Faith United Methodist Church v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 13 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0080.,12–0080.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: FAITH UNITED METHODIST CHURCH AND CEMETERY OF TERRA ALTA, West Virginia, and Trinity United Methodist Church of Terra Alta, West Virginia, Petitioners v. Marvin D. MORGAN, Respondent.

231 W.Va. 423

745 S.E.2d 461

FAITH UNITED METHODIST CHURCH AND CEMETERY OF TERRA ALTA, West Virginia, and Trinity United Methodist Church of Terra Alta, West Virginia, Petitioners

v.Marvin D. MORGAN, Respondent.

No. 12–0080.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted April 16, 2013.

Decided June 13, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Syllabus Point 1 of Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W.Va. 81, 118 S.E. 162 (1923), is expressly overruled.

2. The word “surface,” when used in an instrument of conveyance, generally means the exposed area of land, improvements on the land, and any part of the underground actually used by a surface owner as an adjunct to surface use (for example, medium for the roots of growing plants, groundwater, water wells, roads, basements, or construction footings).

3. Deeds are subject to the principles of interpretation and construction that govern contracts generally.

4. “A valid written instrument which expresses the intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction or interpretation but will be applied and enforced according to such intent.” Syllabus Point 1, Cotiga Development Company v. United Fuel Gas Company, 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).

5. “In construing a deed, will, or other written instrument, it is the duty of the court to construe it as a whole, taking and considering all the parts together, and giving effect to the intention of the parties wherever that is reasonably clear and free from doubt, unless to do so will violate some principle of law inconsistent therewith.” Syllabus Point 1, Maddy v. Maddy, 87 W.Va. 581, 105 S.E. 803 (1921).

6. “Extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to explain or alter the terms of a written contract which is clear and unambiguous.” Syllabus Point 9, Paxton v. Benedum–Trees Oil Co., 80 W.Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917).

7. “It is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written contract or to make a new or different contract for them.” Syllabus Point 3, Cotiga Development Company v. United Fuel Gas Company, 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).

8. “Parties are bound by general and ordinary meanings of words used in deeds.” Syllabus Point 1, McDonough Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., Inc., 167 W.Va. 611, 280 S.E.2d 246 (1981).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Preston County, The Honorable Lawrance S. Miller, Jr., Judge, Civil Action No. 11–C–27. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Steven L. Shaffer, Esq., C. Paul Estep, Esq., Estep & Shaffer, L.C., Kingwood, WV, for the Petitioners.

J. Thomas Lane, Esq., C. Seth Wilson, Esq., Joshua L. Jarrell, Esq., Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love LLP, Morgantown, WV, for the Respondent.

KETCHUM, Justice:

In Syllabus Point 1 of Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co.,¹ the Court declared that the term “surface,” when used as a term of conveyance in a deed, is ambiguous on its face and always subject to modern-day interpretation using parol and other evidence extrinsic to the deed.

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Preston County, we are asked to examine a 1907 deed of the “surface only” of a tract. The circuit court found the deed was ambiguous, based upon Ramage, and relied upon contemporary testimony to interpret the deed. The circuit court concluded that the deed conveying the “surface only” also conveyed an interest in all oil and gas under the tract.

As set forth below, we find that the term “surface,” when used as a term of conveyance, is not presumptively ambiguous and does have a definite and certain meaning. We therefore overrule Syllabus Point 1 of Ramage, and reverse the circuit court's decision.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The dispute between the parties centers on one question: who owns the oil and gas under a 225 acre tract of land in Preston County, West Virginia? The dispute revolves around the interpretation of a 1907 deed between two siblings.

In 1869, Calvin C. Forman acquired ownership of the entire 225 acre tract. In 1893, he died intestate leaving seven children as his only heirs. Those seven children—including siblings Walter S. Forman and Florence A. Forman—each inherited an undivided 1/7 fee simple interest in the tract.

By 1902, Walter had acquired the interests of five of his siblings; hence, he was vested with an undivided 6/7 interest in the tract. His sister Florence retained her 1/7 interest. On February 22, 1902, Walter and Florence conveyed by deed “all of the coal upon and under” the tract to two other individuals. ² Nowhere in the 1902 coal severance deed is there any language suggesting a conveyance of any other minerals, including oil and gas.

The deed under consideration was executed on November 14, 1907. The deed, from Florence to her brother Walter, conveyed her 1/7 interest in “the surface only” of the tract. The 1907 deed contains the following language:

That in consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Dollars, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the said party of the first part [Florence] does grant unto the said party of the second part [Walter], the following described property, that is to say: Her one-seventh undivided interest in the surface only with the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging, (the coal and mining privileges having been previously sold) in the two hundred and twenty-five acre tract of land[.] (Emphasis added.)

The parties now dispute the meaning of the phrase “the surface only” used in the 1907 deed, and ask this Court to discern whether Florence's deed to her brother Walter conveyed any rights to oil, gas, or minerals (other than the previously conveyed coal) underlying the tract.

The subject tract was later conveyed several times. In 1967, respondent Marvin D. Morgan purchased the interest in the 225 acre tract that had been owned by Walter S. Forman.³ Mr. Morgan contends that he is the sole owner of all oil and gas rights under the tract.

In 1930, Florence Forman died intestate. The petitioners, Faith United Methodist Church and Trinity Methodist Church, are successors to Ms. Forman. The petitioners contend that Florence conveyed “the surface only” of the tract to her brother Walter without any mineral rights, and that she retained a 1/7 interest in the oil and gas under the tract at the time of her death. The petitioners therefore assert they now own a portion of that 1/7 interest.

To determine the parties' rights under the 1907 deed, respondent Mr. Morgan filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Preston County on February 7, 2011. The circuit court held a bench trial on September 19, 2011.

Mr. Morgan presented two witnesses at the trial. Neither witness could testify as to facts surrounding the 1907 deed, nor could they shed light on the intent of the parties at the time of the conveyance. The first witness, a non-lawyer landman, testified Florence Forman had never specifically mentioned any oil and gas rights in any conveyance after 1907. The witness could find nothing to show Ms. Forman had ever conveyed, leased, devised, or mortgaged the oil and gas rights. The county assessor testified that the real estate tax assessments showed the coal estate had been severed from the remainder of the 225–acre tract for tax purposes in 1902, but that there was no record indicating the assessor's office had ever imposed a separate tax assessment on the tract for oil or gas rights.

In an order dated November 9, 2011, the circuit court ruled in favor of the respondent, Mr. Morgan, finding he “is the successor in title to Walter Forman and presently owns one hundred percent of the oil and gas underlying” the 225 acre tract. The circuit court declared that the term “the surface only” in the 1907 deed was ambiguous. The circuit court relied upon our holding in Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co.,⁴ where the Court held in Syllabus Point 1 that the term “surface” in a deed is always ambiguous and “is not a definite one capable of a definition of universal application.” ⁵ The Ramage Court noted that “the term ‘surface’ has various meanings” ⁶ and “does not have a well defined legal meaning when used as the subject of conveyance,” ⁷ and therefore concluded that, “In our judgment the term is ambiguous.” ⁸ Hence, according to the Ramage Court, whenever the word “surface” is used to convey an interest in property, the conveyance is subject to later interpretation by looking beyond the language of the deed and studying the parol evidence surrounding the transaction.

Based upon Ramage, the circuit court determined that the 1907 deed conveying “the surface only” was ambiguous on its face and subject to modern-day interpretation. The circuit court then looked to other evidence surrounding the transaction and found that, after 1907, the assessor never entered any interest in the tract for Florence Forman on the land books for taxation. The court also found that, after 1907, there was no evidence Ms. Forman ever conveyed, devised, leased, or mortgaged any interest in the tract. Because Ms. Forman never “demonstrate[d] an intent to retain an ownership interest in the Subject Tract” after 1907, the circuit court determined that she must have intended to convey her entire 1/7 interest to the tract including the oil and gas, and not merely “the surface,” to her brother Walter. As a result, the circuit court found that respondent Marvin Morgan purchased the entire 225 acre tract with all of the rights to the oil and gas (less the coal rights conveyed in 1902).

The successors to Ms. Forman, petitioners Faith United Methodist Church and Trinity Methodist Church, now ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's November 9, 2011, order.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case centers upon the circuit court's interpretation of the 1907 deed. We have stated that the interpretation of a deed, which is not dependent upon extrinsic evidence, is a question of law for a court and not...