United States v. Guzman
| Decision Date | 07 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–11279.,12–11279. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Albert GUZMAN, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Andrew O. Wirmani, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Kevin Joel Page, Douglas Anthony Morris, Esq., Federal Public Defender's Office, Dallas, TX, for Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
Albert Guzman was convicted, following a stipulated bench trial, of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Because the district court expressly declined to make factual findings that may have had a determinative impact on the outcome of the suppression hearing, we vacate the conviction and sentence and remand for further findings to ascertain, inter alia, whether the police officer asked Guzman for consent to search his car.
On May 11, 2010, Dallas police officers Daniel Warren Foster and George Garcia arrived at a house in response to a tip that methamphetamines were being sold there. Guzman was sitting in the driver's seat of a tan 1998 Dodge Intrepid parked in the driveway. He exited the car when the officers approached. Foster testified at the suppression hearing that he “struck up a conversation” with Guzman, who was “very cooperative.” Guzman said he was at the house to see a friend, and added that he had recently been released from prison. Foster told Guzman that the officers had received drug complaints regarding the house and had been told that buyers parked in the driveway.
According to Foster, he then asked Guzman if there were drugs in the car and whether he could search the car for drugs. Guzman said that Foster could search the car, that there were no drugs, but that there was a handgun in the car. According to Foster, Guzman did not seem “particularly” anxious, and he “said it was his dad's gun.” 1 Foster searched the car and found a semiautomatic handgun under the driver's seat. The officers did not find drugs in the car or on Guzman's person.
Foster and Garcia took Guzman to the police car, read him his Miranda rights, and conducted a recorded interview. At some point, Foster and Garcia checked Guzman's criminal history and found that he had eight prior felony convictions. During the recorded interview, Guzman admitted to knowingly possessing the gun, said he had it for protection, and repeated that it was his father's. He said he had previously shot the gun “not at anyone but just shooting it off.” Guzman said the car belonged to him and was given to him by his wife. Foster did not ask Guzman to “reaffirm” his consent to the search during the interview.
During the recorded interview, the following exchange took place:
Foster: Like I was saying, we have had ongoing complaints about drugs being sold out of this house, and you are sitting back here behind [it]. In particular there's buyers that are supposed to come and go from where you are sitting. We see you there. You know, we come and talk to you. And you are real cool. We ask you if there are any drugs in the car, and you tell us no, but there's a gun.
Guzman: Yeah, that's ... that's what I said, that's why I was honest with you, right, right off the front street.
Foster: You were very honest.
Guzman: You know, I'm an honest person, I'm not going to lie about nothing. That's why, you know, once you say I'm going to search the car
but there is no drugs in the car, and that's what I told you right off the front, you know there's a gun in there.
Guzman pleaded not guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1). 2 Before trial, the government filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence and statements including Guzman's May 11 admission to knowingly possessing the firearm at issue. Guzman moved to suppress the seized firearm and any incriminating statements arising from the search of his car, arguing that he did not consent to the search.3 In its response, the government maintained that Guzman gave voluntary verbal consent to the search, 4 and, in the alternative, that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement due to Guzman's statements that he had recently been released from prison and that there was a gun in the car.
The court held a suppression hearing on September 14, 2011, at which Foster and Garcia were the only witnesses. Foster testified that Guzman gave verbal consent to the search, and that he, Foster, should have reaffirmed that consent on the record. Nonetheless, he stated that he believed there was “probable cause to search the vehicle just based on his statements” about the gun and having been released from prison, “even without a consent.” When asked what would have happened if Guzman had not consented, Foster said: Questioned about Guzman's statement in the recorded interview that Foster had told him “I'm going to search the car,” Foster responded, “No. I asked him if I could search the car.” Garcia testified that he heard Foster ask Guzman for consent and that Guzman responded “yes, he could search but there were no drugs in there ... but there was a pistol.”
During its closing argument, the government argued that the search was based on valid consent, and that alternatively, even if there was “an issue with consent,” the search was proper under the automobile exception. Before Guzman's attorney began his closing statement, the district court presented him with a hypothetical question:
What if you had a clever police officer who wanted to trick a defendant into making a guilty admission and the police officer said, and the person being deceived by the clever police officer said, “You won't find any drugs, but you will find a handgun”? ... [W]hy isn't that enough? ... The officer hasn't committed any unlawful search. The potential defendant has made a culpable admission that justifies a warrantless search at that point.Guzman's attorney agreed that police officers “can use trickery,” but said an officer's statement that he is going to search the car could be a “violation of [the defendant's] rights.” The attorney went on to argue that Guzman “didn't give consent,” citing the government's recording.
The district court orally denied the motion to suppress. It based its denial on the:
... understanding of the law that the officers could resort to trickery and best case for the defense is that the officers resorted to trickery, told him that they were going to get in the car, and faced with that belief, he volunteered to the officers that there was a gun in the car. At that point I think they had probable cause under the automobile exception to go ahead and do a search.... [B]ased on my current understanding of the law, I think the way the defense characterizes the facts still supports a finding of probable cause.
With regard to consent, the district court stated:
I think there is a conflict in the record, evidence that could be argued both ways on the issue of consent, but I don't think I need to reach that issue and resolve that factual question based on my understanding of the law.5
At the pretrial conference, Guzman's attorney requested that the district court hold a bench trial, at which Guzman would stipulate to facts establishing his “factual guilt,” but would “preserve his right to contest his legal guilt” based on the denial of the suppression motion.6 The district court agreed and held a one-day bench trial on September 10, 2012. Guzman stipulated: that he knowingly possessed a firearm, which had moved in interstate commerce; and that he had been previously convicted of a felony. He waived his rights to testify and to cross-examination.
Guzman was found guilty, convicted, and sentenced to 200 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Guzman appealed “the judgment and sentence,” but the sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress.7
“When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court review[s] factual findings for clear error and the district court's conclusions regarding ... the constitutionality of law enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 739 (5th Cir.2007).
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment'swarrant requirement. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). “One of those exceptions is that a warrantless search of an automobile with probable cause is justified where circumstances make a warranted search impracticable.” United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 528 (5th Cir.1994); see also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–13, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (). Probable cause in this context consists of “trustworthy facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge [that] would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe the car contains contraband.” United States v. Banuelos–Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir.2010). “Probable cause determinations are not to be made on the basis of factors considered in isolation, but rather on the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
The district court denied the motion to suppress because it found that the officers “had probable cause...
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Review Proceedings
...(D.C. Cir. 2016) (right to appeal denial of suppression motion waived because not timely raised below). But see, e.g. , U.S. v. Guzman, 739 F.3d 241, 246 n.8 (5th Cir. 2014) (right to appeal denial of suppression motion if raised on appeal waived but reviewed for plain error “for good measu......