Adamson v. C.I.R., 83-7150

• Citation: 745 F.2d 541
• Decision Date: 16 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-7150,83-7150
• Parties: 84-2 USTC P 9863 Kent A. ADAMSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 541

745 F.2d 541

84-2 USTC P 9863

Kent A. ADAMSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 83-7150.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 8, 1984.

Decided Oct. 16, 1984.

Peter A. Camiel, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner-appellant.

Lisa Prager, Washington, D.C., for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from United States Tax Court.

Before ANDERSON, SKOPIL, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges.

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question whether the exclusionary rule bars the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from using in a civil tax proceeding evidence that concededly was illegally obtained by state police. Based exclusively upon that evidence, which we conclude was not obtained in bad faith, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) made a jeopardy assessment against Adamson in the amount of $262,198.40. With certain modifications, the Tax Court upheld that assessment. Because we believe the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), precludes application of the exclusionary rule in this context, and that the evidence provides a rational foundation for the assessment, we affirm the Tax Court holding.

FACTS

On January 29, 1980, Seattle police officers arrested Kent Adamson and three others for narcotics violations. Earlier that day, a Seattle branch of the Pacific National Bank of Washington was robbed by two Black males. One suspect was shot and captured by the Seattle police, and the other escaped. Responding to a tip from a hotel maid that she had seen a bank bag filled with money in room 423, the police officers went to the room in the Camlin Hotel in search of the remaining suspect. They had not sought a warrant to search any of the hotel rooms or to arrest anyone there.

When the officers arrived at the hotel room, a Caucasian male and female were leaving the room carrying a briefcase. The officers arrested them and then opened the briefcase. Inside the briefcase were pills and marijuana which appeared to be packaged for delivery. The officers then entered the room and saw Adamson, who is Caucasian, and a female. They immediately arrested the two and then searched the room. In a dresser drawer they found a Seattle First National Bank bag containing a large quantity of money and a plastic bag containing hashish. When asked about the money, Adamson stated that it belonged to him. The officers then sealed the room while they sought a search warrant.

A search warrant was issued on the basis of probable cause to believe a narcotics offense had been committed, and that evidence relevant to the crime could be found in room 423 at the Camlin Hotel. Armed with the warrant, the officers returned to the hotel room and seized over $56,000 in U.S. currency, a Seattle First National Bank bag, personal checks made out to Adamson, hashish, a scale containing a white powder residue, a passport in Adamson's name, and a travel bag and leather purse with personal items belonging to Adamson and others.

Adamson was not charged with any crime as a result of his arrest and the search.

After the warrant was executed, the Seattle police contacted agents of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the IRS to examine the seized materials. The IRS agent, relying upon the seized documents, discussions with DEA officers, Adamson's failure to file an income tax return for several years, his prior conviction for a cocaine offense, and his arrest for possession of narcotics, concluded that he did not report his taxable income for 1979.

Based on this conclusion, the Commissioner made a jeopardy assessment against Adamson in the amount of $262,198.40. After noting the government's concession of two mathematical errors and decreasing the jeopardy assessment to correct those errors, the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determination. The Tax Court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the evidence was illegally seized by the Seattle police and would have been excluded in a criminal proceeding. It nevertheless held that the evidence was admissible in a civil tax proceeding.

Based on that evidence, the Tax Court concluded that the Commissioner had sustained his burden of linking the taxpayer to the income-producing activity of drug trafficking, and that the revenue agent's deficiency computations had a rational foundation. The court found that Adamson failed to carry the burden that had shifted to him to prove that the Commissioner's determination was erroneous, or that his failure to file a return was due to reasonable cause.

On appeal, Adamson argues that the Seattle police obtained the search warrant in bad faith and because they almost immediately brought in federal agents, the evidence should have been excluded to effectuate the policies of the exclusionary rule. In addition, he argues that even if the evidence was admissible, it does not provide a rational foundation for the deficiency assessment. We do not agree.

DISCUSSION

1. Exclusionary Rule

In considering the applicability of the exclusionary rule to the evidence used in the tax proceeding we do not write on a fresh slate. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not bar, in a federal civil tax proceeding, use of evidence obtained by state law enforcement officers in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be defective. The Court focused its analysis upon the potential deterrent effect of excluding the evidence as compared to the social cost of losing probative evidence. On balance, the Court found that exclusion of the evidence in the civil proceeding would be unwarranted. Id. at 458, 96 S.Ct. at 3034.

In assessing that balance, the Court pointed to two factors that significantly weakened the deterrent effect of invoking the rule. First, the Court noted that the state law enforcement officers were already "punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal trial. Id. at 448, 96 S.Ct. at 3029. The Court reasoned that any further application of the rule in a federal civil proceeding would provide at best a marginal increase in the deterrent effect, and that the marginal increase did not outweigh the societal costs resulting from the exclusion. Id. at 454, 96 S.Ct. at 3032. Second, the Court noted the intersovereign context of the case and absence of a connection between the purposes of the offending state officers (to convict for illegal gambling) and those of the federal government (to obtain a deficiency judgment in a civil tax proceeding). Id. at 458, 96 S.Ct. at 3034. The Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign." Id. Use of the evidence in a federal civil proceeding, the Court said, is not within the state officers' "zone of primary interest." Id.

In the case at bar, the Tax Court assumed the illegality of the state officers' search without deciding the issue. We too assume it for purposes of our analysis. Because the question is whether the exclusionary rule applies at all, there is no reason for us to determine the legality of the seizures. See Tirado v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 307, 309 & n. 2 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014, 103 S.Ct. 1256, 75 L.Ed.2d 484 (1983).

Adamson urges this court to distinguish Janis on the ground that in his case there was no criminal proceeding and hence no punishment of the offending state officers. The Supreme Court has answered that contention in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). Lopez-Mendoza, like the case at bar, involved a civil defendant who was never prosecuted criminally. Although the Court recognized that one of the factors noted by the Janis Court as contributing to the weakness of the potential deterrent effect of exclusion was that the offending state officers were already "punished" by exclusion of the evidence from the state criminal proceeding, id. at ---- - ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3484-86, it did not find the absence of that factor to be determinative. Similarly, here, we do not find the absence of a state criminal prosecution to be determinative of the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be invoked.

The only logical explanation of the failure to prosecute Adamson for violation of state or federal criminal drug laws is that the prosecuting authorities concluded that the evidence obtained by the search would have been excluded. The decision not to prosecute because of the police officers' conduct provides deterrence equivalent to the exclusion of the evidence.

Adamson also urges this court to distinguish Janis on the ground that Janis involved state law enforcement officers obtaining evidence in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be defective, whereas the case at bar involved bad faith on the part of the state police. Adamson's contention presents us with the question whether a bad faith violation of an individual's fourth amendment rights requires application of the exclusionary sanction in a civil tax proceeding. We believe that it does; however, in this case we cannot say that the police officers acted in bad faith.

When evidence is obtained by deliberate violations of the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the Constitution, the probative value of that evidence cannot outweigh the need for a judicial sanction. In Lopez-Mendoza, the majority was careful to point out:

[W]e do not deal here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained....