Casey v. State

Citation732 P.2d 885
Decision Date21 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. F-84-754,F-84-754
PartiesMichael Earl CASEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, Michael Earl Casey, was convicted in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CRF-83-4377, of Rape in the First Degree and Forcible Sodomy, for which he received sentences of seven and five years' imprisonment, respectively, and he appeals raising six assignments of error.

At about 3:25 a.m. on December 10, 1983, Officers Rudick and Middleton of the Tulsa Police Department were summoned to a residential area in southeast Tulsa where they observed an automobile parked at the side of the street. Upon approaching the vehicle Office Rudick observed the appellant sitting clothed in only an unbuttoned shirt, and the nude prosecutrix lying in the front seat with her face in his lap, apparently performing oral sex upon the appellant. Rudick ordered the two to get dressed and get out of the vehicle. Both exited the car immediately, the prosecutrix stating, "I've been raped," and the appellant replying "I can't believe this is happening.... I've known her for over a year, she's done this to me before." Rudick observed a large red mark on her hip. After both put their clothing on, Officer Rudick took the appellant to his patrol car and Officer Middleton took the prosecutrix to his. Rudick explained to the appellant that they had received calls that naked people were running around a car in the area, and that the car had been running for some time. The appellant stated that they had never been out of the car and that he had been taking the prosecutrix home when they became sexually active, and so pulled over to "have sex." After questioning him briefly he stated that all of the acts were consensual. After Rudick consulted with Officer Middleton, he determined that the prosecutrix had told a quite different story, and checking for corroborative evidence, he found dried grass on the car seat and the floorboard, blood stains on the car seat, a Great Escape Club card in the adjacent yard, and an area in the yard near a tree where the grass appeared to be pressed down by an object of weight. The appellant was unable to give the officers the name of the prosecutrix and so he was arrested.

The prosecutrix testified that she had been waiting in below freezing weather outside the Great Escape Club, after it had closed at 2:00 a.m. for her sister to return. The appellant drove up and offered her a ride home, but instead of taking her home, he drove around with her. Appellant asked her if she ever wanted to see her child again. When he finally stopped the car, she ran to a house, knocked on the door and yelled for help. Appellant chased and caught her, dragged her to some shrubs and raped her for the first time. He then placed her back in the car, raped and sodomized her.

A resident of the neighborhood testified that he observed the appellant, who had the prosecutrix by the arms, pushing her into a car, and that the appellant was clothed only in a shirt. Another resident testified she had heard someone "scream, 'No,' " and after her husband investigated and observed the car, he called the police.

The appellant testified that he had observed the prosecutrix standing outside the Great Escape Club and decided to give her a ride home. When she got in she was too intoxicated to tell him an address and so he drove around trying to decide what to do. He finally stopped the car. After some discussion they became aroused and while removing their clothes she suddenly decided to get out of the car. As she was only partially clothed, he got out to help her back into the car. He further testified that they never had intercourse.

Medical testimony revealed that a vaginal swab had enzymes and antigens which were indicative of seminal fluid. Lab tests revealed that seminal fluid was found on the blouse of the prosecutrix, and semen was found on the car seat. Samples of the appellant's blood and saliva revealed that he is blood group A and is a secreter which is consistent with the antigen A found on the vaginal swab, the blouse, and on the car seat. Testing of the prosecutrix indicated she does not secrete in other body fluids and therefore could not be responsible for the antigen found in the samples.

As his first assignment of error the appellant argues that the sodomy statute was improperly applied to him. He urges that because the legislature changed the title of the statute to "Forcible Sodomy," and because sodomy at common law was restricted to anal copulation, Berryman v. State, 283 P.2d 558 (Okl.Cr.1955), that he was improperly charged and convicted of forced oral copulation. The applicable statute, 21 O.S.Supp.1984, § 888, provides:

Any person who forces another person to engage in the detestable and abominable crime against nature, pursuant to Section 886 of this title, upon conviction, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of not more than twenty (20) years. This crime may also be known as forcible sodomy.

As the act prohibited is "the detestable and abominable crime against nature," and the statute refers to 21 O.S.1981, § 886, which uses the identical term and has been construed to include oral copulation, see Clayton v. State, 695 P.2d 3 (Okl.Cr.1985), we must conclude that the legislature intended this statute to be given the same construction. We note further that Section 888 provides that the prohibited act may also be known as forcible sodomy. Therefore, under Oklahoma law, forcible sodomy includes oral copulation as well as anal copulation. This assignment of error is meritless.

The appellant next contends that 21 O.S.Supp.1984, § 888 is unconstitutionally vague. This same issue was addressed in Clayton, in construing the term in 21 O.S.1981, § 886 "detestable and abominable crime against nature," which we found was neither vague nor indefinite. Clayton 695 P.2d at 6. As the new statute contains the same term, the same reasoning applies. This assignment of error is without merit.

For his third assignment of error, the appellant alleges that he was interrogated in violation of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That case holds that a statement stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant is not admissible by the prosecution unless the defendant was given certain specific warnings concerning his right to refuse to incriminate himself, and to an attorney. Custodial interrogation was defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The record reveals that Officer Rudick questioned the appellant in Rudick's patrol car and came to the conclusion that no crime had been committed because the sexual acts were consensual. However, after he spoke with Officer Middleton, who had questioned the prosecutrix, he asked the appellant the name of the prosecutrix which he was unable to give. At that point Officer Rudick placed the appellant under arrest and advised him of his rights. As the appellant was not under formal arrest during the initial questioning, the issue is whether or not he was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question, nor is the requirement of warnings to be...

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7 cases
  • Rea v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • October 3, 2001
    ...763 P.2d 141 (Okl.Cr.1988)), while a rapist receives only seven years for a violent act of rape and five years for sodomy (Casey v. State, 732 P.2d 885 (Okl.Cr.1987)). 11. Several earlier cases refer to the Court's "conscience" in a variety of contexts other than sentencing. See Ellis v. St......
  • Lott v. Trammell
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • January 14, 2013
    ...a defendant may not complain of error which he has invited, and that reversal cannot be predicated upon such error.”); Casey v. State, 732 P.2d 885, 888 (Okla.Crim.App.1987) (“The rule is well settled that a party may not complain of error which he himself has invited.”); Griffin v. State, ......
  • Slaughter v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • December 17, 1997
    ...he cannot be heard to complain, on appeal, that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear this testimony."); Casey v. State, 732 P.2d 885, 888 (Okl.Cr.1987) ("The rule is well settled that a party may not complain of error which he himself has invited. Error, if any is shown, was c......
  • Bryan v. State, F-95-84
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • March 4, 1997
    ...840 P.2d at 635; Moore v. State, 761 P.2d 866, 876 (Okl.Cr.1988); Glenn v. State, 749 P.2d 121, 125 (Okl.Cr.1988); Casey v. State, 732 P.2d 885, 887 (Okl.Cr.1987). 17 Bryan relies on testimony from the first trial. This testimony was neither recognized by the trial court nor used for impeac......
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