Smithrud v. City of St. Paul

Citation746 F.3d 391
Decision Date09 May 2014
Docket NumberNos. 12–3713,12–3736.,s. 12–3713
PartiesLeRoy SMITHRUD, Plaintiff–Appellant v. CITY OF ST. PAUL; John and Jane Does 1–10, Defendants–Appellees. LeRoy Smithrud, Plaintiff–Appellant v. City of Minneapolis; John and Jane Does 1–10, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

May C. Yang, argued, Minneapolis, MN (Mitchell R. Hadler, on the brief), for appellant.

Lawrence J. Hayes, Jr., Assistant City Attorney, argued, Saint Paul, MN, for appellee.

Before BYE, BRIGHT, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

LeRoy Smithrud (Smithrud) brought actions against the City of Minneapolis, the City of St. Paul, and John and Jane Does 1–10 (collectively the cities) alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), federal civil rights laws, and state law stemming from the cities' demolition of his properties after declaring them nuisances. The district court 1 dismissed the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a consolidated appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims, but reversed and remanded to the district court to consider whether Smithrud stated a claim under federal law. See Smithrud v. City of Minneapolis, 456 Fed.Appx. 634, 635 (8th Cir.2012). On remand, the district court concluded that Smithrud failed to state a claim under federal law and that the statute of limitations barred his FHA claims. The district court subsequently denied his motion to alter or amend. Smithrud appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

Relevant to this appeal, Smithrud owned two rental properties in St. Paul, Minnesota, located at 847 Agate and 1863 Montana, and an apartment building in Minneapolis, Minnesota, located at 2400 Dupont Avenue North. Both cities declared the properties nuisances and sought demolition. The cities made the respective decisions to demolish the properties on August 26, 2008, for the Minneapolis apartment and August 20, 2008, and September 10, 2008, for the St. Paul properties.

Seeking to prevent the demolition, Smithrud initially pursued legal action in Minnesota state courts but the district courts dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed both dismissals. See Smithrud v. City of Minneapolis, No. A08–2157 (Minn.Ct.App. Sept. 15, 2009) (order); Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, No. A08–2003, 2009 WL 2927389 (Minn.Ct.App. Sept. 15, 2009).

On November 3, 2010, Smithrud filed nearly identical complaints against the cities in federal court alleging violations under the FHA, federal civil rights laws, and state law.2 In its answer, St. Paul denied the allegations and raised the FHA's two-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Minneapolis did not answer the complaint, and instead moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), or alternatively, for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The district court dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and entered judgment for the cities.

Smithrud appealed. This court agreed that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smithrud's state law claims, but held that the dismissal of the federal claims was improper, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding to the district court to determine whether Smithrud stated a claim under federal law. See Smithrud, 456 Fed.Appx. at 634.

On remand, the district court ordered the parties to submit briefs on whether the complaints state a claim under federal law. In their briefs, both cities argued that the two-year statute of limitations barred Smithrud's FHA claims. Although St. Paul had raised the issue as an affirmative defense in its answer, the district court granted Smithrud leave to respond on the statute-of-limitations issue because it did not arise in the first appeal to this court or in Minneapolis' initial motion to dismiss. Smithrud argued that he had tolled the statute of limitations.

The district court rejected Smithrud's arguments and concluded that the two-year statute of limitations barred Smithrud's FHA claims and dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim under federal law. Smithrud moved to alter or amend, which the district court denied. Smithrud appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Discussion

In these consolidated cases, Smithrud argues that the district court erred by: (1) allowing the cities to file “another motion to dismiss on remand; (2) excluding evidence; (3) ruling that the statute of limitations barred his FHA claims; (4) dismissing his complaints for failure to state a claim under federal law; and (5) denying his motions to alter or amend. We will address each argument in turn.

A. Motion to Dismiss

Smithrud argues that the district court erred by allowing the cities to file what he calls “another motion to dismiss.”

However, a review of the record indicates that there was no second motion to dismiss. Rather, after this court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Smithrud's complaints stated a claim under federal law, the district court ordered the parties to submit simultaneous briefs on the issue. Minneapolis had already filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and, as the district court noted on remand, it may also sua sponte dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1042–43 (8th Cir.1991). In ordering the parties to brief the issue of whether Smithrud's complaints stated a claim under federal law, the district court followed the instructions on remand. The district court did not error.

B. Exclusion of Evidence

Next, Smithrud argues that the district court erred by excluding evidence that he submitted.

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court has the discretionary power to exclude exhibits not disclosed in compliance with its pretrial orders.” Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 897 (8th Cir.1978).

Here, the district court stated that of the nearly 300 exhibits Smithrud submitted—the majority of which he had improperly submitted—the district court would “consider only those exhibits bearing on this motion.” The record reflects that Smithrud repeatedly violated district court orders and improperly filed exhibits and documents in what the district court characterized as a “haphazard and chaotic manner” that “littered the docket with extraneous and unsolicited filings” and left the district court with “a nearly insurmountable challenge” of “unearthing” exhibits without identifiers. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court properly considered the relevant evidence and did not err.

C. Statute of Limitations

Smithrud next argues that the district court erred by concluding that the FHA's two-year statute of limitations barred his FHA claims.

We review de novo whether a statute of limitations bars a party's claim. Emp'rs Reinsurance Co. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 782, 791 (8th Cir.2011). “The [FHA] prohibits property owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir.2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b)). Under the FHA, [a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action ... not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice ... to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). “The computation of such 2–year period shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B). An administrative proceeding begins when an aggrieved person files a complaint with the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Id.§§ 3602, 3610.

Here, the final decisions to demolish the properties occurred on August 26, 2008, for the Minneapolis apartment and August 20, 2008, and September 10, 2008, for the St. Paul properties. However, Smithrud did not file the present litigation until November 3, 2010, outside the two-year statute of limitations. As a result, the statute of limitations prohibits Smithrud's claims unless he can demonstrate that tolling applies.3 Smithrud makes three arguments as to why the statute of limitations should not bar his claims.

First, Smithrud argues that he did pursue administrative action by filing a complaint with HUD. As proof, he points to a letter he improperly submitted to the district court that he claims to have sent to HUD as part of an administrative challenge to orders to demolish his property. But as the district court concludes, “there is no indication that the letter was ever actually sent by Smithrud or received by HUD” and the “letter, standing alone, provides no support for the assertion that there was ever an administrative proceeding pending.” Moreover, HUD is required by statute to acknowledge the filing of a complaint by serving notice upon the aggrieved person. See42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(B)(i). The record contains no such notice. Thus, the letter does not show any pending administrative action with HUD. Smithrud's argument fails.

Next, Smithrud argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling. This limited and infrequent form of relief requires a litigant to establish (1) that he has been...

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