Com. v. Basemore
| Decision Date | 20 January 2000 |
| Citation | 560 Pa. 258,744 A.2d 717 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William BASEMORE, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert Brett Dunham, Philadelphia, for William Basemore.
Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, for Com.
Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Office of Attorney General.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
This is an appeal in a capital case from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying post-conviction relief.
On December 23, 1986, Appellant, William Basemore ("Basemore"), gained entry, without permission, to the premises of his former employer, the Riverfront Dinner Theater in Philadelphia, by removing slats in the window of the men's bathroom. Using a homemade hook device, he pulled through the window an acetylene tank, an oxygen tank, a cutting torch, and martial arts weapons, which included a knife and a homemade spear that had attached a throwing knife and a four-point throwing star at opposite ends. Once inside, Basemore murdered an elderly security guard, stabbing him with the knife several times in the neck, chest, and shoulder area. Basemore then dragged the guard's body into the sales office where a safe was located, and, using the cutting torch, breached the safe and removed money and imitation gold coins. Upon fleeing, Basemore left behind the safe-cutting equipment and his weapons. The police ultimately traced these items to Basemore and later executed arrest and search warrants at his residence, at which time Basemore made certain incriminating statements. In addition, the search revealed items taken from the Riverfront Dinner Theater safe, martial arts equipment similar to that found at the scene, and clothing of Basemore stained with the victim's blood.
At trial, Basemore requested a continuance, claiming that the defense investigation was incomplete and that he wished to have new counsel appointed to represent him. The trial court questioned counsel as to his preparedness, and counsel responded by outlining his preparation for the guilt phase of the trial. Upon being satisfied that counsel was ready to proceed, the trial court denied Basemore's requests. Apparently dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, Basemore repeatedly disrupted the jury selection proceedings, stating at one point that he had placed counsel under surveillance, and that civil suits were pending against counsel, neither of which was true. When Basemore refused to abide by the court's order to refrain from such conduct, he was removed from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial.
As a result of Basemore's behavior, the trial court ordered a mental health evaluation, which was conducted by a psychiatrist, Robert Stanton, M.D., who had evaluated Basemore approximately six months earlier in connection with an unrelated robbery (also involving a former employer). In his previous evaluation, Dr. Stanton noted that Basemore denied any history of psychiatric illness, treatment or hospitalization and denied experiencing delusions, hallucinations or suicidal ideation. Dr. Stanton found Basemore to be alert and cooperative and concluded that his insight and judgment were adequate. Although Dr. Stanton reported that Basemore suffered some degree of anxiety and suspicion, he found no evidence of psychosis. Dr. Stanton diagnosed Basemore as having a mixed personality disorder, with passive-aggressive and schizoid features, also noting that Basemore appeared to have underlying emotional instability.
In the second evaluation, conducted at the beginning of Basemore's trial, Dr. Stanton referenced his earlier report, reiterating the same diagnoses. On this occasion, however, Basemore was unwilling to provide any information. Nevertheless, Dr. Stanton found no evidence of psychosis, noting that Basemore's behavior, specifically his refusal to cooperate, appeared to be volitional. Thus, Dr. Stanton concluded that there was no reason to believe that Basemore's ability to take part in the trial was impaired by any psychotic process.
Basemore was found guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, burglary, and possession of an instrument of crime. Prior to the penalty phase, the defense obtained a ruling from the trial court limiting the use of Basemore's prior robbery conviction to rebutting character evidence suggesting that he was truthful or law-abiding. The trial court also ruled that the conviction would be admissible to rebut an argument that Basemore had no significant history of prior criminal convictions pursuant to the statutory mitigator in Section 9711(e)(1) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(1). The Commonwealth sought to establish as an aggravating circumstance that Basemore had committed the murder during the perpetration of a felony. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6).
In addition to limiting the defense mitigation evidence consistent with the trial court's ruling, trial counsel elected not to present testimony from certain of Basemore's family members. In particular, counsel was concerned that those family members who lived with Basemore had access to the fruits of the crime (the money and gold coins) and could be cross-examined regarding their knowledge of such items. Counsel also declined to present testimony from Basemore's mother because she had provided a statement to the police in which she indicated that Basemore practiced karate at night in a cemetery. Thus, the defense offered in mitigation: Basemore's age at the time of the offense, twenty-two years; through the testimony from his former girlfriend, Stacy Williams, that he had a son to whom he had contributed financial support; and that he had participated in community activities. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(4), (8). The jury found the aggravating circumstance but no mitigating circumstances and sentenced Basemore to death.
Following the verdict, trial counsel was permitted to withdraw, and new counsel was appointed for post-verdict motions, which raised issues as to trial counsel's effectiveness. As part of a pre-sentence investigation, Dr. Stanton evaluated Basemore for a third time. Dr. Stanton reiterated many of the findings from his previous examinations, specifically, that Basemore showed no evidence of psychosis, and that he had a mixed personality disorder with passive aggressive and schizoid features in addition to an underlying emotional disorder. Dr. Stanton concluded that Basemore did not have a major mental illness and was capable of taking part in the sentencing proceeding. The pre-sentence report from Basemore's prior robbery conviction was updated, and it indicated, inter alia, that Basemore "always received the material necessities as well as the emotional needs including love, attention, guidance and proper discipline according to him and his mother." Post-verdict motions were denied, and Basemore was sentenced on the remaining offenses. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed, see Commonwealth v. Basemore, 525 Pa. 512, 582 A.2d 861 (1990),
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Basemore v. Pennsylvania, 502 U.S. 1102, 112 S.Ct. 1191, 117 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992).
On January 20, 1995, Basemore filed a pro se petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 (the "PCRA"). In his petition, Basemore alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for: failing to call certain witnesses during the guilt phase of the trial; not objecting to the testimony from the proprietor of a martial arts store where Basemore had purchased martial arts supplies; and not objecting to the admissibility of the Commonwealth's blood evidence.1 Counsel was appointed and, on July 26, 1995, filed a letter stating that Basemore's petition was without merit and that there were no meritorious issues that could be presented in an amended petition. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 494-95, 544 A.2d 927, 928 (1988)
(setting forth the procedure for counsel to withdraw when the issues raised in a post-conviction proceeding are meritless). Subsequently, counsel moved to withdraw the "no merit letter" and to submit an amended PCRA petition alleging, in pertinent part, trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to investigate, prepare and present certain mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of trial. The PCRA court ordered the "no merit letter" withdrawn and allowed Basemore to amend his PCRA petition. On January 10, 1996, counsel from the Center for Legal Education, Advocacy & Defense Assistance ("CLEADA") also entered an appearance on behalf of Basemore.
From December of 1996 through April of 1997, the PCRA court conducted hearings, the focus of which concerned trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate and present available mitigation evidence relating to Basemore's traumatic childhood and mental illness. During the hearings, Basemore presented testimony from Stacy Williams and an individual with whom he worked, Cheryl Hawkins, with both women relating that Basemore was withdrawn, dressed strangely, and, at times, thought he was David Bowie or a ninja. Ms. Williams said that trial counsel never asked her about Basemore's behavior, and Ms. Hawkins testified that she was never contacted. Basemore's sisters, Charlotte Emfinger and Angelina Coleman, brother, Dennis Mease, and mother, Josephine Mease, testified that Basemore was physically abused as a child by his father, acted and dressed strangely, and, when he was eight or nine years of age, had fallen from a second story window striking his head.2 Ms. Emfinger also related that Basemore thought that he was a ninja. The family members explained that trial counsel had never inquired of them regarding Basemore's background.
Testimony was also presented from a psychologist, Jethrow Toomer, who evaluated Basemore in September of 1995 and diagnosed him as having schizophrenia, without...
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