Smith v. Ellis

Decision Date10 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. S12A1174.,S12A1174.
Citation12 FCDR 2747,291 Ga. 566,731 S.E.2d 731
PartiesSMITH et al. v. ELLIS.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Richard C. Mitchell, Mitchell & Shapiro, Atlanta, for appellant.

Jeremy Robinson Davis, Scott David Huray, Christopher A. Whitlock, Carlock Copeland & Stair LLP, Atlanta, for appellee.

NAHMIAS, Justice.

The principal question in this appeal is whether an employee who files an injury claim against his employer under the Workers' Compensation Act, OCGA §§ 34–9–1 to 34–9–421, and receives compensation in exchange for a “no liability” settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation pursuant to OCGA § 34–9–15(b), may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision, OCGA § 34–9–11(a), bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy under OCGA § 34–9–15(b). See Ridley v. Monroe, 256 Ga.App. 686, 569 S.E.2d 561 (2002). In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether Ridley should be overruled, and the case was sent to this Court for resolution. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V (“In the event of an equal division of the Judges [of the Court of Appeals] when sitting as a body, the case shall be immediately transmitted to the Supreme Court.”).

We hold that Ridley was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer under OCGA § 34–9–15(b) in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualifies as an “employee of the same employer” as Smith, rather than a “third-party tort-feasor,” as those phrases are used in OCGA § 34–9–11(a). However, the evidence does not establish, without genuine dispute, that Ellis was acting as “an employee of the same employer,” that is, in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment is reversed.

1. On appeal from an award of summary judgment, we view the evidence and make all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Kaplan v. City of Sandy Springs, 286 Ga. 559, 560, 690 S.E.2d 395 (2010). Viewed most favorably to Smith, the evidence shows as follows. In February 2009, Smith and Ellis were both employed by The Knight Group, a company that builds and sells new houses. Smith was assigned to work at the Westcott Place subdivision in Dawsonville, and Ellis was assigned to the Red Hawk Ridge subdivision in Cartersville.

On February 12, Ellis called Smith to arrange a meeting so that he could borrow one of Smith's tools for his personal use. Ellis also wanted to shoot some new guns he had purchased, including an AR–15 rifle, in an undeveloped field in the Westcott Place subdivision. At 10:30 the next morning, the two men met at a house that Smith was finishing in Westcott Place. Ellis made one phone call regarding a problem with the house and then followed Smith through a couple more houses for which Smith was responsible before they went to lunch around 11:00 a.m. Smith and Ellis returned to the subdivision at 1:00 p.m., where Smith continued to work. Ellis had no work to do and left that part of the property to avoid being seen by one of his supervisors, because he was not supposed to be at Westcott Place. At about 2:30 p.m., Smith met Ellis in the undeveloped field, which was a quarter of a mile away from the houses where Smith had been working. Ellis began firing his new rifle while Smith organized his work tools next to his truck. The rifle jammed three times. Ellis successfully cleared the first two rounds, but he accidentally shot Smith in the right thigh when he tried to clear the third round. The bullet went through Smith's right leg and into his left leg, causing serious injury.

The Knight Group fired both men shortly after the shooting. Smith filed a workers' compensation claim against the employer, alleging that his injury was compensable under the Act because it arose out of and in the course of his employment. See OCGA § 34–9–1(4) (defining “injury” to mean “only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the [employee's] employment”). The Knight Group ultimately agreed to pay Smith $6,000 in exchange for his stipulation that he had not sustained a compensable injury. Pursuant to OCGA § 34–9–15(b), the “no liability” settlement was submitted to and approved by the Workers' Compensation Board, which issued an award denying the employer's liability on June 4, 2009.

Nine months later, Smith sued Ellis for negligence, and Smith's wife, appellant Janet Smith, sued for loss of consortium. Ellis moved for summary judgment on both claims, contending that the tort lawsuit was barred by the Act's exclusive remedy provision, OCGA § 34–9–11(a).1 Relying on Ridley v. Monroe, 256 Ga.App. 686, 569 S.E.2d 561 (2002), the trial court granted summary judgment to Ellis. Smith appealed, arguing that his tort action against Ellis was not barred by his workers' compensation settlement with The Knight Group because Ellis was acting as a “third-party tort-feasor” rather than as an “employee of the same employer” at the time of the injury. The whole Court of Appeals heard the case and divided evenly by vote of six to six. Both sides of the court focused on whether Ridley should be overruled rather than on the argument Smith had raised.

Presiding Judge Barnes, writing for the six judges in favor of reversing the trial court, said that “if an injury is not compensable under the Workers Compensation Act, then the exclusive remedy provision does not apply.” Smith v. Ellis, Case No. A11A2171, decided Mar. 29, 2012, slip op. at 7 (opinion of Barnes, P.J.) (unpublished). Presiding Judge Barnes then said that Smith's injury was not compensable under the Act, because “no rational mind can see a causal connection in this case between the conditions of [Smith's] employment and his injury.” Id. at 8. Although Ridley held that a no-liability settlement triggers the Act's exclusive remedy provision and bars the injured employee from later suing a co-worker in tort, Presiding Judge Barnes concluded that Ridley's holding was “illogical” and should be overruled. Smith, slip op. at 8 (opinion of Barnes, P.J.).

Judge Andrews, writing for the six judges in favor of affirming the trial court, held that Ridley controlled and was correctly decided. Smith, slip op. at 5 (opinion of Andrews, J.). Although Judge Andrews agreed that the exclusive remedy provision does not apply if an injury is not compensable under the Act, he noted that Smith was actually compensated under the Act. See id. Judge Andrews observed that Smith's ‘settlement agreement was approved by the Board and thus it represents an award of the Board,’ id. at 5 (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davis, 253 Ga. 376, 377, 320 S.E.2d 368 (1984)), and “when an employee accepts the terms of the Act, he as well as the employer is limited to those things for which the Act makes provision,’ id. at 4 (quoting Boulware v. Quiktrip Corp., 226 Ga.App. 399, 400, 486 S.E.2d 662 (1997)). Judge Andrews concluded that allowing parties to circumvent the Act's exclusive remedy provision by agreeing to a no-liability stipulation would flout the Act's command that it be interpreted liberally to bring both employers and employees within its scope. See id. at 5.

The equal division of the Court of Appeals sent the case to this Court.

2. (a) The exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act says, in relevant part:

The rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter [i.e., the Act] shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death; provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tort-feasor, other than an employee of the same employer....

OCGA § 34–9–11(a). Among the rights and remedies granted to an employee like Smith by the Act is the option to obtain compensation for an alleged work-related injury through a Board-approved settlement. See OCGA § 34–9–15. 2 The interplay of OCGA § 34–9–11(a) and OCGA § 34–9–15(b), which this Court has not previously addressed, is informed by how we and the Court of Appeals have interpreted the interplay between the exclusive remedy provision and subsection (a) of OCGA § 34–9–15.

(b) It is well-established that a settlement under OCGA § 34–9–15(a) which requires an employer to compensate its employee for an alleged injury bars a subsequent tort suit by the employee against anyone protected by the exclusive remedy provision, regardless of the actual circumstances of the employee's injury and the amount of compensation to which the parties agreed. See Haygood v. Home Transp. Co., 244 Ga. 165, 166–67, 259 S.E.2d 429 (1979) (holding that the exclusive remedy provision barred a tort lawsuit against the plaintiff's employer because the plaintiff had previously entered a Board-approved settlement with the employer for the same injury); Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga.App. 47, 48, 296 S.E.2d 251 (1982) ([T]he plaintiffs, having affirmatively obtained benefits [from the employer] under the Workers' Compensation Act, are barred from bringing a tort action against a fellow employee.”). See also OCGA § 34–9–15(a) ([T]he Board shall approve the settlement ... even though such settlement may provide for the payment of compensation in a sum or sums less than would be payable if there were no conflict as to the employee's right to recover compensation.”). Put simply, an injured employee may not conclude a settlement with his employer to recover compensation under the Act, obtain...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Seals v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 18, 2021
    ...but rather in context.’ " City of Guyton v. Barrow , 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3), 828 S.E.2d 366 (2019) (quoting Smith v. Ellis , 291 Ga. 566, 573 (3) (a), 731 S.E.2d 731 (2012) ). "The primary determinant of a text's meaning is its context, which includes the structure and history of the text and......
  • Undisclosed LLC v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 30, 2017
    ...State, 295 Ga. 388, 391, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014). Rather, to determine its meaning, we also consider its context. Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 573 (3) (a), 731 S.E.2d 731 (2012) ("In construing statutes, however, we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context."). This context include......
  • City of Guyton v. Barrow
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 20, 2019
    ...said many times before when interpreting legal text, "we do not read words in isolation, but rather in context." Smith v. Ellis , 291 Ga. 566, 573 (3) (a), 731 S.E.2d 731 (2012). The primary determinant of a text’s meaning is its context, which includes the structure and history of the text......
  • Carr v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 2, 2012
    ...summary judgment by arguing that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the compensability of his injuries. See Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 731 S.E.2d 731(2) (2012).4. [317 Ga.App. 740]Charlene Carr's request for remand. Charlene Carr argues that “[i]f the Court is disinclined t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT