Trentadue v. Buckler Lawn Sprinkler

• Decision Date: 25 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 128624.,No. 128623.,No. 128579.,No. 128625. Calendar No. 4.,128579.,128623.,128624.,128625. Calendar No. 4.
• Parties: Dayle TRENTADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarette F. Eby, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey GORTON, Victor Nyberg, Todd Michael Bakos, MFO Management Company, and Carl F. Bekofske, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ruth R. Mott, Deceased, Defendants, and BUCKLER AUTOMATIC LAWN SPRINKLER COMPANY, Shirley Gorton and Laurence W. Gorton, Defendants-Appellants. Dayle TRENTADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarette F. Eby, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BUCKLER AUTOMATIC LAWN SPRINKLER COMPANY, Shirley Gorton, Laurence W. Gorton, Jeffrey Gorton, Victor Nyberg, Todd Michael Bakos and Carl L. Bekofske, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ruth R. Mott, Deceased, Defendants, and MFO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

738 N.W.2d 664

479 Mich. 378

Dayle TRENTADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarette F. Eby, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey GORTON, Victor Nyberg, Todd Michael Bakos, MFO Management Company, and Carl F. Bekofske, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ruth R. Mott, Deceased, Defendants, and BUCKLER AUTOMATIC LAWN SPRINKLER COMPANY, Shirley Gorton and Laurence W. Gorton, Defendants-Appellants.

Dayle TRENTADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarette F. Eby, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BUCKLER AUTOMATIC LAWN SPRINKLER COMPANY, Shirley Gorton, Laurence W. Gorton, Jeffrey Gorton, Victor Nyberg, Todd Michael Bakos and Carl L. Bekofske, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ruth R. Mott, Deceased, Defendants, and MFO MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 128579.

No. 128623.

No. 128624.

No. 128625. Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 12, 2006.

Decided July 25, 2007.

[738 N.W.2d 666]

Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C. (by David A. Binkley, Trisha M. Werder, and Elizabeth A. Favaro), and Mark Granzotto, P.C. (by Mark Granzotto), for the plaintiff. Troy; Royal Oak.

Gault Davison, P.C. (by Edward B. Davison), for Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company and Shirley and Laurence W. Gorton. Grand Blanc.

Collins, Einhorn, Farrell & Ulanoff, P.C. (by Noreen L. Slank, Deborah A. Hebert, and Geoffrey M. Brown), for MFO Management Company. Southfield.

Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David R. Parker), for State Bar of Michigan Negligence Section. Detroit.

Sullivan, Ward, Asher & Patton, P.C. (by Ronald S. Lederman and Sharon S. Almonrode), for Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund, Roofers Local 149 Pension Fund, Plumbers Local 98 Defined Benefit Pension Fund, Pipefitters Local 636 Defined Benefit Pension Fund, and I.A.M. Motor City Pension Funds. Southfield.

Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker, P.L.L.C. (by Michael J. Reynolds), for Michigan Electric and Gas Association. Detroit.

Michael B. Serling, Angela J. Nicita. and Zamler, Mellen & Schiffman, P.C. (by Margaret Holman-Jensen), for Channing Pollock and others. Birmingham; Allen Park; Southfield.

Goldberg, Persky & White, P.C. (by James J. Bedortha and Lane A. Clack), for Asbestos Claimants. Saginaw.

CORRIGAN, J.

This wrongful death case requires us to consider whether the common-law "discovery rule," which allows tolling of the statutory period of limitations when a plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the elements of a cause of action within the limitations period, can operate to toll the period of limitations, or whether MCL 600.5827, which has no such provision, alone governs the time of accrual of the plaintiff's claims. We conclude that MCL 600.5827 alone controls. Because the Court of Appeals held to the contrary, we reverse its judgment and remand the case to the Genesee Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

This case arises from the tragic rape and murder of Margarette F. Eby in November 1986 at her home in Flint. According to plaintiff's complaint, in 1981 Eby leased a residence in the gatehouse on the grounds of the Mott family estate from Ruth R. Mott (Mott) where Eby began to live. Eby was found raped and murdered on November 9, 1986, after last being seen alive on November 7, 1986. The rape and murder remained unsolved until 2002, when deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence established that Jeffrey Gorton, an employee of his parents' corporation, the Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Company (Buckler), which serviced the sprinkler system on the grounds, had committed the crime. Gorton pleaded no contest when charged with the murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment for Eby's rape-murder.

On August 2, 2002, plaintiff Dayle Trentadue, Eby's daughter and the personal representative of her estate, filed a complaint against Jeffrey Gorton; his parents Shirley and Lawrence Gorton who, as noted, operated Buckler; Buckler; Carl F. Bekofske, personal representative of the estate of Ruth R. Mott, deceased, who died in 1999; MFO Management Company (MFO), the management company that provided administrative services to the Mott family; and two of Mott's employees, Victor Nyberg and Todd Bakos, asserting several theories of negligence. Regarding the Gortons, the contentions were essentially negligent hiring and monitoring of Jeffrey Gorton. The other defendants were allegedly negligent in allowing access to the area that led to Eby's residence and not providing adequate security or alarms.

Each defendant, except Jeffrey Gorton, moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing, among other things, that plaintiff's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions.¹ In particular, they argued that under MCL 600.5827² a claim accrues when the plaintiff is harmed,³ and the action for wrongful death must be commenced within three years after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims. MCL 600.5805(1); MCL 600.5805(10). Further, while MCL 600.5852 permits an extension of up to three years based on when a personal representative is appointed, that statute was inapplicable here because almost 16 years had passed. Thus, defendants asserted that the suit should have been dismissed as untimely and barred under the statute of limitations. Plaintiff in response asserted that the common-law discovery rule applied to toll the period of limitations. That is, even though the provisions of the period of limitations were silent on tolling based on discovery, until she knew the identity of the killer, the period of limitations was tolled.⁴

The Genesee Circuit Court ruled for plaintiff, adopting her theory that the common-law discovery rule remains viable in Michigan and thus applicable here. The court concluded regarding defendants Buckler and Shirley and Lawrence Gorton that "[a] claim for personal injury accrues when all of the elements are present and can be properly pleaded in a complaint," citing, e.g., Connelly v. Paul Ruddy's Equip. Repair & Service Co., 388 Mich. 146, 200 N.W.2d 70 (1972). Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, opinion of the Genesee Circuit Court, issued October 28, 2003 (Docket No. 02.74145-NZ), p. 4. The court also "recognize[d], in some instances, [that the] identity of the killer may be necessary to plead a cause of action." Id. Accordingly, it decided that most of plaintiff's claims were not time-barred because plaintiff could not determine that the duties were breached, or that the breaches caused the injuries, until she became aware of the killer's identity in 2002. Regarding Bekofske and MFO, the court granted their summary disposition motions on the basis that if Mott and MFO had failed to provide adequate security, this claim was known to plaintiff at the time of the killing, and the cause of action could have been brought at that time.⁵

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, concluding that the common-law discovery rule tolled the limitations period for all plaintiff's claims, including the improper security claims against Bekofske and MFO. 266 Mich.App. 297, 701 N.W.2d 756 (2005). The Court of Appeals concluded that the common-law discovery rule tolled the period of limitations because plaintiff was unaware of a cause of action against Buckler, the Gortons, Nyberg, or Bakos until their relationship with the killer became known. Regarding Bekofske and MFO, the Court of Appeals reversed the part of the trial court's judgment that granted summary disposition in their favor. It concluded that the discovery rule applied because until the identity of the killer became known, no causal connection could be discovered between a breach of duty and Eby's death. The Court of Appeals failed to address the absence of the common-law discovery provision in MCL 600.5827. It evidently presumed that the discovery provision could co-exist with the statute and was not abrogated by the statute's enactment.

Buckler, the Gortons, and MFO sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to appeal to consider whether a common-law discovery rule continues to exist in Michigan or whether MCL 600.5827, which has no common-law discovery provision, is the exclusive means of establishing tolling.⁶

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) de novo. Grimes v. Dep't of Transportation, 475 Mich. 72, 76, 715 N.W.2d 275 (2006). In the absence of disputed facts, we also review de novo whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Joliet v. Pitoniak, 475 Mich. 30, 35, 715 N.W.2d 60 (2006). Finally, we address questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Grimes, supra at 76, 715 N.W.2d 275.

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE COMMON-LAW DISCOVERY RULE

The applicable statute of limitations in a wrongful death case is MCL 600.5805(10),⁷ which states: "The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property." Thus, the period of limitations runs three years from "the death or injury."

Moreover, MCL 600.5827 defines the time of accrual for actions subject to the limitations period in MCL 600.5805(10).⁸ It provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in sections 5829 to 5838, and in cases not covered by these sections the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results.

This is consistent with MCL 600.5805(10) because it indicates that the claim accrues "at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done ...." We have, not surprisingly...