Hoke v. Chater
| Decision Date | 17 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1340,95-1340 |
| Citation | 74 F.3d 1231 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Ernest L. HOKE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Tomi W. Bryan, Tomi Bryan & Associates, Greensboro, NC, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Benjamin H. White, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel, Randolph W. Gaines, Acting Principal Deputy General Counsel, A. George Lowe, Acting Associate General Counsel, T. David Hu, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and HALL and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.
Ernest L. Hoke appeals from a district court order, adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge and upholding the determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services * that he was no longer entitled to disability benefits. Because we find that substantial evidence supported the Secretary's decision, we affirm.
In 1983, Hoke was found to be disabled due to injuries sustained to his back and to his right hip, knee and ankle in a motorcycle accident. On June 1, 1990, Hoke received a Notice of Disability Cessation, stating that he was no longer disabled. The cessation of benefits was found appropriate upon reconsideration, and Hoke requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ determined that, although Hoke's condition precluded him from performing his past work, he was not disabled because he could still perform sedentary work. The Appeals Council denied Hoke's request for review, and the ALJ's decision therefore became the final decision of the Secretary. Hoke then filed a civil action in the district court, and the court affirmed the Secretary's decision, which Hoke appealed to this court.
Hoke contends that the ALJ erred by affording too little weight to the opinion of one of his treating physicians. He also asserts that the
ALJ erred in determining that his impairments did not equal 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 Sec. 1.03 (1995). Finally, Hoke claims that the ALJ incorrectly found that he could perform sedentary work.
Hoke asserts that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr. James P. Aplington that Hoke was disabled. Dr. Aplington briefly opined that Hoke was disabled on a Housing Authority form. The form involved no more than circling a paragraph that stated Hoke was disabled. However, Dr. Aplington's treatment notes indicate that Hoke's right knee exhibited a good range of motion and that he demonstrated unrestricted hip motion without any pain. Neither Dr. Aplington's notes nor the Housing Authority form show how or to what extent Hoke's abilities and activities are curtailed. In addition, no other treating physician opined that Hoke was disabled, and in fact, another doctor released Hoke to work without any limitation.
Although a treating physician's diagnosis is normally entitled to deference, Dr. Aplington's conclusory, and contradictory, opinion is not significant enough to be reasonably expected to carry substantial weight. See Scott v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 482, 485 (5th Cir.1985) (); Houston v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365, 367 (6th Cir.1984) (). Stating that Hoke is "disabled" does not assist a finder of fact in developing an informed opinion or a full understanding of Hoke's limitations. Therefore, the ALJ properly discounted the conclusion of disability submitted by Dr. Aplington.
Hoke contends that the ALJ's determination that he no longer had a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1594(f)(2) (1995) was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Hoke alleges that his impairment met Listing 1.03.
Substantial evidence is defined as " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.1990) (quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.1966)).
As the presiding officer at the administrative hearing, the ALJ makes factual determinations and resolves evidentiary conflicts, including inconsistencies in the medical evidence. Reviewing courts do not weigh evidence anew or substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary, provided substantial evidence supports the Secretary's decision. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
Listing 1.03 directs a finding of disability when there is:
[a]rthritis of a major weight-bearing joint (due to any cause):
With history of persistent joint pain and stiffness with signs of marked limitation of motion or abnormal motion of the affected joint on current physical examination. With:
A. Gross anatomical deformity of hip or knee (e.g. subluxation, contracture, bony or fibrous ankylosis, instability) supported by X-ray evidence of either significant joint space narrowing or significant bony destruction and markedly limiting ability to walk and stand; or
B. Reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major weight-bearing joint and return to full weight-bearing status did not occur, or is not expected to occur, within 12 months of onset.
The only evidence of arthritis is a medical report from Dr. James M. Marlowe, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, which...
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