Raulerson v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-3541,83-3541
• Citation: 732 F.2d 803
• Parties: James David RAULERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation, Richard Dugger, Superintendent of Florida State Prison at Starke, Florida, and Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 803

732 F.2d 803

James David RAULERSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Department of

Offender Rehabilitation, Richard Dugger, Superintendent of

Florida State Prison at Starke, Florida, and Jim Smith,

Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 83-3541.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 1, 1984.

Stephen B. Bright, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.

David P. Gauldin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before FAY and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

ALBERT J. HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the denial of the petition of the appellant, James Davis Raulerson, for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. On April 27, 1975, Raulerson and his accomplice, Jerry Leon Tant, robbed the Sailmaker Restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. During the course of the robbery, Raulerson forced a female employee into a back room and raped her. In the meantime, two police officers, James English and Michael Stewart, were dispatched to the scene. Upon their arrival, a gun battle ensued during which Tant and Officer Stewart were killed. The evidence disclosed that the bullets that killed Officer Stewart came from Raulerson's gun.

In August of 1975 Raulerson was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See Raulerson v. State, 358 So.2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959, 99 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed.2d 352 (1978). Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. That court found that Raulerson had been denied the opportunity to rebut the contents of his presentence report in violation of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), and ordered a new sentencing hearing. See Raulerson v. Wainwright, 508 F.Supp. 381, 383-85 (M.D.Fla.1980). ¹ Raulerson was again sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court consolidated the appeals from the denial of post conviction relief and reimposition of the death penalty and affirmed both judgments. See Raulerson v. State, 420 So.2d 567 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3572, 77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983).

The state set Raulerson's execution for September 7, 1983. On August 22, 1983, he filed a second petition for post conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Duval County under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The circuit court denied both the petition and a motion for a stay of execution. The Florida Supreme Court again affirmed. See Raulerson v. State, 437 So.2d 1105 (Fla.1983).

On September 2, 1983, Raulerson filed this habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The court held an evidentiary hearing on September 6, 1983, and granted a temporary stay of execution. Ultimately, the district court denied the writ and lifted the stay but granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal.

In this appeal, Raulerson urges five grounds of error: (1) the state trial court's failure to consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence; (2) the denial of his right to represent himself at trial; (3) the denial of effective assistance of counsel during several stages of the proceedings; (4) the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to enable him to gather favorable evidence for his sentencing hearing; and (5) the district court's expeditious resolution of his habeas corpus petition. After careful examination of these assignments of error, we find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Raulerson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. Nonstatutory Mitigating Evidence

During the second sentencing hearing, Raulerson called a host of witnesses who testified to his troubled childhood, excellent work record, devotion to family, religious beliefs and prospects for rehabilitation. In pronouncing sentence, the court stated that it found five aggravating circumstances but no mitigating ones, statutory or otherwise. It is this statement that gave rise to Raulerson's first contention that the trial court failed to consider his evidence of mitigating circumstances. Contrary to Raulerson's assertion, it is evident from the record before us that the trial judge did consider the evidence but concluded that it did not outweigh the factors militating in favor of the death penalty. The real thrust of his argument seems to be that the court committed error of constitutional magnitude by not accepting the evidence as mitigating.

It is clear from recent decisions of the Supreme Court that a prerequisite to constitutional imposition of the death penalty is consideration by the sentencer of the individual circumstances of the crime, that is, "the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense...." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). This obviously means that the totality of circumstances must be reviewed including both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).

In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) the Supreme Court struck down a North Carolina statute that required imposition of the death penalty for first degree murder. The Court reasoned that such mandatory sentencing statutes obviate the necessity for the sentencer to exercise discretion in contravention of the principle that "justice ... requires consideration of ... the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." Id. at 304, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 61, 82 L.Ed. 43, 46 (1937)).

This requirement of giving full consideration to mitigating factors in addition to the nature and circumstances of the crime was given increased vitality in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). In Lockett, the Supreme Court struck down the Ohio death penalty statute because it failed to allow consideration of such factors as age and familial history in mitigation. Under the Ohio statute, personal background evidence was admissible only if it substantiated the existence of any of the state's three statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances. ² The Supreme Court invalidated the statute as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments, holding that the sentencer must "not be precluded from considering ... any aspect of a defendant's character or record" proffered in mitigation of his offense. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d at 990. Thus, Lockett instructs that the sentencing body be free to consider the impact of the defendant's background in making its decision. To say, however, as Raulerson maintains, that Lockett imposes a duty on the sentencer to regard such evidence as mitigating is quite another matter. That such an interpretation would be an overbroad reading of Lockett is apparent from the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).

In Eddings, the Supreme Court overturned a death penalty because the trial court refused to consider Eddings' troubled past in mitigation of his sentence. In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that it was "clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact, rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence." Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. at 875, 71 L.Ed.2d at 10 (emphasis original). The trial judge's self-imposed restrictions on the scope of the evidence that he would consider in mitigation violated both state statutory law and federal judicial precedent. As the Court stated, "the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence 'as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen." Id. at 115, n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 876 n. 10, 71 L.Ed.2d at 11 n. 10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

A careful examination of Eddings reveals that the Constitution prescribes only that the sentencer hear and consider all the evidence a defendant chooses to offer in mitigation. There is no requirement that the court agree with the defendant's view that it is mitigating, only that the proffer be given consideration. ³

The reliance on mitigating evidence is a matter for the sentencing authority. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that in certain circumstances, background evidence not only must be considered but must be accorded significant weight, ⁴ the general rule is that as long as the evidence is evaluated, it properly may be given little weight or no weight at all. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. at 875-76, 71 L.Ed.2d at 11.

In this case, the trial court explicitly demonstrated that it had met its constitutional burden. It heard extensive evidence in mitigation and then made an explicit finding: "The Court has examined and considered the evidence to determine whether there are circumstances, other than those specified [in the Florida statute], which would mitigate the murder committed by the Defendant herein. The Court finds that there are no such non-statutory mitigating circumstances within the meaning of Lockett v. Ohio...." ⁵ There can be no clearer evidence that the trial court followed Lockett's dictates.

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