Burrus v. Turnbo
| Decision Date | 25 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1951,83-1951 |
| Citation | 743 F.2d 693 |
| Parties | James Robert BURRUS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Charles TURNBO, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Harry Hellerstein, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner-appellee.
Judith A. Whetstine, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for respondent-appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Before GOODWIN, PREGERSON, and NELSON, Circuit Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Warden Charles Turnbo of the Pleasanton Federal Correctional Institution (Warden) appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The order permanently enjoins the Warden from recognizing a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum 1 asking him to transfer petitioner James Robert Burrus (Burrus) to the custody of Arizona authorities. Arizona seeks the transfer for the purpose of trying Burrus on various fraud and forgery counts.
The district court granted the injunction because Arizona had once before obtained custody of Burrus to prosecute these charges, but had returned him to the federal authorities before bringing him to trial. The court reasoned that in so doing, Arizona had flatly violated the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), Pub.L. No. 91-538, 84 Stat.
1397 (1970), codified at 18 U.S.C. app. Secs. 1-8 (1982). 2
The Warden challenges the injunction on three grounds. First, he contends that the district court interfered with pending state criminal proceedings and thereby offended the doctrine of equitable restraint as articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Second, the Warden argues that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the IAD required Arizona temporarily to return Burrus to federal custody, and therefore that the IAD cannot now penalize Arizona for attempting to resume its prosecution of him. Third, the Warden asserts that Burrus, not Arizona authorities, prevented the trial from taking place before the IAD's speedy trial deadline had expired. According to the Warden, Burrus asked for and received a lengthy pretrial continuance that made it impossible for Arizona to bring Burrus to trial on time.
For the reasons expressed below, we reject all of these arguments and affirm the district court.
The United States and Arizona are parties to the IAD, a compact designed, according to article I, to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding criminal] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." Each state that is party to the compact has enacted and codified the IAD as its own law. See 18 U.S.C. app. Sec. 2 (1982); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 31-481 (West 1976). Article II(a) defines the United States as a "state" for purposes of administering the agreement.
The detainer is central to the administration of the IAD. A detainer is simply a document notifying one state (the sending state) that another state (the receiving state) wants to prosecute a prisoner that the sending state is holding. Once lodged with the sending state, a detainer remains in effect indefinitely, and therein lies the problem. Before the IAD, the sending state was under no compulsion, other than comity, to send the prisoner to the receiving state. Usually, however, the sending state did transfer the prisoner. But having accepted the transfer, the receiving state could prosecute immediately, retain custody but postpone the trial, or shuttle the prisoner back to the sending state until the receiving state was ready to proceed against him and renew its request for custody 3--all while the detainer remained in effect.
Thus, the detainer has several deleterious effects. First, it may make the prisoner ineligible for desirable work or educational assignments. If the prisoner is constantly shuttled from one facility to another, prison officials may be reluctant to permit him to participate in rehabilitation programs. Second, a detainer reduces the prisoner's incentive to participate in work, education, and other programs that help rehabilitate him and improve his chances for early parole. Uncertain whether he will have to serve another, non-concurrent sentence in the future, the prisoner loses his interest in improving himself in the present. Third, a detainer tells the prisoner that he may have to stand trial elsewhere, but does not provide him with a vehicle for going there immediately to secure witnesses and take other steps to preserve his defense. See, e.g., United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358 n. 25, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1846 n. 25, 1847, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (citing authoritative sources); accord United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir.1975).
Before the IAD existed, some prison officials and state prosecutorial authorities abused the detainer system. Sometimes, authorities in potential receiving states lodged detainers not to obtain prisoners for the purpose of putting them on trial, but instead to make life more difficult for them in the prisons where they were already incarcerated. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 737-40 (2d Cir.1977) (recounting cases of such abuse), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978)
To correct these evils, article III(a) 4 gives the prisoner the right to demand that the receiving state swiftly dispose of any outstanding charges:
[W]henever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment ... on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer ... written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment ....
18 U.S.C. app. Sec. 2, art. III(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, article III(d) 5 penalizes the receiving state for failure to prosecute a prisoner transferred under the IAD:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
Id. art. III(d) (emphasis added).
Finally, article V(g) vests the sending state with jurisdiction over the prisoner for all purposes other than final disposition of outstanding indictments in the receiving state:
For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state ....
Id. art. V(g) (emphasis added).
Burrus, a federal prisoner at the Englewood Federal Correctional Institution in Colorado, learned that the State of Arizona had lodged a detainer against him with federal authorities. On November 23, 1980, pursuant to article III of the IAD, he filed 6 a request asking Arizona to dispose of all outstanding charges against him. 7
Arizona accepted that request, and on February 11, 1981, federal authorities transferred Burrus to the custody of Arizona authorities.
The State arraigned Burrus in Maricopa County Superior Court on February 20 and later set various trial dates. Along the way, both sides made several motions. On March 20, Burrus asked for and received a 32-day continuance of the deadline for filing pre-trial motions. Later, the trial court, acting sua sponte, twice continued the original trial date of April 8--initially to May 11, then to May 21.
On May 21, Burrus filed a motion to dismiss the Arizona indictment. He argued that in failing to bring him to trial by May 12, 1981, Arizona had violated the state's own speedy trial rule. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 8.3(a). 8 Rule 8.3(a) reinforces Arizona's adherence to the IAD's speedy trial provisions. It required Arizona to try Burrus within 90 days of his delivery into Arizona's temporary custody. On May 22, 179 days after Burrus had filed his request for speedy disposition of the outstanding charges (but 100 days after federal authorities had delivered him to Arizona), the Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the indictment with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8.3(a). State v. Burrus, Crim. No. 106900 (Ariz.Super.Ct. Maricopa County May 22, 1981) (Myers, J.) (unpublished order). Arizona authorities returned Burrus to federal custody at Englewood on May 29, and the Maricopa County sheriff officially withdrew the Arizona detainer against him on June 6.
Meanwhile, on May 22, Arizona appealed the superior court's decision. On October 7, 1982--almost a year-and-a-half later--the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, reinstated the indictment, and remanded the case for trial. State v. Burrus, 134 Ariz. 251, 655 P.2d 371 (App.1982). The state appeals court ruled that by obtaining his lengthy continuance, Burrus had waived his right under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 8.3(a) to be tried within 90 days of arriving in the state, and that Arizona had 32 more days in which to put Burrus on trial. Id. at 253, 655 P.2d at 373. On December 29, 1982, Burrus received notice that Arizona had renewed its demand for temporary custody, this time by obtaining a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in Maricopa County Superior Court.
Burrus, now imprisoned in the federal penitentiary at Pleasanton, California, decided to explore two separate avenues in his search for relief. First, he petitioned the Arizona courts. He reasoned that even if Arizona had...
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