Lynch v. Baxley

Decision Date26 October 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-7346,82-7346
Citation744 F.2d 1452
PartiesJean P. LYNCH, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, Jesse M. Hughes, et al., Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William J. BAXLEY, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Robert D. Segall, E. Terry Brown, Montgomery, Ala., for intervening plaintiffs-appellants.

Julian Butler, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Huntsville, Ala., R. Emmett Poundstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Mental Health, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before VANCE and CLARK, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit judge.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants seek to enjoin the defendant officials of the state of Alabama from detaining in county jails persons awaiting mental illness involuntary commitment proceedings. 1 The class alleges that the incarceration provided for in the emergency detention provision of the Alabama civil commitment statute deprives them of due process, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and denies them equal protection of the laws.

This case marks a continuation of wide-ranging litigation which began in 1974 as an attack on the constitutionality of Alabama's civil commitment procedures. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala.1974) (Lynch I ). The class certified in that case contained all persons who were or would be involuntarily civilly committed in Alabama. The three-judge district court found that the commitment statute then in effect violated due process in large part because it allowed detention without a probable cause hearing within a reasonable time, failed to require the presence of the person being committed and appointed counsel at the hearing and contained ill-defined standards for commitment. In response to the judgment of the court, which included an injunction against involuntary commitments under the old system, Alabama enacted a new civil commitment statute in 1975. The new statute provided for a probable cause hearing within 7 days of detention and a final hearing within 30 days of receipt of the commitment petition (Sec. 22-52-8), the appointment of an attorney (Sec. 22-52-4) and the presence of that attorney and the person to be committed at all hearings (Sec. 22-52-9) and established a clear standard for determining whether commitment was appropriate (Sec. 22-52-10). 2

In 1977, the class filed a Motion for Further Relief arguing that other provisions of the new statute, those allowing emergency detention in jails until the commitment hearings are held (Secs. 22-52-7 and 22-52-8), violated due process, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and deprived them of equal protection. 3 Appellants retained the same class and class representatives as in the original action. Discovery, which involved sending interrogatories on the terms and conditions of jail detention to all county probate judges, ensued for two years. The district court then dismissed the case without prejudice finding that there was no proof that the named plaintiffs had standing to seek relief from the new statute. On appeal, a panel of this court held that the original plaintiffs no longer had standing. 4 Lynch v. Baxley, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (Lynch II ). Lack of standing by the named plaintiffs, however, was not found to be determinative. The Lynch II court found that the class retained a legal status separate from that of the named plaintiffs and that although the class had been truncated by the passage of the new civil commitment statute the claims of those members upon whom the emergency detention provision would operate remained viable. 651 F.2d at 388. The court then remanded the case with instructions to allow time for the intervention of plaintiffs with standing to represent the interests of the class. Id. at 388-89. In response to the district court order complying with the Lynch II mandate, counsel for the plaintiffs made a motion to amend the complaint adding David Bruce Pearcy as a party plaintiff in the case. The district court granted that motion and then proceeded to rule against the plaintiffs on their constitutional claims (September 30, 1982). The class then appealed that judgment to this court. During oral argument, a question was raised as to whether this action presented a case or controversy. The amendment to the pleading making Pearcy a class representative indicated that at the time it was filed Pearcy was no longer being held in a county jail but had been committed to a state hospital. Unable to determine whether the named plaintiff had standing to represent the class, this court remanded the case to the district court to make that determination (January 18, 1984). Pursuant to our order, the district court received and considered a stipulation filed by the parties on this question. The stipulation revealed that Pearcy was eventually released from the state mental hospital but was later detained in the Lee County jail pursuant to another petition for commitment under Sec. 22-52-7. Pearcy remained incarcerated at the county jail until his commitment to yet another state facility. The district court considered this evidence and found that Pearcy had standing and therefore was a proper class representative. Since this court retained jurisdiction over this action pending a determination on the standing issue, the case is now before us again. Before considering the claims of the plaintiffs-appellants, however, this court must examine whether the named plaintiff has standing to represent the class.

Standing

The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to "cases or controversies." Standing is one aspect of the case or controversy requirement. "The constitutional limits on standing eliminate claims in which the plaintiff has failed to make out a case or controversy between himself and the defendant." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607, 60 L.Ed.2d 66, 76 (1979). Any plaintiff attempting to invoke the power of a federal court must demonstrate a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues" and thereby enable the court to resolve constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 678 (1962). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 354 (1975). A demonstration of this personal stake is made by the plaintiff's showing that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" and that his injury or threat of injury is "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674, 682 (1974). Individual standing requirements must be met by anyone attempting to represent his own interest or those of a class. If the named plaintiff seeking to represent a class fails to establish the requisite case or controversy, he may not seek relief on his behalf or on that of the class. 5 414 U.S. at 494, 94 S.Ct. at 675, 38 L.Ed.2d at 682. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03, 95 S.Ct. 553, 559, 42 L.Ed.2d 532, 542; 1 Newberg, Class Actions Sec. 1072 (1977).

The question before this court is whether Pearcy has a personal stake in this litigation entitling him to seek injunctive relief. In the motion to amend complaint and pleadings submitted in 1981 to add Pearcy as the named plaintiff, it was alleged that at the time of filing Pearcy was hospitalized after having been committed. He had been detained immediately prior to his hospitalization in the Lee County jail pending the involuntary commitment proceedings. Although the pleadings alleged that Pearcy was at risk of being incarcerated again, there was no evidence to that effect. In the stipulation presented to the district court on remand of this case, there is proof that Pearcy has been incarcerated again pending commitment proceedings. The allegations in both sets of pleadings, however, establish that Pearcy's injury from jail detention was past at the time he was added as a named plaintiff in the case.

Past injury from alleged unconstitutional conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, if unaccompanied by current adverse effects. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. at 495-96, 94 S.Ct. at 676, 38 L.Ed.2d at 683. Past wrongs do constitute evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury which could be averted by the issuing of an injunction. Id. The alleged past wrongs in the present case, Pearcy's detention on successive commitment petitions, underscores the likelihood Pearcy will spend more time in jail awaiting commitment hearings.

In O'Shea, the Court found that the named plaintiffs lacked standing to seek the requested injunction because they did not show the likelihood that the problem exposing them to unconstitutional conduct would persist or that the challenged conduct would continue. 6 There was a notable absence of allegations about the unconstitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied. 414 U.S. at 496-97, 94 S.Ct. at 676, 38 L.Ed.2d at 683-84. Pearcy has, as the district court found, mental problems which require and benefit from the treatment which comes with commitment but which are subject to reoccurrence. There is every indication that the named plaintiff could continue to be the subject of involuntary commitment petitions and thereby subject to emergency detention. 7 Pearcy's mental condition which has prompted two such detentions in the past three years appears persistent. In addition, there is every likelihood that any petition filed against Pearcy would result in his incarceration in the Lee County jail. The class in this case is arguing that the...

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