Millard v. La Pointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 83-3726

Decision Date03 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-3726,83-3726
Citation736 F.2d 501
Parties34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1335, 35 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 830, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,383 Lener T. MILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LA POINTE'S FASHION STORE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Mark A. Peterson, Klamath Falls, Or., for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert F.L. Trotman, Klamath Falls, Or., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before MERRILL, FARRIS and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.

MERRILL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Lener Millard filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that she had been denied consideration for employment by Appellee, LaPointe's Fashion Store, Inc., on account of her race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. The Commission ultimately determined that efforts to resolve the matter were unsuccessful and issued Millard a right-to-sue letter, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1), on July 24, 1981. The letter notified Millard that she had ninety days in which to file a civil action in the appropriate district court. On August 10, 1981, Millard came to the district clerk's office for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas and requested that she be referred to an attorney. No further action was taken by either the clerk's office or Millard for almost ten months. On June 1, 1982, in response to a telephone inquiry by Millard, a law clerk from the District Court referred her to the offices of the East Texas Legal Services. On September 2, 1982, Millard's complaint was filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. On September 28, 1982, the District Court issued an order transferring venue to the United States District Court of Oregon.

LaPointe filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion for a More Definite Statement, both of which were opposed by Millard. On December 28, 1982, the District Court found in favor of LaPointe on the Summary Judgment motion and dismissed Millard's claims. In particular, the District Court found that Millard's Title VII claim was time-barred since she did not file her suit within ninety days of her receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the Commission. This appeal followed.

For this appeal, the relevant portion of Title VII, which allows discrimination suits against private parties, provides:

If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission ... the Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge .... Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).

This Court has repeatedly held that the limitation period for filing a civil complaint is a jurisdictional requirement. See Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1214 & n. 10 (9th Cir.1980); Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 2234, 56 L.Ed.2d 402 (1978); Wong v. Bon Marche, 508 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir.1975). If the aggrieved party does not file an action within the prescribed time limit, federal courts have no power to entertain the action.

In the instant case, Millard filed her complaint over a year after she received the right-to-sue letter. That letter was unequivocal in its notification of the ninety-day limitations period. Millard submits that her request for counsel--made within the ninety-day period--is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the civil action be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1).

It is true that this Court has recently adopted a less rigorous standard for determining the sufficiency of a filing...

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4 cases
  • Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 8, 1986
    ...is jurisdictional. Id. We have held that the 90-day period is a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., Millard v. La Pointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 736 F.2d 501, 502-03 (9th Cir.1984); Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.1975) (30-day limit for filing actions a......
  • Nielsen v. Flower Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • July 14, 1986
    ...them as untimely filed. See, e.g., Firle v. Mississippi State Dep't of Educ., 762 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.1985); Millard v. La Pointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 736 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Pala, Inc., 621 F.Supp. 1119, 1120-21 (M.D.La. 1985); Birge v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 597 F.Supp. 4......
  • Shieh v. Ebershoff
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 30, 1993
    ...1985(2) claim on the grounds that Shieh had not adequately pled the underlying discrimination. Relying on Millard v. La Pointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 736 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.1984), the district court found that Shieh's claims brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 were barred because they......
  • Birge v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • November 19, 1984
    ..."commences" a Title VII action. Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, supra, 720 F.2d 1084. See also Millard v. LaPointe's Fashion Store, Inc., 736 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.1984) (pro se plaintiff's request for counsel and right-to-sue letter insufficient to constitute the filing of a civil ......

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