U.S. v. Arias
| Decision Date | 02 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-6143,94-6143 |
| Citation | 74 F.3d 1241 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ramon ARIAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: JONES, DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON, District Judge. *
Defendant Ramon Arias appeals his jury conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. For the following reasons we affirm his conviction and sentence.
On February 3, 1994, Celestine Debnam arrived in Louisville, Kentucky on a flight from Newark, New Jersey. When Debnam deplaned, detectives recognized her as a suspect in a drug investigation and followed her through the airport. The detectives watched Debnam as she met Derek Scott at the doors of the airport and followed him towards a jeep parked at the curb. Defendant Ramon Arias was driving the jeep.
Before Debnam and Scott reached the jeep, one of the detectives approached her, identified himself as police officer, and asked to see her plane ticket. Debnam identified herself as Eva Miller and produced a ticket bearing that name. The officers then requested permission to search her bag. She consented. During this search, officers found evidence of Debnam's true identity and arrested her for falsely identifying herself to police officers. In a second search, incident to her arrest, the officers found 498.48 grams of cocaine. Later in an interview, Debnam told the police that she made the round trip to Newark under the direction of Arias. When asked where Arias may have gone, Debnam and Scott answered that he probably went to a residence in the 700 block of 22nd Street after he left the airport. Based upon the information obtained from Debnam and Scott as well as from surveillance, officers of the Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Narcotics Unit were called to the 700 block of 22nd Street. The police arrived at the residence of Donna Moore-Feliciano at the same time as one of Moore-Feliciano's friends. The officers asked the friend to knock on the door and inform Ms. Moore-Feliciano that the police were present. Moore-Feliciano answered the door, and the police entered the apartment and told her they were looking for Arias. Arias was found hiding in the closet. The police brought him out and arrested him at gunpoint.
After his arrest, Arias consented to a search of his apartment and signed a standard consent to search form. The officers drove Arias to his home and searched his apartment. Among the items seized were personal papers with Arias' various aliases and two sets of digital scales.
Police officers located and, without a warrant, seized Arias' jeep for an intended forfeiture. At the impoundment lot, officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and seized various items, including a cellular telephone and some of Arias' personal papers.
Arias was indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute approximately 500 grams of cocaine base. Before his trial, Arias moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment. During the trial, he moved the court to suppress the evidence seized from his jeep. The district court denied both motions as well as Arias' motion for a mistrial made after witnesses inadvertently referred to evidence that was excluded under a motion in limine.
Arias was convicted and sentenced. He now appeals the denial of his motions as well as issues surrounding his sentencing.
The first issue Arias raises in his appeal is whether the district court erred by admitting the evidence seized from Arias' apartment without a warrant. We review a district court's factual findings on suppression issues for clear error and review conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 285 (1994). A district court's findings with respect to voluntariness of consent are questions of fact. United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir.1988).
Arias argues that his arrest at Donna Moore-Feliciano's apartment was illegal, and therefore the fruits of this illegal arrest, including the search of his apartment, should have been suppressed. See United States v. Blanco, 844 F.2d 344, 349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1046 (1988). Although executed without a warrant, Arias' arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable cause. Co-conspirators Scott and Debnam had provided the police with information regarding Arias' participation in the drug conspiracy. Accordingly, the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowledge " 'were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [Arias] had committed or was committing an offense.' " See Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
Arias next contends that the arrest was unlawful because the officers entered the home of Ms. Moore-Feliciano without a warrant. Arias fails to recognize, however, that Ms. Moore-Feliciano knew the police were at the door, and the police did not enter the residence until she opened the door from the inside. Because they entered the residence with Ms. Moore-Feliciano's consent, the officers did not violate Arias' Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him in Moore-Feliciano's home. See United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1333 (8th Cir.1990) ().
Arias asserts that even if his arrest was lawful, an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that his consent to a search of his apartment was coerced and not voluntary. See United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 404 (1992). Arias contends that: (1) the effect of being in police custody; (2) his language barrier; (3) the poor explanation of and improper witnessing of the consent form; and (4) the officers' forced entry into Arias' residence were all factors that precluded voluntary consent on his part. We disagree.
Testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Arias agreed to sign the consent form after he told the officers they would not "find anything." At the suppression hearing, a police officer testified that "[he] made sure [Arias] realized what he was doing" when Arias read over and signed the consent form. J.A. at 240. The consent form that Arias executed stated that he did so "knowing that [he had] a constitutional right to refuse a search of [his] premises." J.A. at 946. The officer further testified that Arias appeared to understand the form. J.A. at 241. Finally, when the officers realized Arias did not have keys to the apartment, Arias gave his permission for them to pry open the door with a screwdriver. Although Arias argues a language barrier prevented him from giving knowing consent, none of the officers indicated Arias had difficulty understanding common English. One officer testified, based on his conversation with Arias, that he thought Arias was "very fluent." J.A. at 268. We believe that this "clear and positive testimony" demonstrates that Arias' consent was not tainted. See Taylor, 956 F.2d at 577 (quoting United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir.1985).
In a related argument, Arias claims that items were seized from rooms in the apartment over which he did not have sufficient dominion or control to authorize a search. A person who possesses "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises" may consent to a search of a residence. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 528 (6th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
The touchstone of common authority is "mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
The record indicates that Arias exercised sufficient authority to consent to the search. Arias' belongings were found throughout the apartment. No one else was in the apartment, and Arias never informed the officers that he occupied only certain rooms of the small apartment. Outside of a telephone bill that was in name of Derek Bell, the officers would have no reason to doubt Arias' dominion over the entire apartment. This is especially true in light of Arias' failing to identify any one who also lived in the apartment. Based on this evidence, we will not disturb the district court's finding that Arias consented to a search of the entire apartment.
Arias also appeals the district court's admission of evidence seized from his jeep after it was impounded by the police. After Arias was arrested, the police towed his vehicle to an impound lot to be held for future forfeiture. During an inventory search, a police officer recovered Arias' cellular telephone and various personal papers that revealed Arias' use of aliases.
The trial court concluded the seizure of the vehicle was legal as incident to an intended forfeiture. The court found, based on the earlier arrests and statements by Arias' co-conspirators that the officers had probable cause to believe the vehicle was used or was intended to be used in cocaine trafficking.
A finding of probable cause provides a basis for seizing a vehicle for impoundment purposes. See Autoworld Specialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir.1987). After reviewing the evidence de...
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