74 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1935), 7587, Republic Supply Co. of Cal. v. Richfield Oil Co. of Cal.
|Citation:||74 F.2d 907|
|Party Name:||REPUBLIC SUPPLY CO. OF CALIFORNIA v. RICHFIELD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA. CITIES SERVICE CO. v. ARMSBY et al.|
|Case Date:||January 14, 1935|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Rehearing denied April 1, 1935.
Hill, Morgan & Bledsoe, Benjamin F. Bledsoe, Charles P. McCarthy, Elvon Musick, and Howard Burrell, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Alexander Macdonald and A. Stevens Halsted, Jr., both of Los Angeles, Cal., Colin C. Ives, of New York City, Jefferson P. Chandler, Leo S. Chandler, and Robert B. Murphey, all of Los Angeles, Cal. (Bauer, MacDonald, Schultheis & Pettit, of Los Angeles, Cal., Cravath, deGersdorff, Swaine & Wood, of New York City, and Chandler, Wright & Ward and Call & Murphey, all of Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel), for appellees.
Before WILBUR and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges.
WILBUR, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order made in the consolidated equity receiverships of the properties of the Richfield Oil Company of California and the Pan American Petroleum Company. The value of the property is estimated at between $23,000,000 and $100,000,000. The bonded and unsecured indebtedness is very large, and exceeds the amount expected to be realized from the sale of the properties under the contemplated plan of reorganization. The appeal is taken from an order of the trial court assuming jurisdiction over and supervision of a plan of reorganization which involves the issuance of certificates in the nature of receipts by the reorganization committee. These certificates constitute securities within the meaning of the National Securities Act of 1933. That act excepts from its requirements securities issued in pursuance of a reorganization plan supervised by the court. Section 4, clause 3, Securities Act of 1933, c. 38 (48 Stat. 77), U.S. Stat. 73d Congress, 1st Session (see 15 USCA 77d note). The object of the reorganization plan is to facilitate bidding at a public sale
to be subsequently held. The sale is required to be at public auction on notice, and will be subject to confirmation by the court. The first question which naturally suggests itself is whether or not such an order which does not conclude the litigation and is merely preliminary to a sale which must subsequently be ratified by the court is a final order from which an appeal is authorized by law. Jud. Code Sec...
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