Geddes v. Benefits Review Bd. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 83-1452
| Decision Date | 27 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1452,83-1452 |
| Citation | 236 U.S. App. D.C. 381,735 F.2d 1412 |
| Parties | Francis V. GEDDES, Jr., Petitioner, v. BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Intervenor. . Argued 10 Nov. 1983. Decided 22 May 1984. Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. Bernard J. DiMuro, Alexandria, Va., with whom John D. Grad, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for petitioner. Janis L. McDonald, Alexandria, Va., also entered an appearance for petitioner. John F. Ward, Gaithersburg, Md., for intervenor, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. Before WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY. Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge MacKINNON. WILKEY, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Francis V. Geddes seeks review of a determination of the Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, which denied his claim for back pay and benefits under section 49 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). 1 That section prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee has claimed compensation under the Act. The Benefits Review Board (the "Board") denied Geddes' section 49 claim on the ground that petitioner did not prove that his filing of a claim for compensation motivated the employer's allegedly discriminatory action. 2 We find that the Benefits Review Board failed to apply the correct standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of proof between Geddes and his employer. We, therefore, vacate the order on review and remand the case to the Board. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner Geddes was employed as a bus driver by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") for seven years prior to his injury. In March of 1975, a public hearing was held concerning proposed rate increases for WMATA buses. Geddes testified in opposition to the proposed rate increases as a private citizen at the public hearing, noting inst |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board.
Bernard J. DiMuro, Alexandria, Va., with whom John D. Grad, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for petitioner. Janis L. McDonald, Alexandria, Va., also entered an appearance for petitioner.
John F. Ward, Gaithersburg, Md., for intervenor, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
Before WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
Petitioner Francis V. Geddes seeks review of a determination of the Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, which denied his claim for back pay and benefits under section 49 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). 1 That section prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee has claimed compensation under the Act. The Benefits Review Board (the "Board") denied Geddes' section 49 claim on the ground that petitioner did not prove that his filing of a claim for compensation motivated the employer's allegedly discriminatory action. 2 We find that the Benefits Review Board failed to apply the correct standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of proof between Geddes and his employer. We, therefore, vacate the order on review and remand the case to the Board.
Petitioner Geddes was employed as a bus driver by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") for seven years prior to his injury. In March of 1975, a public hearing was held concerning proposed rate increases for WMATA buses. Geddes testified in opposition to the proposed rate increases as a private citizen at the public hearing, noting instances of wasteful mismanagement at WMATA. Within two days of Geddes' appearance at the hearing, WMATA fired him from his job. After much publicity and press coverage of the firing, Geddes was reinstated the following week. 3
Once reinstated, however, Geddes was subjected to intense harassment by WMATA officials. He was put under unusually strict surveillance on the job; he received citations for fabricated violations; and his supervisors spread lies about him. 4 The repeated harassment by supervisors had an upsetting effect on Geddes, who became physically ill on 11 April 1978 when he was told to report after work to answer for yet another violation. Geddes was unable to complete his scheduled bus run and was placed on sick leave. He came under the care of a psychiatrist. On 8 May 1978 Geddes filed a claim for compensation for total temporary disability under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 5 After recovering from his illness, in October 1978 Geddes began making inquiries about returning to work. WMATA, however, put Geddes on "inactive status" and failed to respond to his inquiries. Geddes has not worked at WMATA since the day he became ill. 6
Geddes' claims under the Act sought both compensation for total temporary disability as well as back pay due to WMATA's allegedly unlawful refusal to permit him to return to work. A hearing on both claims was held before an Administrative Law Judge in April 1979. In his subsequent decision and order, the ALJ determined that WMATA supervisors' harassment of Geddes during the course of his employment caused Geddes' psychological/physical illness. The ALJ held that Geddes was entitled to compensation for temporary total disability from 11 April 1978 until 11 August 1978. In addition, the ALJ found that WMATA unlawfully discriminated against Geddes by refusing to allow him to return to work after his recovery. This, the ALJ held, violated section 49 of the Act, which prohibits an employer from discriminating in any manner against an employee because the employee has claimed compensation under the Act. Accordingly, the ALJ ordered WMATA to reimburse Geddes for lost wages for the period during which Geddes had recovered but had not been reinstated. 7
WMATA petitioned the ALJ for reconsideration of the section 49 discrimination issue only; it did not challenge the ALJ's finding that the supervisors' harassment of Geddes at work made him ill. The petition for reconsideration was granted and a supplemental hearing was held. In his decision upon reconsideration, the ALJ found that WMATA became aware of Geddes' interest in returning to work in October 1978. He further found that WMATA treated Geddes as an "outcast," hoping to prevent him from returning to work. 8 He explicitly found that WMATA had animus toward Geddes and did not want Geddes back on the job. The ALJ, however, reversed his previous position on causation in regard to the discrimination claim and held that Geddes had failed to prove that his filing of a claim for compensation under the Act contributed to the animus and hostility WMATA directed at him. The ALJ, therefore, denied Geddes' claim for back pay under section 49. 9
Geddes appealed that finding to the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor. The sole issue on appeal was whether the ALJ properly denied Geddes' discrimination claim under section 49. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision and this petition for review ensued.
review of the decision of the Benefits Review Board is limited to a review for errors of law and for findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 10 We find that the Board erred by failing to apply the proper standard of proof and by improperly allocating the evidentiary burden between Geddes and WMATA.
Geddes seeks back pay on the ground that WMATA discriminated against him in violation of section 49 of the Act. That section provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer or his duly authorized agent to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation from such employer.... 11
The elements of a meritorious complaint under section 49 are twofold. First, the employer must commit a discriminatory act. Second, the discriminatory act must be motivated by animus against the employee because of the employee's pursuit of his rights under the Act. 12 This second requirement of a section 49 claim is satisfied even if the employer's action is only partially motivated by an employee's exercise of his rights under the Act; an employer who discriminates against an employee both because the employee filed a compensation claim and because of other, independent reasons nonetheless violates section 49. 13
Turning to the first element of the section 49 offense claimed here, the ALJ heard testimony about WMATA's discriminatory treatment of Geddes, which was alleged to be WMATA's refusal to allow Geddes to return to work from the time of his recovery until June 1980. Geddes testified that he made numerous attempts to return to work beginning in the fall of 1978 and that WMATA ignored and frustrated his efforts to be reinstated. The ALJ found that, at minimum, WMATA was aware of Geddes' inquiries about returning to work and attempted to dissuade him from doing so. The ALJ apparently found it unnecessary, however, to make an explicit determination of whether the actions of WMATA were discriminatory because of his finding with respect to the second element of a section 49 claim--WMATA's motivation for its actions.
In addressing the issue of WMATA's motivation for its actions, the ALJ found that WMATA had animus against Geddes, which finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. There was testimony that WMATA supervisors passed Geddes' claim form around the office while laughing at his claim and ridiculing his illness. 14 There was also testimony that a member of WMATA's claims office said that Geddes would be prevented from returning to work until the dispute over his claim for compensation had been fully resolved. 15
The ALJ not only concluded that WMATA believed that Geddes was not a "team player" and that it had animus against him but he also concluded that this animus prompted WMATA's unwillingness to allow Geddes to resume his job. According to the ALJ, WMATA treated Geddes as an "outcast," intending to induce him never to return to work. 16 This treatment was caused by WMATA's animus against Geddes.
Although Geddes successfully proved that WMATA's animus motivated its attempts to prevent Geddes from returning to work, the ALJ denied petitioner's claim under section 49 because Geddes failed to prove that the animus against him was at least partially motivated by his filing of a claim for compensation. The ALJ noted that WMATA's harassment of Geddes began when Geddes testified at the public hearing in 1975. He concluded that "general animus" continued to motivate WMATA's actions even after Geddes filed his claim for compenation under the Act. The ALJ denied Geddes' claim, therefore, because Geddes failed to prove that his filing of a compensation claim was a separate, contributing factor in WMATA's refusal to let him return to work, when this refusal was viewed in the context of WMATA's repeated harassment of and discrimination against Geddes over the course of three years. 17
In finding that WMATA's motivation for its actions against Geddes was unrelated to Geddes' exercise of his rights under the Act, the ALJ placed too heavy a burden on Geddes to prove that the filing of his compensation claim contributed to the animus against him....
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