Stephens v. State, 86-176

• Citation: 734 P.2d 555
• Decision Date: 27 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-176,86-176
• Parties: Roy Dale STEPHENS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

Page 555

734 P.2d 555

Roy Dale STEPHENS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 86-176.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 27, 1987.

A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction of accessory after the fact to the commission of a burglary, in violation of § 6-5-202, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement). The issues raised by appellant are whether or not there was sufficient evidence of the element of "rendering assistance" and of the element of "intent" to sustain the conviction. We hold that there was not sufficient evidence of either element, and reverse the conviction.

On December 1, 1985, appellant was at his ex-wife's residence with Harry Van Buren. Appellant agreed to let Van Buren stay with him that evening and in return Van Buren agreed to help appellant look for a part for appellant's truck the following morning. Appellant left the house about three o'clock that afternoon, while Van Buren remained. The next time appellant saw Van Buren was about 8:00 that evening. At that time, Van Buren informed appellant and appellant's girl friend that he had burglarized Yellowstone Electric hours earlier. Appellant told Van Buren he "didn't want to hear about it." The next morning appellant and his girlfriend When appellant was unable to find the truck part he needed he asked Van Buren to give him some money to purchase a car. Van Buren complied, giving appellant $100. Thereafter, an automobile was purchased and the two traveled back to the home, appellant driving the recently purchased car while Van Buren drove the truck. Upon arriving home, appellant noticed that Van Buren, having arrived home already, was being questioned by police officers in a police car. Subsequently, appellant was approached by the police officers.

awoke to find Van Buren gone. He returned around 7:30 a.m., and went with appellant to look for the truck part, as previously arranged.

When the officers questioned appellant about the burglary and Van Buren's possible role in it, appellant replied that he did not know anything about it. Upon further questioning, appellant informed the officers that a few years earlier he had received money from Van Buren from a similar burglary. Appellant told the officers that he had learned his lesson after the earlier burglary and would not get involved in that situation again.

About fifteen minutes later the police confronted appellant with some information they had received from his girlfriend, and appellant then admitted that he knew of the burglary and of Van Buren's role in it. Appellant also told the officers that he had told Van Buren he did not want to know about it.

The statute under which appellant was convicted reads, in part:

"(a) A person is an accessory after the fact if, with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, detention, conviction or punishment of another for the commission of a crime, he renders assistance to the person * * *." § 6-5-202, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement).

The two elements that appellant contends are missing are the elements of intent and rendering assistance.

RENDERING ASSISTANCE

"Render assistance" is defined in § 6-5-201 as follows:

"(a) As used in this article:

" * * *

"(iv) 'Render assistance' means to:

"(A) Harbor or conceal the person;

"(B) Warn the person of impending discovery or apprehension, excluding an official warning given in an effort to bring the person into compliance with the law;

" * * *

"(D) By force, intimidation or deception, obstruct anyone in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of the person."

The state contends that appellant rendered assistance by harboring or concealing Van Buren and by helping Van Buren to avoid discovery and apprehension. The facts that the state relies on are that appellant provided Van Buren a place to stay the night after the burglary and that he denied knowledge of Van Buren's involvement in the burglary. Case law from other jurisdictions does not support this argument.

In the case of State v. Clifford, 263 Or. 436, 502 P.2d 1371 (1972), the defendant saw Douglas Wright a day after Wright murdered two people and kidnapped a five-year-old boy. After learning of the murder, defendant was arrested on other charges and asked by the police if he had seen Wright. Defendant told the police either that he had not seen Wright, or that he had not seen him in a long time. The Oregon Supreme Court, after reciting the common-law history of the offense of being an accessory after the fact, concluded that there was no sharp line between conduct which constituted aiding or concealing and that which does not. However, some type of line may be drawn from examples given.

" * * * The examples describing criminal conduct uniformly consist of an affirmative act from which the intention to aid an offender, to escape arrest, conviction or punishment is obvious. None of the examples indicate that a mere denial of knowledge of the whereabouts of an offender at some time in the past would Furthermore, other cases uniformly support the conclusion reached by the Oregon Supreme Court, that is, merely denying knowledge of the principal's involvement in a crime will not give rise to a charge of accessory after the fact. See Findley v. State, Tex.Crim.App., 378 S.W.2d 850 (1964); and Tipton v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.Rptr. 439, 72 S.W.2d 290 (1934). A mere denial of knowledge is to be differentiated from an "[a]ffirmative statement of facts tending to raise any defense for (the principal), or a statement within itself indicating an effort to shield or protect (the principal)." State v. Clifford, supra, 502 P.2d at 1374, quoting from Tipton v. State, supra. Such an affirmative statement would be such as supplying a false alibi. This amounts to more than passive nondisclosure. People v. Duty, 269 Cal.App.2d 97, 74 Cal.Rptr. 606 (1969).

amount to accessorial conduct." State v. Clifford, supra, at 1374.

In the case here, appellant did nothing more than passively deny knowledge of Van Buren's involvement in the burglary. When finally confronted by the statement made by his girlfriend, appellant relented and told the police what he really knew. This does not rise to the level...