Slakan v. Porter

• Decision Date: 05 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-6542,83-6542
• Citation: 737 F.2d 368
• Parties: 16 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 59 Charles J. SLAKAN, Appellee, v. T.C. PORTER, M.M. Walters, Amos Reed, Ralph Edwards, Sam Garrison, Appellants. and J.B. Barefoot, J.G. Watson, D.R. Woodard, Jack Lemons, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 368

737 F.2d 368

16 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 59

Charles J. SLAKAN, Appellee, v. T.C. PORTER, M.M. Walters, Amos Reed, Ralph Edwards, Sam Garrison, Appellants and J.B. Barefoot, J.G. Watson, D.R. Woodard, Jack Lemons, Defendants.

No. 83-6542.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 10, 1984.

Decided June 5, 1984.

Lucien Capone, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N.C. (Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N.C., on brief), for appellants.

Charles T.L. Anderson, Apex, N.C. (Richard E. Giroux, North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc., Raleigh, N.C., on brief), for appellee.

Before SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge. ^*

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:

Charles J. Slakan, a North Carolina inmate, was injured when prison guards Michael Walters, Tracy Porter, and Johnny Barefoot used high-pressure water hoses, tear gas, and billy clubs to subdue him while he was confined in a one-man cell. He brought a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 suit against the three guards and three high ranking prison supervisory officials, Warden Sam Garrison, Director of Prisons Ralph Edwards, and Secretary of Corrections Amos Reed, alleging (1) that the guards used excessive force against him in violation of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause and (2) that supervisory officials were deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm, as evidenced by their failure to provide prison guards with adequate training and guidance. The jury absolved prison guard Porter of liability, but awarded Slakan $32,500 in combined compensatory and punitive damages against the remaining five defendants. We affirm.

I

Slakan was housed in a one-man cell at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina, during the episode involved in this appeal. Walters, Porter, and Barefoot were prison guards assigned to the intensive management section of the Raleigh facility where Slakan was confined. Garrison was the Central Prison Warden and Edwards and Reed served as North Carolina's Director of Prisons and Secretary of Corrections, respectively.

On the morning of August 3, 1979, Slakan awakened to discover that he and many of his fellow inmates had missed receiving their usual morning cup of coffee. He complained loudly and finally drew the attention of Walters, the acting lieutenant in charge of cell-blocks A, B, C and D. Walters brusquely rejected Slakan's complaint and began walking away from the cell when the inmate reached through the bars of his door and slapped the lieutenant on the shoulder. The parties vigorously dispute the amount of force Slakan used to impede the guard's movement. Walters spun around upon receiving the blow and flung a cup of coffee he was holding in Slakan's direction, striking the prisoner in the face and shoulder. Enraged, Slakan spewed obscenities at Walters, who immediately called for a water hose to quell the one-man disturbance. The hose was brought to the cell door and a blast of water was directed at Slakan's head and neck. The inmate panicked and hurled toilet paper, cleaning agents, and other small items within his reach towards Walters. Another hose was ordered and a second blast of water was directed at Slakan's head and neck, forcing him against the back wall of his cell.

Meanwhile, tear gas was sprayed into the cell every several minutes, eventually rendering the prisoner powerless. Guards Walters, Barefoot, and Porter ceased their two-pronged attack against Slakan after five to ten minutes and entered his cell. One of the guards struck Slakan twice on the head with a billy club causing him to fall onto his bed. He then was beaten repeatedly on the head and body an indeterminate number of times until he apparently lost consciousness. Slakan eventually was removed from the cell and taken to the first aid room for treatment. He required sixty-nine stitches for the head wounds received during the attack, and reportedly suffered minor contusions and eye irritation from the water blasts and tear gas.

Slakan, acting pro se, filed suit against the guards involved in the episode, alleging that they had used excessive force in the conduct of their duties. He also named Warden Garrison, Director Edwards, and Secretary Reed as co-defendants, claiming that they either had been deliberately indifferent to the use of excessive force by guards or had tacitly authorized such practices through their regulations and policies. The district court appointed counsel to assist Slakan in the presentation of his case, and all parties consented to jury trial before a United States magistrate.

The trial began on May 31, 1983, and lasted four days. The evidence relating to the guard's excessive use of force in subduing Slakan was straightforward and convincing. The evidence relating to the supervisory liability of Garrison, Edwards, and Reed, however, was much more indirect and involved. It showed that, though none of the three men had given express approval for the use of force against Slakan, they were all aware of seven recent cases involving the use of high-pressure hoses against Central Prison inmates housed in one-man cells. The evidence further showed that Garrison and Edwards had disapproved of a gubernatorial committee's call for rules restricting the use of high pressure water hoses to situations in which the inmate posed a threat to himself or others. Slakan's case against Secretary Reed focused principally on his failure to enact regulations specifying when and under what circumstances high-pressure hoses, billy clubs, and tear gas might be used against a prisoner in a one-man cell.

The jury deliberated for a few hours and returned a verdict for the plaintiff against all defendants except Porter, one of the guards allegedly responsible for striking Slakan on the head. All five remaining defendants were ordered to pay $500 each in compensatory damages and sums ranging from $10,000 to $1,000 each in punitive damages, for a total award to Slakan of $32,500. On appeal, the various defendants seek reversal on the following grounds: (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish the supervisory liability of Garrison, Edwards or Reed; (2) in any event, these officials enjoyed qualified immunity because they did not violate any of Slakan's established constitutional rights; (3) the video demonstration of the effects of a high-pressure water hose was prejudicial and should have been excluded; (4) the trial court erred by ruling that the plaintiff's conversations with his psychologist immediately after the attack were privileged; and (5) the trial court erred by permitting an expert to testify about the punitive nature of North Carolina's practices concerning the use of water hoses against inmates.

II

The unjustified striking or beating of a prisoner by police or correctional officials constitutes cruel and unusual punishment which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir.1983); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir.1980). See also Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.1976); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). Society's intolerance for such brutality is well-documented, but it rises to new levels when the instrument of harm, even when properly used, possesses inherently dangerous characteristics capable of causing serious and perhaps irreparable injury to the victim. High-pressure water hoses, tear gas, and billy clubs, though legitimate forms of control in certain circumstances, become instruments of brutality when used indiscriminately against a defenseless prisoner. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.1979). Even when a prisoner's conduct warrants some form of response, evolving norms of decency require prison officials to use techniques and procedures that are both humane and restrained.

The prison guards' heavy-handed use of water hoses, billy clubs, and tear gas against Slakan unquestionably crossed the line separating necessary force from brutality. The prisoner was locked in a one-man cell at the time of the incident and posed no direct physical threat to other inmates or any of the guards. His abusive language may have deserved punishment through the prison disciplinary machinery, but it assuredly did not justify subjecting him to steady blasts of water from two high-pressure hoses or beating him savagely around the head and body with billy clubs. The guards' conduct indisputably deprived Slakan of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Our principal focus, then, is determining whether the responsibility for that deprivation can be traced to the actions of the guards' supervisors.

A

The decisions of this Court have firmly established the principle that supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929, 101 S.Ct. 1387, 67 L.Ed.2d 361 (1981). See also Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936; Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.1980). Liability in this context is not premised on respondeat superior, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), but on a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care. Orpiano, 632 F.2d at 1101.

The plaintiff, of course, assumes a heavy burden of proof in supervisory liability cases. He not only must demonstrate that the prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source, but he must show that the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or "tacit...