I.L. v. State

• Decision Date: 10 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 11–15464.,11–15464.
• Citation: 739 F.3d 1273
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Parties: I.L., et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross–Appellees, v. State of ALABAMA, et al., Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.

739 F.3d 1273

I.L., et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross–Appellees,

v.State of ALABAMA, et al., Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.

No. 11–15464.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 10, 2014.

James Uriah Blacksher, Larry T. Menefee, Attorney At Law, Shannon L. Holliday, Robert D. Segall, Copeland Franco Screws & Gill, PA, Montgomery, AL, Edward Still, Edward Still Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross–Appellees.

William Glenn Parker, Jr., Attorney General's Office, Montgomery, AL, Gregg Mitchel McCormick, Tony George Miller, James L. Mitchell, John D. Bethay, III, Drayton Nabers, Jr., Thomas W. Thagard, III, Christopher James Williams, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Elwyn Berton Spence, John B. Tally, Jr., Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell, PA, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. D.C. Docket No. 5:08–cv–00450–CLS.

Before JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and HORNBY,^* District Judge.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

In the “best of all possible worlds,” ¹ state and local governments would ensure adequate funding for all facets of their public school systems. In the world in which we live, however, the reality is that some public school systems do not have sufficient resources to educate the children entrusted to their care.

This appeal primarily concerns a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to various sections of the Alabama Constitution that are central to the State's system of ad valorem property taxation. The plaintiffs, black and white children attending public schools in Sumter and Lawrence Counties, filed suit in federal district court, asserting that these provisions are “rooted in [the State's] historic racially discriminatory policies,” D.E. 31 at 16, and cripple the ability of certain rural, nearly all-black public school systems in Alabama to raise revenues. According to the plaintiffs, the counties in Alabama's so-called “Black Belt”—a poor, largely agricultural region with a significant African–American population—have been disadvantaged under the current tax system because of “extremely low under-valuation of farm and timber land.” Appellants' Br. at 39. The plaintiffs further allege that Alabama's constitutional limitations on millage rates restrict the ability of those in the “Black Belt” to raise property taxes and adequately fund public schools. See id. at 45.

The district court, following a bench trial, issued an 804–page order concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs then filed this appeal. After reviewing the briefs and the extensive record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm in part, and remand with instructions to dismiss without prejudice in part for lack of standing.

I

Alabama's property tax system is no stranger to the Eleventh Circuit. As the district court noted, the current case is “a sequel to [a] long-running, higher-education desegregation action” initially filed in 1981. See D.E. 35 at 1.

In Knight v. Alabama, 476 F.3d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir.2007), a different group of plaintiffs sought to establish a link between property tax limits for K–12 education funding and persistent segregation in Alabama's higher education system. Knight was initially styled as a higher education desegregation case, but the plaintiffs eventually sought to transform the case into a challenge to Alabama's tax policies. See id. at 1229. We ultimately determined on appeal that “even if underfunding of Alabama's K–12 schools were related to segregation in its colleges and universities, this relationship [wa]s too attenuated and rest[ed] on too many unpredictable premises to entitle [the] plaintiffs to relief under [United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 120 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992) ].” Knight, 476 F.3d at 1228.

We further noted in Knight that the plaintiffs' request for so-called “additional relief”—an injunction requiring the Alabama Legislature to adequately fund K–12 schools—was “beyond [the] case or controversy” presented in that litigation. See id. at 1229 n. 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in the current action apparently interpreted this language in Knight as an invitation to bring a separate lawsuit seeking to enjoin the enforcement of allegedly discriminatory property tax restrictions in Alabama's Constitution. See Complaint at ¶ 6. See also Appellants' Br. at 3 (“[P]laintiff K–12 students were acting on the invitation of the district court and this Court in Knight v. Alabama [.]”).

The parties agree that the plaintiffs' current challenges, to the extent justiciable, are governed by the standards described in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). See Appellants' Br. at 46, 56–57, 73–74; Appellees' Br. at 30, 33, 35. A facially neutral state law will not be struck down as unconstitutional “because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required.” See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227–28, 105 S.Ct. 1916 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 229–33, 105 S.Ct. 1916 (holding that a provision of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which disenfranchised persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, violated equal protection because, even though the provision was racially neutral, its enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and had a racially discriminatory effect). As we summarized in Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1043–45 (11th Cir.2008), a law that is neutral on its face violates the Equal Protection Clause if discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the government's enactment of the law, and if the government cannot show that the law would have been enacted in the absence of any discriminatory motive. “[U]nless there is a clear pattern that [the law] is impacting one race more than another, impact alone is not determinative[.]” Id. at 1045.

The district court found that four of the challenged provisions in the Alabama Constitution (Sections 214, 215, and 216 of Article XI and Section 269 of Article XIV) were “enacted with a racially discriminatory intent,” but that two later amendments to another provision of the Alabama Constitution (Amendments 325 and 373 to Section 217 of Article XI) were primarily motivated by financial considerations. See D.E. 296–1 at 775–76. The district court further found that, on a statewide basis, “Alabama's black citizens and black public school students [were] not disparately impacted by the challenged provisions.” Id. at 779.

Our discussion of this complicated case is divided into three parts. First, we consider whether the plaintiffs have standing for the various claims they assert. Second, we address Alabama's contention that the action is barred by the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity. Finally, we conclude with the merits of the claims properly before us.

II

Alabama argues, as it did below, that the plaintiffs lack standing. Standing is one of the Article III case or controversy requirements, see Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.2008), and must therefore be established “as a threshold matter,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). To have standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See, e.g., DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301–02 (11th Cir.2008). Failure to satisfy any of these three requirements is fatal. See Fla. Wildlife Fed., Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir.2011).

We review the plaintiffs' standing de novo. See DiMaio, 520 F.3d at 1301. The State contends that the plaintiffs lack a cognizable injury and cannot show that any alleged injury would be redressed by the relief they request. See Appellees' Br. at 17–21. We disagree with the first contention, but concur in part with the second.

A

An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that “racially discriminatory property tax restrictions in the Alabama Constitution ... impede their ability and the ability of their elected representatives to raise state and local revenues adequately to fund ... public education.” Complaint at ¶ 7. The State argues, however, that this injury does not “affect the plaintiff[s] in a personal and individual way,” as required by Article III. See Appellees' Br. at 19 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130).

We conclude, contrary to the State's position, that impediments to public educationfunding arising from racially discriminatory state laws can constitute particularized and concrete injury for purposes of standing. See, e.g., Petrella v. Brownback, 697 F.3d 1285, 1293 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that alleged intentional underfunding of a school district constituted an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing). Under Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, discriminatory governmental action of the type alleged here constitutes an Article III injury. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739–40, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984) (noting that discriminatory government action resulting in noneconomic injury to the plaintiff can support standing); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir.2009) (“For purposes of standing, a denial of equal treatment is an actual injury even when the complainant is able to overcome the challenged barrier[.]”). Cf. United...