United States v. Johnson

Decision Date15 October 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 12–2313–cr.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Matthew F. JOHNSON, Defendant–Appellant, Monae Davis, Barrett B. Johnson, Shawn S. Johnson, Corey J. Rivers, Raheim Howell, Jennifer M. Gourley, Andrea Perkins, Kevin L. Glowacki, Richard D. Farnham, Sr., John A. Lee, Mark L. Burdick, David J. Thompson, Leroy W. Nupp, Jr., Mark W. Decker, Anna M. Benjamin, Scott Peters, Jimi Lin Gourley, Ryan V. Potter, Lori A. Carrow, Beth L. Saifakas, Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joseph J. Karaszewski, United States Attorney's Office, Buffalo, N.Y. (William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney's Office, Buffalo, N.Y., on the brief), for Appellee.

Jonathan I. Edelstein, Edelstein & Grossman, New York, N.Y., for DefendantAppellant.

Before: NEWMAN, KEARSE, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a federal court may, in certain circumstances, reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment because of amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). This sentencing appeal concerns the application of section 3582(c)(2) in the unusual context of a combination of Guidelines amendments, an amended statutory mandatory minimum, and a substantial assistance departure from a mandatory minimum authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The appeal presents three issues: (1) whether the DefendantAppellant is eligible for any section 3582(c)(2) reduction, (2) whether a section 3553(e) departure from a mandatory minimum displaces the mandatory minimum for purposes of Guidelines calculations, and whether the reductions in mandatory minimums made by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (the “FSA” or the Act) apply to a defendant sentenced before the effective date of the FSA whose sentence was reduced after that date pursuant to section 3582(c)(2).

These issues arise on an appeal by DefendantAppellant Matthew Johnson from the May 25, 2012, order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (William M. Skretny, Chief Judge), granting his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2). Chief Judge Skretny reduced Johnson's sentence from 87 months to 78 months. Johnson contends that the Court's calculation of the reduction was improper and should have resulted in a range of 57–71 months.

We conclude that Johnson was not eligible for a reduction under section 3582(c)(2), that the mandatory minimum applicable to Johnson has not been displaced, and that the FSA does not apply to Johnson. In the absence of a cross-appeal by the Government, we affirm.

Background

In May 2009, Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base (sometimes called “crack cocaine”). At the time, the statutory minimum sentence for this offense was ten years' imprisonment. See21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2009). The plea agreement provided that the amount of cocaine base involved in Johnson's relevant conduct was between 150 and 500 grams. The agreement also provided that Johnson would cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of others, and if the Government was satisfied with his cooperation, it would move for a two-level downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)1 and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.2

In the presentence investigation report (“PSR”), the Probation Department determined that Johnson's base offense level was 32. SeeU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2008). With a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1(a), (b), Johnson's adjusted offense level was 29. This adjusted offense level and a criminal history category (“CHC”) of III resulted in an advisory sentencing range of 108–135 months. However, because the statutory minimum term of imprisonment was ten years, the Probation Department adjusted its recommended sentencing range to 120–135 months, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2) (sentence may not be “less than any statutorily required minimum sentence”).

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Government moved for a substantial assistance departure, specifically a two-level reduction in the adjusted offense level from 29 to 27, which, in CHC III, resulted in a sentencing range of 87–108 months. The District Court granted the Government's motion, accepted the suggestion that the departure for substantial assistance should be measured by offense levels, lowered the adjusted offense level from 29 to 27, and, on September 4, 2009, sentenced Johnson to 87 months' imprisonment, the low end of the range for level 27 in CHC III.3 Johnson's initial appeal, we held, was barred by the waiver contained in the plea agreement. See United States v. Johnson, 425 Fed.Appx. 66, 67 (2d Cir.2011).

On August 3, 2010, the FSA took effect, reducing the mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses and reducing the disparity between the penalties for cocaine base and powder cocaine offenses. The reduction was accomplished by raising the quantities of cocaine base required for various mandatory minimum sentences. For example, the FSA raised the minimum quantity of cocaine base requiring a ten-year minimum sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams, thereby making offenses like Johnson's, involving 150 grams, subject to a five-year minimum sentence. SeePub.L. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372, § 2(a)(1), (2), codified at21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). The Sentencing Commission subsequently promulgated amendments to the Guidelines to reduce base offense levels to conform to the new statutory minimums for cocaine base offenses. As relevant to Johnson, the Commission reduced the base offense level for 150 grams of cocaine base from 32 to 28. See U.S.S.G.App. C., Amend. 748, third paragraph 4 (effective Nov. 1, 2010) (promulgating temporary, emergency reductions); U.S.S.G.App. C., Amend. 750, first paragraph (effective Nov. 1, 2011) (repromulgating reductions as permanent). The Commission then amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) to provide that portions of Amendment 750, including those applicable to Johnson, applied retroactively. See U.S.S.G.App. C., Amend. 759, second paragraph (effective Nov. 1, 2011).

In November 2011, Johnson moved for a sentence reduction pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), relying on Amendment 750. Johnson argued that with his base offense level reduced from 32 to 28, the District Court should accord him the same five levels of reduction the Court had originally made (three levels for acceptance of responsibility plus two levels for substantial assistance), which would have lowered his adjusted offense level from 27 to 23, with a new sentencing range, in CHC III, of 57 to 71 months. However, the Commission has instructed that the relevant guideline range is to be derived from the offense level determined before a departure for substantial assistance. SeeU.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n. 1(A). Johnson's offense level after the Commission's amendments would have been 25 (with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility but without the two-level departure for substantial assistance), which, in CHC III, would have yielded a guideline range of 70–87 months, but for application of the 120–month mandatory minimum.

In response to Johnson's motion, the Probation Department prepared an Abbreviated Supplemental Presentence Report (“ASPSR”). The ASPSR agreed that Johnson's new base offense level was 28 and that, with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his adjusted offense level would have been 25, except for the effect of the mandatory minimum. The ASPSR reasoned that Johnson remained subject to the pre-FSA mandatory minimum of 120 months, and that his pre-departure adjusted offense level could therefore be no lower than 28 because that is the lowest level, in CHC III, that yields a sentencing range (97 to 121 months) that includes 120 months.5 The ASPSR agreed that Johnson was entitled to “a comparable downward departure of two levels” for substantial assistance, like the one he had received at the initial sentencing, apparently relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), which provides that in the event of a Government motion reflecting the defendant's substantial assistance, “a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range ... may be appropriate.” However, the ASPSR recommended that these two levels be subtracted from level 28, instead of 25. The ASPSR therefore recommended a post-departure adjusted offense level of 26, with a guideline range, in CHC III, of 78 to 97 months.

The District Court agreed with the analysis in the ASPSR, granted Johnson's section 3582(c)(2) motion, and reduced his sentence to 78 months, the low end of the range for level 26 in CHC III, but more than Johnson would have received at level 23 (where the range in CHC III is 57 to 71 months) had the two levels for substantial assistance been subtracted from level 25.

Discussion

Although this Court generally reviews a district court's decision to grant or deny a section 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir.2009), the questions of law raised on this appeal 6 are reviewed de novo, see United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 202–03 (2d Cir.2009).

I. Eligibility for Section 3582(c)(2) Relief

Section 3582(c)(2) provides:

[Where] a defendant ... has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994( o), ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). The emphasized words raise an initial issueas to Johnson's eligibility for any ...

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