Gifford v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 23 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2358,83-2358
• Citation: 741 F.2d 263
• Parties: Howard L. GIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 263

741 F.2d 263

6 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 211

Howard L. GIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-2358.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Submitted May 18, 1984.

Decided Aug. 23, 1984.

Howard L. Gifford, in pro per.

J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donald B. Ayer, U.S. Atty., Gregory G. Hollows, Asst. U.S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., Dennis J. Mulshine, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

Before ANDERSON and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges, and HATFIELD, ^* District Judge.

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:

Gifford appeals the district court's denial of sanctions and contempt charges against the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). Gifford contends that the Secretary failed to comply with the court's order directing her to recompute supplemental security income (SSI) benefits allegedly owed to Gifford. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. The court properly upheld the Secretary's computation of benefits. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Gifford filed this action in November 1977 to obtain judicial review of the Secretary's decision denying him certain benefits. The district court determined that Gifford had been denied procedural rights in the administrative determination. The court remanded for additional proceedings. On rehearing, an ALJ determined that frequent errors were made in the computation of Gifford's past checks. An adjustment was made for the previous underpayment. The Appeals Council, however, recomputed the amount. On judicial review, the Secretary conceded that the Appeals Council's calculations were incorrect and sought to correct the error by submitting to Gifford a check for $17.90. Gifford "steadfastly" demanded his "procedural rights", contending that "never have they two times in a row given the same answer or figures." Gifford's main complaint was that California had decreased its mandatory benefits by an amount equal to the federal government's increase in social security and Veteran's pension benefits, thus nullifying his federal cost-of-living increases.

A Magistrate recommended that the Secretary be ordered to recompute the amounts due plaintiff, including passing along to him federal SSI cost-of-living increases since June 1977. The district court through Judge Wilkins adopted the Magistrate's findings and ordered the Secretary to (1) provide to plaintiff evidence of the amounts previously paid him; and (2) recompute the amounts due plaintiff, "including the pass-through of federal SSI cost-of-living increases since June, 1977 ...."

The Secretary promptly appealed the district court's order. Gifford cross-appealed contending that the court should have ordered retroactive payment from the date of actual conversion from the state program to SSI. On appeal, the Secretary requested voluntary dismissal and Gifford agreed to dismiss his cross-appeal. The appeal was thereupon dismissed.

Gifford filed a "motion for sanctions" when the Secretary allegedly failed to submit documentation or prepare the recomputations within 30 days of the dismissed appeal. He also filed a "motion to show cause why defendant should not be cited for contempt" and a motion of "bias and prejudice" against Judge Wilkins. Judge Wilkins denied these motions. Gifford moved for reconsideration and again requested that Judge Wilkins remove himself from the case. In response, Judge Wilkins determined that plaintiff's new allegations were sufficient to compel recusal. Judge Ramirez was assigned the case.

Plaintiff's motions for reconsideration were renewed. Judge Ramirez determined that since Judge Wilkins recused himself, the court's prior order was "without force or effect". Judge Ramirez then denied plaintiff's motion for sanctions on the timeliness issue. With respect to the sufficiency of the Secretary's performance in recomputing the monies owing, however, Judge Ramirez referred the matter to a Magistrate for the limited question of whether the Secretary had complied with the court's prior order.

Before the Magistrate, Gifford argued that the Secretary wrongly recomputed his benefits because the Secretary failed to include cost-of-living increases provided by California law. The Secretary argued that Gifford was not entitled to any cost-of-living increases under state law. She contended that California opted to satisfy the federal SSI cost-of-living increases provision, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1382g (1976), by maintaining its total expenditures for supplementary payments at the previous year's totals, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.2096(c) (1981). Thus, the provisions requiring that state increases be added to a recipient's minimum income level in computing mandatory minimum supplementary payment levels, 20 C.F.R. Sec. 416.2096(b) (1981), are not applicable to California recipients.

After additional briefing, the Magistrate concluded "with some discomfort" that the regulations do not require California to pay any of the state increases to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Magistrate found that the Secretary complied with the prior order and recommended that the court deny plaintiff's motions for sanctions and contempt. The court adopted the Magistrate's recommendation, judgment was entered and Gifford appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Deny Sanctions and Contempt

The Secretary contends that the only issue presented on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Gifford's motions for sanctions and contempt charges. Assuming the Secretary is correct, our review is quite limited. A district court has the power to adjudge in civil contempt any person who willfully disobeys a specific and definite order of the court. Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir.1983). A person fails to act as ordered by a court when "he fails to take 'all the reasonable steps within [his] power to insure compliance with the [court's] order.' " Id. at 1146-47, quoting Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald 44 F.2d 396, 406 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977). A court has wide latitude in determining whether there has been contemptuous defiance of its order. Neebars, Inc. v. Long Bar Grinding, Inc., 438 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir.1971). The lower court's decision to impose sanctions or punishment for contempt is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., L.A. Mem. Coliseum Commission v. City of Oakland, 717 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1983) (sanction for violation of local rules); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 532 (9th Cir.1983) (sanctions for discovery violations); Vertex Distributing v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1982) (civil contempt for failure to comply with consent order).

Here, the district court ordered the Secretary to recompute Gifford's entitlement, including any federal cost-of-living increases. The Secretary's response was timely. When plaintiff questioned the sufficiency of the Secretary's performance in recomputing the amount owing, the district court twice referred the matter to a Magistrate. The Magistrate found that the Secretary had complied with the court's order. The court adopted the Magistrate's findings. The process of checking compliance with the original order took approximately 2 1/2 years. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Secretary would not be subject to sanctions or charged with civil contempt for a failure to comply with the court's order.

B. Cost-of-Living Increases

Gifford argues that the issue presented on appeal is whether he is entitled to state cost-of-living increases. The Secretary has always maintained that the inclusion of state increases was never a part of the court's order. That order directed the Secretary to "recompute the amounts due plaintiff, including the pass-through of federal SSI cost-of-living increases ...." The order does not mention calculation of state cost-of-living increases. The Secretary's position was repeatedly rejected, however, by both the Magistrate and the district court. The remand order was intended to require the Secretary to compute all amounts owing under all relevant legislation. At the time of the first appeal, of course, Gifford could not have known that the Secretary might fail to do so. Accordingly, this is the...