Ex parte Stewart
Citation | 730 So.2d 1246 |
Parties | Ex parte Charles Randall STEWART. (In re Charles Randall Stewart v. State). |
Decision Date | 08 January 1999 |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Randall S. Susskind and Bryan A. Stevenson, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Kathryn D. Anderson, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
Charles Randall Stewart was convicted on six counts of capital murder, all based on the death of his ex-wife Betty Sue Lang. Four of these counts had been elevated to capital murder because the murder was committed during the course of a burglary, and the other two counts had been made capital because the murder was also committed during the course of a kidnapping. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Stewart to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Stewart's convictions and sentence and remanded the cause so that the trial court could vacate three of the capital-murder counts based on the burglary and one count based on the kidnapping. Stewart v. State, 601 So.2d 491 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). On remand, the trial court vacated those four counts of capital murder, accordingly. On return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Stewart's convictions and sentence. Stewart v. State, 659 So.2d 120 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). This Court subsequently affirmed the convictions, but reversed the sentence because of an improper jury instruction. Ex parte Stewart, 659 So.2d 122 (Ala.1993). The trial court held a second sentencing hearing, which again resulted in a death sentence for Stewart. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on March 22, 1996, reversed this second sentence because the trial court had failed to properly instruct the jury on the means of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and it remanded for a third sentencing hearing. Stewart v. State, 730 So.2d 1203 (Ala.Crim.App.1996).
On September 10, 1996, on remand for the third sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously recommended that Stewart receive the death penalty. The trial judge accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Stewart to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this sentence. Stewart v. State, 730 So.2d 1203, at 1212 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997). We granted certiorari review pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P. Because this Court has previously affirmed Stewart's convictions, we now review only the sentence.
In his petition for the writ of certiorari, Stewart raised 21 issues for review. All of those issues were fully discussed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in its September 26, 1997, opinion affirming Stewart's sentence. We will discuss only one of those issues. Stewart argues that the trial court erred during the third sentencing hearing by allowing the jury to separate over his objection, in violation of Rule 19.3(a), Ala.R.Crim. P., as that rule read at the time of the third sentencing hearing. The separation or sequestration of jurors is a procedural matter governed by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by this Court. At the time of Stewart's third sentencing hearing, Rule 19.3 read:
Under that rule (which has since been amended, effective December 1, 1997), the trial court was not authorized to allow the jury to separate, unless the prosecution and the defense agreed to a separation. The trial court's allowing the jury to separate without the consent of the defense clearly violated this rule.
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, despite this violation of Rule 19.3(a), the trial court did not err, because of the terms of § 12-16-9, Ala.Code 1975, as amended effective June 15, 1995. Section 12-16-9, as amended, provides:
Before the June 15, 1995, amendment, § 12-16-9 had read as follows:
Thus, the June 15, 1995, amendment to this statute eliminated the need for an agreement to separate the jury in capital cases, by vesting in the trial court the discretion to make the separation decision in such cases. Yet, after June 15, 1995, Rule 19.3 continued to require the consent of all parties before the judge could allow the jury to separate in a capital case. Thus, given a procedural rule that appears to have been applicable and a conflicting statute, we must determine which governed the question of jury separation at the time of the third sentencing hearing.
We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that the amended § 12-16-9 controlled the separation issue. Generally, the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure govern procedural matters, such as separation of jurors. Indeed, § 12-1-1, Ala.Code 1975, requires that the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure take precedence over statutory provisions covering the same subject matter:
"Any provisions of this title regulating procedure [i.e., Title 12, Ala.Code 1975] shall apply only if the procedure is not governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure or any other rule of practice and procedure as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama."
At the time of the third sentencing hearing, § 12-1-1 read as it does now.
The 1975 Code became effective on October 31, 1977, pursuant to a proclamation of the Governor of October 1, 1977, based on Act No. 20 (1977 Regular Session). Section 12-1-1, a part of Act No. 20, prevented the adoption of the Code from constituting the exercise of the Legislature's authority to change court rules by an act of statewide application, an authority granted by § 6.11, Amendment 328 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, ratified almost four years earlier. Hence, under § 12-1-1, the enactment of any section of Title 12 of the new Code that might deal with subject matter also then covered by a rule could not be taken as overriding the rule; the Legislature affirmatively indicated by the wording of § 12-1-1 that it had no intent to override the then existing rules merely by providing for adoption of the 1975 Code.
However, § 12-1-1 is also phrased so as to allow a prospective field of operation in that it refers not only to rules existing when the 1975 Code was adopted, but also to "any other rule of practice and procedure as may be adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama." Prospective application of § 12-1-1, to the extent it would never allow a statute enacted after that section's effective date to override a rule of court, would forfeit the authority conferred by the people on the Legislature in § 6.11. Such an application would, therefore, unconstitutionally defeat the mandate of § 6.11 that the Legislature, and not the Court, has the last word on matters of procedure so long as the change is wrought by a general act of statewide application.
Section 6.11 of Amendment 328 to the Constitution of Alabama provides:
As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in its opinion of September 26, 1997, the act revising § 12-16-9 (Ac...
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