State v. Winkler

Decision Date30 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 16065,16065
Citation112 Idaho 917,736 P.2d 1371
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael WINKLER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Michael J. Wood, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Peter Charles Erbland (argued), Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

One afternoon in Twin Falls, Michael Winkler made the acquaintance of a fourteen-year old female. This young woman contends Winkler lured her from a party at a house to a van parked nearby and, by threatening harm, induced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Winkler denies accompanying her to the van and denies any sexual assault. A jury found Winkler guilty of rape. 1 The trial judge entered judgment and committed Winkler to the custody of the State Board of Correction for an indeterminate period not to exceed life.

On appeal, Winkler presents four issues: (1) Did the trial court err by admitting an exhibit consisting of three newspaper clippings, which reported other charges pending against Winkler? (2) Did the court err by limiting cross-examination of the alleged victim regarding her prior sexual activity? (3) Did the court err in admitting evidence of previous felony convictions to impeach Winkler's testimony? (4) Did reversible error occur when the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the complaining witness, during his summation? We hold the court committed reversible error by admitting the newspaper clippings which reported pending charges. We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial. We will address all the issues raised by Winkler, for guidance at a new trial.

The following undisputed facts are gleaned from the record. Winkler met the alleged victim when she entered a van in which he was riding. They and their companions in the van proceeded by a circuitous route to the home of the van owner's brother, with the intention of "partying." Sometime later the victim left the home on foot in a state of emotional distress. When a neighbor offered aid, the victim disclosed that she had been raped, requested use of a phone and, later, accepted a ride to the apartment where she lived. This samaritan reported the victim's allegations to the police and an investigation ensued. Winkler was charged with rape on the basis of the victim's age, and on the basis of her statement that she had been prevented from resisting sexual intercourse by threats of bodily harm.

However, the events at the party are substantially disputed. The victim's testimony set forth the following scenario. While walking to her grandmother's home from the apartment where she was staying, she approached the van in question. A friend in the van invited her to party with them. She accepted and entered the van. There she met Winkler, who was one of the five occupants of the van. They drove to the residence of an acquaintance, where alcohol and marijuana were shared. However, she contends her consumption of intoxicants was minimal.

The victim testified that, while in the house, she was treated rudely by the others present and, therefore, agreed to accompany Winkler outside. She contends Winkler lured her into the van and sexually assaulted her. She testified Winkler threatened to throw her off a bridge or into a nearby canyon if she didn't comply with his wish for sexual intercourse. She also described a display of certain newspaper articles from his wallet, accompanied by suggestions that he had previously committed violent acts on other persons. According to the victim, sexual intercourse followed. She then returned to the residence, where she was insulted and slapped by one of the female guests. Crying, she left the scene.

Winkler took the stand on his own behalf and disputed the victim's version of the evening. He testified that the girl invited him outside and that they proceeded only as far as a nearby gate, where she requested a place to stay or a ride somewhere. He denied any sexual assault. He contended she had earlier provided money to him with which to purchase drugs and that she became angry when he refused to return the funds. It was implied that this refusal may have been the motivation for her accusations.

The state presented corroborating evidence to support the girl's testimony. This evidence included personal articles belonging to the victim (a comb and a sock) which were found in the van, newspaper clippings contained in Winkler's wallet when he was arrested shortly after the alleged rape, and the results of analyses of body fluid, hair and clothing samples. The state presented testimony from a series of investigators who confirmed that semen had been found in the victim's vagina. One of the investigators testified that, because the blood-type of the victim in this case would "mask" that of the defendant, Winkler, the blood-type analysis did not eliminate the possibility, nor conclusively prove, that Winkler was the source of this semen. Dried semen stains were also located on blankets obtained from the van and upon the clothing of both the victim and Winkler. Those stains apparently were not tested to determine blood-types. An investigator testified that a hair found on the defendant's underwear had the same characteristics as hair from the victim's head. As noted, the jury found Winkler guilty of rape.

I

We will first discuss the admission in evidence of the newspaper clippings. The clippings were admitted as a single exhibit, marked as "Exhibit AA." These newspaper clippings included reports of unrelated arrests and charges pending against Winkler. One article reported that Winkler had been arrested and charged with "aggravated battery with intent to commit murder." This item included witness descriptions of a fight involving Winkler, wherein he allegedly shot and wounded an apparently innocent person who had attempted to intervene in the fight. A second article described a misdemeanor charge of malicious destruction of property for smashing a windshield, and repeated the "aggravated assault" report. The third article reported a separate incident for which Winkler had been charged with aggravated battery. In that report, Winkler was accused of beating and cutting the face of an individual who had supplied the police with information leading to the arrest of two other individuals for selling cocaine. The articles disclosed that Winkler was held on bonds of $25,000 and $50,000. All of the alleged crimes were reported as having occurred in the Twin Falls area. On appeal, Winkler contends that introduction of the newspaper clippings was extremely prejudicial, erroneously admitted, and possibly led the jury to convict him on improper grounds.

Evidence of a defendant's unrelated criminal activity is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity or guilt of the crime charged. State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978); State v. Garney, 45 Idaho 768, 265 P. 668 (1928); State v. Larsen, 42 Idaho 517, 246 P. 313 (1926); see also I.R.E. 404. This exclusion is based upon the theory that evidence of other crimes "induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore, takes the jury away from their primary consideration of [the] guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial." State v. Wrenn, supra, 99 Idaho at 510, 584 P.2d at 1235.

Under certain circumstances, evidence of other crimes is admissible.

[T]his type of evidence can be admitted if relevant to prove: (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, and (6) other similar issues.

State v. Roach, 109 Idaho 973, 974, 712 P.2d 674, 675 (Ct.App.1985); see, e.g., State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984).

However, even where the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to a material issue at trial, the probative force of the evidence may be substantially outweighed by an inherent potential for prejudice. Thus, the decision to admit or exclude evidence of other crimes involves a two-tiered analysis. First, the evidence must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged. Second, and only if the evidence is deemed relevant, it must be determined whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Simonson, 112 Idaho 451, 732 P.2d 689 (Ct.App.1987); see also United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.1978) (comparable federal court approach), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). This balancing is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed unless that discretion has been abused. State v. Simonson, supra.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the circumstances under which the newspaper clippings were admitted in this case, as Exhibit AA. Before trial, the state had requested a ruling from the court regarding the admissibility of the clippings. After a hearing, the court concluded:

The Court is going to reserve ruling on this point. I would definitely feel that if in fact the witness'--the alleged victim's credibility is placed at stake, this would be definitely permissible as a rebuttal evidence.

Whether or not they should be admitted in the case in chief would depend on my seeing the clippings and making a determination whether their prejudicial value would outweigh the probative value, since I would agree with [defendant's counsel] that the force and threats are not a necessary element of...

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