Downer v. State
| Decision Date | 19 March 1912 |
| Docket Number | (No. 3,990.) |
| Citation | 10 Ga.App. 827,74 S.E. 301 |
| Parties | DOWNER. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
The front porch of a dwelling house, covered by a roof, is a part of the dwelling house, and the larceny of property from the front porch is, in contemplation of law, a larceny from the dwelling house.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. § 20.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2285-2295; vol. 8, p. 7646; vol. 5, pp. 3991-4003.]
There was sufficient evidence to show that the value of the property alleged to have been stolen exceeded $50.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 154, 155; Dec. Dig. § 59.*]
Where, during the trial of a criminal case, the jury were, by consent, allowed to disperse, and one of the jurors heard a conversation between a witness for the state and a third person, in which the accused was denounced by the witness as having stated a falsehood, in his statement to the jury, as to a material fact, this denunciation had presumptively an effect on the mind of the juror detrimental to the accused, and this presumption was not fully rebutted by the affidavit of the juror that it did not influence his finding. In the interest of a fair and impartial trial, and the finding of a verdict based solely on the evidence, unaffected by any extraneous circumstance, another trial should have been granted.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2238-2247; Dec. Dig. § 925.*]
The other assignments of error are without merit.
Error from Superior Court, Elbert County; D. W. Meadow, Judge.
John Downer was convicted of larceny from a dwelling, and brings error. Reversed.
P. Middlebrooks and Donnelly Bennett, for plaintiff in error.
Thos. J. Brown, Sol. Gen., for the State.
HILL, C. J. John Downer was convicted of larceny from the house, the property stolen being a Columbia bicycle, which was left on the front porch of a dwelling house by the owner and stolen therefrom at night. His motion for a new trial was overruled, and he brings error. A consideration of the general grounds is not necessary, since another trial will have to be granted on one of the special grounds.
1. It is contended by the plaintiff in error that there could be no legal conviction of larceny from the house, because the evidence discloses the fact that the property was not stolen from inside the house, but from the front porch of the dwelling house, and that the evidence showed that this front porch, although inclosed by a roof and constituting a part of the dwelling house, was not itself laterally inclosed. The point is without merit. The front porch of a house is a part of the house itself, and if property is taken from the front porch, where it was left by the owner, it is taken from the house in the meaning of the statute. Johnson v. State, 2 Ga. App. 405, 58 S. E. 684. In the case of Burge v. State, 62 Ga. 170, a watch was left hanging on the front porch, which was covered by the roof of the house, and the accused took it therefrom. It was held that this was larceny from the house. The case of McCabe v. State, 1 Ga. App. 719, 58 S. E. 277, relied on by the plaintiff in error, is distinguishable on the facts from the present case. In that case the property was stolen from a wharf or pier, which had no lateral inclosure, although covered by a roof.
2. The indictment alleged that the property stolen was of the value of $53.50. The evidence showed that the owner gave this amount for the property at wholesale, and that the retail value of the bicycle was from $75 to $80. It was also shown that the value of the bicycle, when stolen, exceeded $50. This was sufficient proof on the question of value, and authorized the imposition of a felony sentence.
3. While the trial was in progress, the jury were allowed to disperse,...
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