Seegull Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 83-5248

Decision Date28 August 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-5248,83-5248
Citation735 F.2d 971
Parties116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2569, 101 Lab.Cas. P 11,049 SEEGULL MANUFACTURING CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Aileen A. Armstrong (Lead), Asst. Gen. Counsel for Special Litigation, Elaine Patrick (argued), Margery Lieber, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., John F. Harrington, N.L.R.B., Memphis, Tenn., for defendant-appellant.

John P. Scruggs, W. Kerby Bowling, II (argued), Bowling & Scruggs, Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KEITH and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and REED, District Judge. *

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has appealed the district court's award of attorney fees to Seegull Manufacturing Company (Seegull) in this Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.) proceeding.

The facts are undisputed. On December 28 and 30, 1981, the NLRB commenced unfair labor practice charges against Seegull filed by former Seegull employees Margie Gilley (Gilley) and Lonnie Stanford (Stanford). Gilley subsequently initiated Equal Pay Act litigation against Seegull in the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that she had performed work substantially equal to Stanford's, but had received unequal compensation.

To assist in its defense to Gilley's civil action, Seegull sought affidavits submitted by Stanford and Gilley to the NLRB during the unfair labor practice investigation of Seegull. On April 29, 1982, Seegull requested the documents from the Board pursuant to the F.O.I.A., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(3), and 29 C.F.R. Sec. 102.117(c)(1) of the Board's regulations. On May 7, 1982, the NLRB's Regional Director denied the request. The denial was based upon alternative rationales that the NLRB General Counsel's FOIA Guidelines in Closed Cases, 100 LRR 122, precluded disclosing the requested materials prior to the expiration of the six-month buffer period and that the information was privileged from disclosure pursuant to exemptions 7(A), (C) and (D) of Sec. 552(b) of the F.O.I.A. Seegull timely appealed the Regional Director's determination to the NLRB's General Counsel, who affirmed the decision not to release the documents. On July 21, 1982, Seegull commenced action to compel disclosure of the documents pursuant to the F.O.I.A. On August 17, the NLRB released the documents to Seegull, explaining that the release was due to the expiration of the six-month buffer period as provided in the NLRB's guidelines. The NLRB then answered Seegull's complaint by admitting the foregoing facts, and by pleading that the issue was moot as a result of the August 17 disclosure.

On September 16, 1982, Seegull filed a petition for attorney fees and costs pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E). Seegull requested $1,583.80. The NLRB opposed the motion, and on March 17, 1983, the district court awarded Seegull $943.80. (The amount reflected a deduction for work done on a summary judgment motion which was never filed.) The NLRB timely appealed. The issue presented on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. See Murty v. Office of Personnel Management, 707 F.2d 815 (4th Cir.1983); Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740 (D.C.Cir.1979).

The statutory basis for an award of attorney fees and costs under the F.O.I.A. is found in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E), which states:

The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.

The threshold inquiry pursuant to this provision is whether Seegull has "substantially prevailed". The NLRB has urged that Seegull's lawsuit was unnecessary and had no causative effect on the delivery of information because the documents were automatically subject to release at the termination of the six-month period imposed by NLRB guidelines. The district court properly rejected this argument. The Regional Director's letter clearly stated that the documents were absolutely privileged under exemptions 7(A), (C) and (D) of the F.O.I.A.'s Sec. 552(b). The General Counsel did not disclaim this exemption ruling, nor was Seegull informed that it could renew its request at the end of the six months. Rather, the General Counsel's letter informed Seegull of its right to institute the federal lawsuit. Therefore, Seegull's filing of the lawsuit was not so superfluous as to deprive Seegull of its substantially prevailing party status under the Act. Cf. Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66 (6th Cir.1983).

Insofar as the filing of the complaint was necessary to and did result in achieving the disclosure, it was not error for the district judge to have concluded that Seegull prevailed in its lawsuit. See Wolfel, supra, at 69.

The considerations relevant to the exercise of discretion in awarding fees are the benefit to the public deriving from the case, the commercial benefit to the complainant and the nature of his interest in the records, and whether the...

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1 cases
  • Seegull Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • August 28, 1984
    ...Company (Seegull), in this proceeding under the Freedom of Information Act. This court's previous opinion in this case, issued June 1, 1984, 735 F.2d 971, is vacated and the instant decision is issued in its The facts are not in dispute. On December 28 and 30, 1981, the Board concluded unfa......

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