Preston v. State
Decision Date | 26 September 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 67A01-0001-CR-14.,67A01-0001-CR-14. |
Citation | 735 N.E.2d 330 |
Parties | James L. PRESTON and David L. McCarty, Appellants-Defendants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jeffrey R. Mitchell, Yarling & Robinson, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellants.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Priscilla J. Fossum, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellants-defendants James L. Preston ("Preston") and David L. McCarty ("McCarty") (collectively, "appellants") appeal the trial court's judgments against them for violating maximum highway weight limitations. We affirm.
Appellants raise four issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:
I. whether the trial court's judgments are supported by sufficient evidence;
II. whether Indiana Code Section 9-20-18-7 was applicable as a defense to the weight limitation action initiated by the State under Indiana Code Section 9-20-4-1; and
III. if Indiana Code Section 9-20-4-1 was applicable as a defense, whether appellants presented sufficient evidence of their lack of access to or control of the loading of their trucks to avoid liability.
On May 26, 1999, appellants were driving asphalt-laden tri-axle1 dump trucks for Milestone Contractors when state police motor carrier inspectors stopped their vehicles in Putnam County, Indiana. The inspectors weighed both trucks and determined that Preston's load weighed 55,600 pounds and that McCarty's load weighed 54,100 pounds. Both Preston and McCarty received citations for "overweight combination axles" pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-20-4-1.
On October 19, 1999, the trial court conducted a joint hearing on appellants' citations. During final argument, appellants' counsel attempted to assert Indiana Code Section 9-20-18-7 as a defense, claiming that appellants "had no access to or control of" the loading of their trucks. Noting that this statute mentions criminal liability, whereas appellants' alleged violations were merely infractions, the trial court took its applicability under advisement. On November 3, 1999, the trial court entered judgment against appellants, ordering Preston to pay $460 plus costs and McCarty to pay $248 plus costs. The trial court did not enter findings regarding the applicability of Indiana Code Section 9-20-18-7 in its orders of judgment. However, the corresponding chronological case summary ("CCS") entries for both causes state that the court found "that IC X-XX-XX-X is inapplicable to this case as it speaks to criminal liability only, and the charge herein is an infraction under IC 9-20-4."
"[A]n appellate court may affirm a trial court's judgment2 on any theory supported by the evidence." Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.1999). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. See Pridemore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991)
. Id. (citations omitted).
Traffic infraction proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature, and are to be conducted in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. See Pridemore, 577 N.E.2d at 238
; see also IND.CODE § 9-20-18-12 ( ); IND. CODE § 34-28-5-1 ( ); Wirgau v. State, 443 N.E.2d 327, 329-30 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) ( ). "[T]he State must prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the evidence[.]" Pridemore, 577 N.E.2d at 238.
Appellants contend that the State failed to prove that they violated any subsection of section 9-20-4-1. However, we need not accept their invitation to sift the evidence through each subsection of the statute because they both admitted at the hearing that the load limit for their tri-axle dump trucks is 50,000 pounds.3 See Wirgau, 443 N.E.2d at 332
(. ) Because appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the State's evidence that their loads exceeded this limit, we need not address this issue further.
Having determined that the State met its burden of proof, we must now determine whether section 9-20-18-7 was applicable as a defense. The statute reads as follows:
Since 1981, traffic infractions have been civil, rather than criminal, in nature. See Wirgau, 443 N.E.2d at 329-30
. Section 9-20-18-7 was last amended in 1991, and the defense regarding "access to or control of the loading" first appeared in 1971. See 1991 Ind. Acts 2 § 8; 1971 Ind. Acts 134 § 1. Appellants contend that notwithstanding the statute's mention of criminal liability, it must be applicable as a defense to a weight limit violation charge under the current civil procedural guidelines. We agree.
"When interpreting a statute, a court should strive to achieve the intent of the legislature." Baker v. State, 483 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied. Where, as here, a statute has not been previously construed, the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction control the interpretation. See Becker v. Four Points Inv. Corp., 708 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999),
trans. denied.
Baker, 483 N.E.2d at 774 (citations omitted). Althaus v. Evansville Courier Co., 615 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind.Ct. App.1993) (citations omitted). Since the legislature clearly intended that criminal liability no longer be imposed for transporting an overweight load over Indiana highways, see IND.CODE § 9-20-18-12,4 we conclude that the only practical interpretation of section 9-20-18-7 is to consider as mere surplusage any mention of criminal liability within the statute.5 Thus, section 9-20-18-7 was applicable as a defense to the State's charges of appellants' weight limit violations under section 9-20-4-1.
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court "simply ignored" the "uncontroverted evidence" that they had no access to or control of the loading of their overweighted loads. See IND.CODE § 9-20-18-7(b). McCarty testified...
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