Green v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.

Decision Date29 July 1999
Citation160 N.J. 480,734 A.2d 1147
PartiesRobert GREEN and Irene Green, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent. Robert Green and Irene Green, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Deborah A. Dreyer and on Time Transport, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendants, and Ironbound Heat Treating Co., a New Jersey Corporation and Harold A. Williams, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Andrew J. Kyreakakis, Bloomfield, for plaintiffs-appellants (Ambrosio, Kyreakakis, DiLorenzo, Moraff & McKenna, attorneys).

Brian G. Steller, Roseland, for defendant-respondent New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (Connell Foley & Geiser, attorneys; Glenn T. Dyer, on the brief).

Edwin J. McCreedy, Cranford, for defendants-respondents Ironbound Heat Treating Co. and Harold A. Williams (McCreedy & Cox, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by HANDLER, J.

This consolidated case is based on personal injury claims arising out of two motor vehicle accidents. In the course of the trial, the court allowed defendants to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's racial bias. That evidence consisted of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, which was used to impeach him on cross-examination. The jury returned a verdict of no cause against plaintiff, and the Appellate Division, in an unreported decision, affirmed the jury verdict. The matter is before the Court based on a dissent. Rule 2:2-1(a).

The dissent would have reversed the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial because the admission of the plaintiff's racist remarks was unduly prejudicial and had the clear capacity to infect the jury's verdict, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 403. The position of the dissent concerning the evidence of the plaintiff's racial bias poses the issue on appeal.

I

On the night of August 6, 1991, plaintiff, Robert Green, a high-voltage electrician, was on his way to a night shift when his van was struck by a car and pushed into a signal pole. The van was completely destroyed. Green refused to go to a hospital believing that he had suffered only minor injuries. He completed his entire work shift from twelve midnight to seven o'clock the next morning.

The next day, plaintiff went to a care station complaining of chest pains. He was diagnosed with a broken rib and later experienced pain in his elbow. On September 27, 1991, after consulting with two physicians, Green stopped going to work. As of the trial date, he had not returned to work.

Plaintiff's second accident occurred on the afternoon of January 19, 1994, as Green was being driven home by a medical transport vehicle from an appointment with his psychologist. Plaintiff was unable to drive because of neck problems. The "On Time Transport" vehicle had stopped at a stop sign when it was struck from the rear by a van, causing it to skid into the middle of the road. Plaintiff asserted that when the transport vehicle was struck, he jammed his wrists against the dashboard to keep from hitting the windshield and was then slammed back into his seat by the shoulder belt. Green was taken to the hospital, where he was prescribed pain medication and released with instructions to consult his doctor.

Plaintiff received a settlement for damages incurred in the 1991 accident based on the other driver's policy limit of $100,000. He then pursued an underinsured motorist's action (UIM) against his carrier, defendant New Jersey Manufacturer's Insurance Company (NJM), for alleged damages in excess of $100,000. A binding arbitration of that action resulted in a liability finding of 85% negligence against the alleged tortfeasor and 15% negligence on the part of the plaintiff and an award for damages. NJM filed an action for de novo review on the issue of damages. Plaintiff also sued NJM, his Personal Injury Protection (PIP) carrier, for unreimbursed medical expenses, allegedly incurred as a result of the 1991 accident.

After the 1994 accident, plaintiff brought an unrelated personal injury action against On Time Transport and its driver, Deborah Dreyer; defendant Harold Williams, who was driving a van owned by defendant Ironbound Heat Treating Company; and NJM, Ironbound's insurance carrier. On Time Transport and Deborah Dreyer settled with plaintiff before trial.

The actions against NJM for UIM coverage for the 1991 accident and against defendants Ironbound and Williams (hereinafter "Ironbound") for the 1994 accident were consolidated and tried together by a jury. The PIP action was reserved for the trial court's determination.

A.

The issue before the Court involving the admission and import of plaintiff's racist statements must be considered in the context of the extensive medical evidence detailing plaintiff's injuries.

The medical experts at trial addressed Green's physical symptoms and their origins, focusing particularly on his chronic pain. Green testified that he suffered numerous symptoms as a result of the 1991 accident, including chronic pain in his neck, arms and legs, as well as numbness in his hands. He began to experience lower back pain after the 1994 accident, and he ultimately had three surgeries performed: a nerve release on the right arm performed by Dr. Hodosh; a discectomy and left arm nerve release performed by Dr. Koziol; and the insertion of a spinal cord stimulator performed by Dr. Kantha. Green testified, however, that none of the surgical procedures was successful in significantly alleviating his chronic pain.

Green also related a number of physical injuries prior to the 1991 automobile accident. He denied missing any substantial amount of work for those injuries, but admitted on cross-examination to other past injuries that required him to miss work for several weeks at a time. Plaintiff's treating physician in the 1980's testified to his treatment of Green and that he referred Green to an orthopedic surgeon, a neurologist, and two neurosurgeons.

Four other medical experts testified on behalf of Green. These experts found that Green's injuries, including his neck, back, elbow, and nerve injuries, were permanent and had been caused by the 1991 accident. They testified that Green's condition worsened following the 1994 accident and that he experienced lower back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and shoulder instability as a result. The experts conceded, however, that Green had complained of some symptoms, including numbness in the arms, as early as 1983.

Green also claimed that he suffered psychological injuries as a result of the two car accidents. He presented evidence regarding his symptoms, including a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),1 which he claimed was a result of the trauma he suffered in the 1991 accident. Defendants contended, however, that plaintiff's PTSD was the result of trauma Green suffered while serving in Vietnam, and that it was compounded by other, preexisting psychological conditions, including paranoia.

Plaintiff initially testified that he had had no stressful personal events in his life prior to the 1991 accident. He stated that it was only after the accident that he began experiencing psychological symptoms, including depression and anxiety, which required psychological and psychiatric treatment. He conceded on cross-examination, however, that his two marriages had ended in divorce and that he had a child with whom he was no longer in contact.

Green also admitted to participating in a group therapy or "rap group" for Vietnam veterans in 1991 at his doctor's recommendation when he experienced flashbacks of his Vietnam experience during the Persian Gulf War. He denied, however, having received any specific treatment or medication at the Veterans' Administration (VA) Hospital for psychological problems related to Vietnam. Green's physician contradicted this testimony, stating that prior to the 1991 accident, he referred Green to a program at the VA hospital to deal with "problems pertaining to post traumatic stress syndrome as a result of his service in Vietnam" and that this program consisted both of group therapy and one-on-one therapy. Green did not inform any of his subsequent doctors that he had had individual therapy.

Green began seeing a psychologist in 1993 after complaining that he was afraid of driving, was having problems adjusting in the aftermath of the 1991 accident, and was having difficulties with family and friends. Plaintiff's psychologist testified that Green's PTSD was primarily the result of the 1991 accident, not of his experiences in Vietnam, although Green did experience some symptoms as a result of his military service. Plaintiff was also referred to a psychiatrist, who testified that Green's PTSD was a result of the 1991 accident because Green's symptoms commenced after the accident; his flashbacks, such as feeling the pole coming through the windshield, were specific to that accident; and he had functioned well between 1973 and 1991. The expert also testified that Green's condition had worsened after the 1994 accident.

Defendants presented several witnesses to challenge plaintiff's claim that he suffered psychological injuries as a result of the two accidents. The expert, Dr. Sorvino, a psychiatrist testifying on behalf of defendant NJM, interviewed plaintiff and diagnosed him with PTSD. Dr. Sorvino testified that he believed Green's PTSD was a result of plaintiff's experiences in Vietnam, exacerbated by the Persian Gulf War. The expert based this opinion on Green's own statement that he had been diagnosed with PTSD.

Dr. Sorvino also diagnosed Green with a paranoid personality disorder. He based this diagnosis on Green's statements that he "doesn't like doctors because they don't render honest reports"; that he was under surveillance by the "insurance people"; and that he left that military "because he didn't like certain elements in the Army."

Finally, Dr. Sorvino diagnosed Green with a...

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