State v. Billie
Decision Date | 10 August 1999 |
Docket Number | (SC 15929) |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MAURICE BILLIE |
Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott and McDonald, Js. James P. Streeto, special public defender, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).
John A. East III, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Gary Nicholson, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee-appellant (state).
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in striking the testimony of the defendant's expert witness.1 The defendant, Maurice Billie, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of manslaughter in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-82 and 53a-55 (a) (1),3 one count of commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k,4 and one count of carrying a firearm without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35.5
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly excluded certain testimony of the defendant's expert witness regarding behavioral changes caused by the use of a drug known as "illy"6 that the defendant allegedly had been using on the days preceding and on the day of the crimes. State v. Billie, 47 Conn. App. 678, 679-80, 707 A.2d 324 (1998). The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in striking the testimony because the expert witness possessed a special knowledge of the drug not common to the average person, and his testimony would have assisted the jury in considering the issue of intoxication. Id., 684. Nevertheless, the Appellate Court concluded that the error was harmless because, even if the jury had believed the evidence of intoxication and had concluded that the defendant was so intoxicated that he could not form the specific intent to cause serious bodily harm pursuant to § 53a-55 (a) (1), the jury would have returned the same verdict of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. Id., 686.7 The court determined that the only distinction would be that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty under subdivision (3) of § 53a-55 (a) instead of subdivision (1).8 This certified appeal followed.
We conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court had abused its discretion in striking the testimony of the defendant's expert witness regarding the substance known as illy and its effects.9 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the defendant's conviction, although we do so on different grounds.
The Appellate Court determined that the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. "On September 3, 1994, the defendant spent the evening drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana and illy. The next day, the defendant went to a cookout hosted by friends where he and two friends smoked `blunts.'10 Later in the day, the defendant met his friend Andre Cinicola, who had a .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol in a shoulder holster. The defendant put on the holster and weapon and covered them with a leather jacket. Id., 680. The defendant decided to go to Congress Avenue in New Haven to purchase marijuana. The defendant drove a Mazda Miata and Cinicola rode in the passenger seat. While on Congress Avenue, the defendant and Cinicola were told Id. The defendant and Cinicola drove off in search of the blue Mustang.
Minutes later, the defendant came upon a blue Mustang with tinted windows, and a high speed chase ensued. Id., 680-81.
The police officers found Cinicola on the sidewalk next to the Miata and the defendant trapped in the driver's seat. Two passengers in the backseat of the Mustang had minor injuries. The driver of the Mustang, George Goforth, had been killed by a single gunshot wound to the head. The front seat passenger, Roshwanda Crenshaw, was killed by a single gunshot wound to the chest. Ballistic testing confirmed that the bullet that killed Crenshaw was fired from Cinicola's gun. The bullet that killed Goforth passed through his skull and was never recovered. Id., 681.
At trial, the defendant sought to introduce the expert testimony of Jeremy August, a psychiatrist, who was to testify regarding the behavioral effects caused by the use of the drug illy. Although August did testify regarding the behavioral effects of the components of illy—namely, methanol, phencyclidine (PCP), and formaldehyde—he stated that he could not testify as to the effects of these components in combination. August testified that illy was a nonuniform mixture of a variety of chemical substances, and that he had no knowledge as to the mixture ratio of the elements in the substance allegedly ingested by the defendant. He stated that "[i]lly is not like a prescription drug so ... the clinical presentation depends on how much each of the individual ingredients you have and the extent to which you've been taking the substance." He also testified that he had neither examined the defendant nor reviewed his medical records, and that he could not testify as to the behavioral effects, if any, experienced by the defendant at the time that the crimes were committed. Indeed, August offered to review the defendant's medical records in order to "make a guess as to what was actually in the concoction that he [was] presented with." Defense counsel rejected this offer. Consequently, the trial court ordered that August's entire testimony be stricken as irrelevant.
The defendant presented ample evidence of his drug use and the effects therefrom through his own testimony and that of his companions, Terrence Williams, Judale Wynkoop and Joseph Threatt.11 Williams and Wynkoop testified that they had ingested illy with the defendant during the evening hours preceding the shootings. Furthermore, the defendant testified that he had been a chronic user of illy for "four or five years." He also testified as to the behavioral changes he has experienced as a result of smoking illy.12
The defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of his expert witness. Specifically, the defendant claims that the exclusion of August's testimony improperly precluded him from presenting the defense of intoxication. We disagree. As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard by which we review the trial court's determinations concerning the exclusion of evidence. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, 241 Conn. 784, 789, 699 A.2d 91 (1997). "Moreover, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on appeal only where there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the defendant of substantial prejudice or injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berger, 249 Conn. 218, 230, 733 A.2d 156 (1999). Our review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did. Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202, 210, 487 A.2d 191 (1985).
Concerning expert testimony specifically, we note that State v. Esposito, 235 Conn. 802, 834, 670 A.2d 301 (1996). "Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 354, 696 A.2d 944 (1997).
Our analysis is supported by a review of the well established rules of evidence. ...
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