People v. Schumacher

• Decision Date: 28 June 2007
• Docket Number: Docket No. 267624.
• Citation: 276 Mich. App. 165,740 N.W.2d 534
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth D. SCHUMACHER, Defendant-Appellant, and Alternative Fuels, L.C., Defendant.

740 N.W.2d 534

276 Mich. App. 165

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth D. SCHUMACHER, Defendant-Appellant, and Alternative Fuels, L.C., Defendant.

Docket No. 267624.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 5, 2007, at Grand Rapids.

Decided June 28, 2007, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication October 11, 2007.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by Webb A. Smith and Pamela C. Dausman), Lansing, for Kenneth D. Schumacher.

Before: KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY and SMOLENSKI, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

Defendant Kenneth D. Schumacher appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order affirming his conviction after a jury trial on a charge of unlawful disposal of scrap tires.¹ The trial court sentenced defendant as a second or subsequent offender to 270 days in jail and a $10,000 fine. MCL 324.16909(3). Although the circuit court affirmed defendant's conviction, it granted defendant bail pending appeal and otherwise stayed the sentence. We affirm.

Defendant was convicted of violating § 16902(1) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et seq., which is set forth in part 169 of that act, MCL 324.16901 et seq. At the time of the offense,² § 16902(1), MCL 324.16902(1), provided:

A person shall deliver a scrap tire only to a collection site registered under section 16904, a disposal area licensed under part 115, an end-user, a scrap tire processor, a tire retailer, or a scrap tire recycler, that is in compliance with this part.

Defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. This claim requires that we review de novo the trial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that all the elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Tombs, 472 Mich. 446, 459, 697 N.W.2d 494 (2005). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom may be sufficient to prove all the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 400, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000). Moreover, in reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we must defer to the fact-finder by drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving credibility conflicts in support of the jury verdict. Id.

First, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly violated the statute. The parties dispute whether § 16902(1) imposes strict liability or requires proof of scienter, i.e., that a person knowingly violated its terms, before a conviction may be sustained. Second, defendant argues on the basis of his interpretation of § 16902(1) and part 115 of NREPA, MCL 324.11501 et seq., that he did not violate the statute. Defendant's arguments raise issues of statutory interpretation, which are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Tombs, supra at 451, 697 N.W.2d 494. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Williams, 475 Mich. 245, 250, 716 N.W.2d 208 (2006). If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). "We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, and only where the statutory language is ambiguous may we look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent." Id.

We address first whether the statute requires as an element necessary for criminal liability that the accused knowingly violate its terms: Does the statute require proof of mens rea, or is it a strict-liability offense? "As a general rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent." Tombs, supra at 466, 697 N.W.2d 494 (TAYLOR, C.J., concurring), citing People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 579, 18 N.W. 365 (1884) (COOLEY, C.J.). Nevertheless, "[a]lthough strict-liability offenses are disfavored, the Legislature has firmly rooted authority to create such offenses." People v. Adams, 262 Mich.App. 89, 91, 683 N.W.2d 729 (2004). Furthermore, the Legislature has no constitutional obligation to require proof of mens rea before imposing criminal liability for certain conduct. People v. Quinn, 440 Mich. 178, 185, 487 N.W.2d 194 (1992). Thus, the focus of our inquiry into whether § 16902(1) imposes strict liability is to ascertain what mental culpability the Legislature intended for a conviction for its violation. Id.

The requirement of having mens rea, or criminal intent, to establish criminal culpability has deep roots in our common-law tradition. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-252, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion." Id. at 250, 72 S.Ct. 240. Thus when state legislatures began codifying common-law offenses, courts held that criminal intent was a necessary element even if the statute was silent on the subject. Id. at 252, 72 S.Ct. 240. But the Morissette Court recognized exceptions to this rule of statutory construction: for example, "sex offenses, such as rape, . . . [and] offenses of negligence, such as involuntary manslaughter or criminal negligence and the whole range of crimes arising from omission of duty." Id. at 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240. The Morissette Court also approved strict liability for so-called "public welfare offenses" that had "very different antecedents and origins" than the common law. Id. at 252, 255, 72 S.Ct. 240. These criminal laws instead grew out of the need to regulate modern society after the Industrial Revolution. Id. at 252-256, 72 S.Ct. 240. The growth of society and technology "engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare." Id. at 254, 72 S.Ct. 240. The Morissette Court opined that many so-called public-welfare offenses "do not fit neatly into . . . accepted classifications of common-law offenses, . . . but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty." Id. at 255, 72 S.Ct. 240. Further, the Court recognized that "[m]any violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize." Id. at 255-256, 72 S.Ct. 240. Thus,

whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. [Id. at 256, 72 S.Ct. 240.]

See, also, Roby, supra at 579, 18 N.W. 365 ("Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations . . . impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible.").

In Quinn, our Supreme Court applied Morissette to MCL 750.227c to determine if the statute required proof of knowledge that the firearm was loaded as well as knowledge of its possession to sustain a conviction for transporting or possessing in a vehicle a loaded firearm other than a pistol. The Court first noted that if, as in this case, "the offense in question does not codify a common-law offense and the statute omits the element of knowledge or intent," the intent of the Legislature controls whether the offense requires proof of criminal intent. Quinn, supra at 186, 487 N.W.2d 194. The Court concluded that the Legislature intended that criminal culpability could arise "regardless of the actor's intent" and that the Court's construction of the statute "comports with the purpose of public welfare regulation to protect those who are otherwise unable to protect themselves by placing `the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.'" Id. 186-187, 487 N.W.2d 194 (citation omitted).

In Adams, this Court analyzed MCL 750.165 to determine whether felony nonsupport is a strict-liability offense. The Adams Court noted several factors to consider in determining whether the Legislature intended an otherwise silent statute to nevertheless require fault as a predicate to guilt:

(1) whether the statute is a codification of common law; (2) the statute's legislative history or its title; (3) guidance to interpretation provided by other statutes; (4) the severity of the punishment provided; (5) whether the statute defines a public-welfare offense, and the severity of potential harm to the public; (6) the opportunity to ascertain the true facts; and (7) the difficulty encountered by prosecuting officials in proving a mental state. [Adams, supra at 93-94, 683 N.W.2d 729.]

Applying the Adams factors to § 16902(1), we conclude that even if the Legislature did not intend to create true strict liability, § 16902(1) at most requires only that the prosecution prove that defendant "purposefully or voluntarily performed the wrongful act. . . ." See People v. Lardie, 452 Mich. 231, 241, 551 N.W.2d 656 (1996) (discussing "the distinction between a strict-liability crime and a general-intent crime"), overruled on other grounds by People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich. 418, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005).

First, § 16902(1) does not codify...