Finally, the petition states:

VI.

Each of the alleged acts and omissions of negligence were a proximate cause of the injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have each suffered past mental anguish and will continue to suffer future mental anguish, including but not limited to:

1) Never knowing the cause of death of their baby with resulting worry concerning future pregnancies.

2) Never knowing where their baby was buried and therefore unable to do traditional memorializations such as placing flowers on a grave or visiting a grave site.

3) Loss of the opportunity to conduct a funeral and experience that normal and usual time of grief necessary to the continuation of life as usual following a death.

Thus, the Garrards seek damages only for their mental anguish; they have not pleaded any facts suggesting the mental anguish manifested itself physically.

The defendants filed special exceptions contending that because the Garrards had not pleaded any intentional or willful act, gross negligence, breach of contract, physical injury or a cause of action under the wrongful death or survival statutes, they had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court sustained the exceptions and, following the Garrards' refusal to further amend their petition, dismissed the cause.

In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the court of appeals held that this court's decision in Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983), authorized recovery for mental anguish damages without proof of physical injury or conduct worse than negligence. 1 Additionally, the court of appeals held that in the event it had misread our holding in Sanchez, the Garrards' petition stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of mental anguish under an exception created in Classen v. Benfer, 144 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.). Although the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that Sanchez eliminated the physical manifestation requirement in actions based on simple negligence, we are convinced the rule serves as nothing more than an arbitrary restraint on the right of individuals to seek redress for wrongs committed against them.

The tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish has long been the subject of scholarly debate. See generally Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 Harv.L.Rev. 260 (1921); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033 (1936); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo.L.J. 1237 (1971); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Recognized Tort Action, 67 Marq.L.Rev. 557 (1984); Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U.Fla.L.Rev. 333 (1984). Development and administration of the tort have been inconsistent and confusing. 2 However, there does appear to be a trend emerging in other jurisdictions which closely parallels the manner in which Texas courts have treated claims for mental anguish damages.

Texas first recognized the tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish in Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890). Therein, Justice Gaines, "[i]n a bold, closely reasoned opinion ... presaged the ultimate trend of American law" by acknowledging the validity of a cause of action for negligently inflicted mental anguish. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va.L.Rev. 193, 209 (1944). The plaintiff in Hill had suffered a miscarriage after witnessing an incident involving profane language and bloodshed. Importantly, the Hill opinion analyzed the cause of action in light of traditional tort concepts. The court reasoned that recovery could not be denied if proof could be made that the injury proximately resulted from the actions of the defendant. Additionally, the jury would have to answer the question of whether the defendant acted negligently in light of the reasonably prudent man standard. Thus, negligent infliction of mental anguish became a tort cognizable under Texas law, to be administered using traditional tort concepts. The single deviation from traditional tort principles involved the element of damages. The court deemed improper a recovery for mental anguish, negligently inflicted, when the plaintiff's suffering failed to manifest itself physically.

However, in the almost 100 years following Hill v. Kimball both courts and legal scholars have condemned the physical manifestation requirement as an artificial device, the sole purpose of which is to guarantee the genuineness of claims for mental injury. 3 The specific arguments cited most frequently in support of abandoning the physical manifestation requirement are convincing. The requirement is overinclusive because it permits recovery for mental anguish when the suffering accompanies or results in any physical impairment, regardless of how trivial the injury. More importantly, the requirement is underinclusive because it arbitrarily denies court access to persons with valid claims they could prove if permitted to do so. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 929, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 838 (1980).

Additionally, the requirement is defective because it "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." Id. To continue requiring proof of physical injury when mental suffering may be equally recognizable standing alone would force "victim[s] to exaggerate symptoms of sick headaches, nausea, insomnia, etc., to make out a technical basis of bodily injury upon which to predicate a parasitic recovery for the more grievous disturbance, the mental and emotional distress she endured." Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts at 1059; see also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 117 n. 18, 128 n. 8 (1959) ("in most instances of severe mental disturbance some deleterious physical consequence can, with a little ingenuity be found ..." and characterization of an injury as physical or mental may depend on the ingenuity of counsel in framing the pleadings). As this court noted in Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986), the concept of "physical manifestation" has been expanded to the point where the term has lost much of its former significance.

Moreover, medical research has provided modern mankind with a much more detailed and useful understanding of the interaction between mind and body. 4 It is well recognized that certain psychological injuries can be just as severe and debilitating as physical injuries.

Clearly, freedom from severe emotional distress is an interest which the law should serve to protect. Indeed, we have not hesitated to defend peace of mind when we deemed the facts sufficient to guarantee the genuineness of the claim in the absence of physical manifestations of the mental injury. 5 Having recognized that an interest merits protection, it is the duty of this court to continually monitor the legal doctrines of this state to insure the public is free from unwarranted restrictions on the right to seek redress for wrongs committed against them. The physical manifestation requirement is one such restriction. In Moore v. Lillebo we eliminated the requirement in wrongful death actions. The time has come to advance the common law to coincide with the modern trend. Thus, we hold that proof of physical injury resulting from mental anguish is no longer an element of the common law action for negligent infliction of mental anguish.

By eliminating the physical manifestation requirement Texas joins an established trend in American jurisprudence which recognizes the tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish without imposing arbitrary restrictions on recovery in such actions. 6 The distinction between physical injury and emotional distress is no longer defensible. The problem is one of...

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