National Union v. Marlow
Citation | 74 F. 775 |
Decision Date | 11 May 1896 |
Docket Number | 709. |
Parties | NATIONAL UNION v. MARLOW. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Arcadia L. Marlow, the defendant in error, brought a suit against the National Union, the plaintiff in error, which is a corporation of the state of Ohio, to recover the amount alleged to be due to her on the following benefit certificate: '$5,000.00.
'National Union Benefit Certificate.
George W. Marlow, the person named in said certificate, was the plaintiff's husband. At the time of his death, as well as when said certificate was executed and delivered, he was a resident of the city of St. Joseph, Mo. The case was tried in the circuit court upon an agreed statement of facts. It was admitted in the agreed statement that the foregoing benefit certificate was duly executed and delivered to the deceased, George W. Marlow, at St. Joseph, Mo., some time during the month of February, 1892, while he was a member of Economy Council, No. 215; that he subsequently paid all dues and assessments that were exacted of him as a member; and that he complied with all the rules and regulations of the National Union that were obligatory upon him until November 16, 1893, when he committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol. Attached to the agreed statement, and forming a part thereof, was a pamphlet containing the constitution and laws of the National Union, as well as a copy of the constitution of subordinate councils of the National Union. Such provisions found therein as are deemed most material will be referred to hereafter. The defendant company contended that the suicide of the deceased constituted a full and complete defense to the suit. On the other hand, the plaintiff below insisted that the defendant company was engaged in the business of life insurance when the benefit certificate was issued, that the suit was founded upon a contract of life insurance, and that suicide could not be pleaded as a defense to the action, by virtue of the provisions contained in section 5855, Rev. St. Mo. 1889, which reads as follows: 'In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state, it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void. ' The circuit court sustained the latter view, and rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff below. The case comes to this court on a writ of error which was sued out by the defendant company.
Chas. J. Kavanagh (Saml. P. Huston and Thos. H. Parrish with him on brief), for plaintiff in error.
M. A. Reed (W. K. James with him on brief), for defendant in error.
Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.
THAYER Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .
The contract sued upon in this case is, in form and substance, a contract of life insurance, as has heretofore been held in the state of Missouri, where it was executed. State v. Merchants' Exchange Mut. Benev. Soc., 72 Mo. 146, 160. It was delivered by the defendant company, within the state of Missouri, to a resident of the state, while the company was there doing business through the agency of a local council. For these reasons the contract is governed, as to the obligations thereby incurred and imposed, by the laws of the state of Missouri; and suicide cannot be pleaded as a defense to a suit to enforce the contract, unless some provision is found in the statutes of said state which exempts it from the operation of section 5855, above quoted in the statement. Assurance Soc. v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226, 11 Sup.Ct. 822; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hiett's Adm'r, 19 U.S.App. 173, 178, 7 C.C.A. 359, 58 F. 541; Berry v. Indemnity Co., 46 F. 439. These propositions are not denied. It is claimed, however, that the defendant company is a 'fraternal-beneficial society,' rather than an insurance company, and that inasmuch as the laws of the state of Missouri provide for the incorporation of fraternal-beneficial societies, and permit them to issue benefit certificates insuring the lives of their members without being subject to the insurance laws of the state, the defendant company, though a foreign corporation, may likewise issue benefit certificates to its members resident within said state without accountability to local insurance laws. It is said, in substance, that the laws of Missouri permit domestic corporations to be organized precisely as the defendant is organized, and for the same purposes and objects, and that they exempt such corporations, when formed, from the operation of all laws relating to the subject of insurance. It will be seen, therefore, that the right asserted by the defendant company to insure the lives of its members within the state of Missouri, and at the same time to claim exemption from the provisions of section 5855, supra, which excludes suicide as a defense, rests wholly upon the assumption that it is a fraternal-beneficial society, within the meaning of the Missouri laws. We shall accordingly proceed to inquire whether this contention is well founded.
Chapter 42 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889 relates entirely to the organization of corporations of various kinds, and prescribes their powers and duties. Article 10 of that chapter (Rev. St. Mo. 1889, p. 719) relates to the organization of 'benevolent, religious, scientific, fraternal-beneficial, educational and miscellaneous associations. ' In this article are found the following provisions, to wit:
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