Freeman v. Local Union No. 135, Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, 83-2500

• Citation: 746 F.2d 1316
• Decision Date: 11 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2500,83-2500
• Parties: 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2873, 53 USLW 2239, 102 Lab.Cas. P 11,239 William R. FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 135 CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 1316

746 F.2d 1316

117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2873, 53 USLW 2239,

102 Lab.Cas. P 11,239

William R. FREEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 135 CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-2500.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted Oct. 11, 1984. ^*

Decided Oct. 26, 1984.

Patrick H. Mulvany, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.

William R. Groth, Fillenwarth, Dennerline & Groth, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, and BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.

This case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether a union's duty of fair representation extends to its decision not to ask a court to vacate an arbitrator's award. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case there was no such duty and, as a result, affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint.

I.

The plaintiff, William Freeman, worked for Roadway Express ("Roadway") until he was discharged on July 29, 1981. The next day, Freeman filed a grievance protesting the discharge. The collective bargaining agreement between Roadway and the defendant union, Local 135, established a grievance-arbitration procedure for handling employer-employee disputes. ¹ Freeman's grievance went through the stages provided in the contract, culminating in a hearing before the grievance committee. The committee--whose decisions are final and binding under the contract--ruled unanimously to deny plaintiff's grievance on September 1, 1981. ²

Freeman did not file the instant action until May 25, 1982. The heart of the complaint is that Local 135 acted arbitrarily and in bad faith in refusing or failing to assist plaintiff in requesting relief from the alleged wrongful discharge. ³ Freeman claims that his cause of action did not accrue until December 1, 1981, when the time expired to seek judicial review of the arbitrator's award in an Indiana court. Ind.Code Ann. Sec. 34-4-2-13(b) (West 1983). Local 135 contends that Freeman's cause of action accrued on September 1, 1981, when the committee rendered its decision, and was therefore untimely; the union argues that it had no duty to bring suit to vacate the award. The parties agree that the relevant statute of limitations is the six-month period provided in Sec. 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982). DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476. ⁴

As we read plaintiff's briefs, he makes two arguments in support of his contention that his cause of action accrued on December 1, 1981 and was therefore not time-barred. First, Freeman asserts that the union violated its duty of fair representation during the grievance procedure and that his discharge did not become final until the time for judicial review elapsed. Second, plaintiff contends that the union's refusal to file an action to vacate the arbitrator's award was an independent breach of the duty of fair representation. We will address these issues seriatim.

II.

Freeman's finality argument can be disposed of quickly. The collective bargaining contract provides that the arbitrator's decision is final. Subject to very limited judicial review, plaintiff is bound by the committee's ruling. DelCostello, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. The arbitrator's decision is the final step in the remedies provided by the agreement which an employee is required to exhaust before he or she may bring suit for breach of the contract. Id. We have found no precedent, nor has plaintiff provided any, supporting the proposition that an arbitrator's award is not final until the time for judicial review has expired. The cases implicitly assume, absent contract provisions to the contrary, that an employee's discharge is final when the arbitrator has reached a decision. See, e.g., DelCostello, 103 S.Ct. at 2291 n. 16, 2294 (cause of action accrues when grievance committee's decision rendered); ⁵ Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.1983) (claim accrued at end of arbitration), certiorari denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 171; Metz v. Tootsie Roll Industries, Inc., 715 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir.1983) (union's decision not to file grievance has same finality as arbitration award), certiorari denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 976, 79 L.Ed.2d 214. See also Ranieri v. United Transportation Union, 743 F.2d 598 at 601 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1984) (employee conceded that duty of fair representation claim accrued on date of arbitration award). At the time the committee reached its decision, Freeman knew or should have known facts supporting the allegations in his complaint, namely that the union refused or failed to assist plaintiff during the grievance procedure. Metz, 715 F.2d at 304. Plaintiff's cause of action concerning the alleged inadequacy of Local 135's assistance during the grievance process accrued when the arbitrator reached a final, binding decision. Suit was not brought on this claim within six months of that date and, consequently, was untimely. Id.

III.

Freeman's second theory presents a more difficult issue, but one which is no more meritorious than his first argument. Plaintiff contends that the union owed him a duty to file suit to vacate the arbitrator's allegedly ultra vires award. A number of courts have considered similar arguments. In some of these cases, the courts rejected plaintiffs' assertions that the unions acted arbitrarily or in bad faith ⁶ and did not discuss the question whether such a duty existed. See Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir.1971); Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169, 171 n. 4 (5th Cir.1968), certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1466, 22 L.Ed.2d 762; Capobianco v. Brink's, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 971, 976 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd by unpublished order, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.1983); Baker v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 519 F.Supp. 657, 662 (E.D.N.Y.1981). Other courts have implied that there is no such duty, Crusco v. Fisher & Brother, Inc., 458 F.Supp. 413, 422 (S.D.N.Y.1978) ("Having submitted the dispute to arbitration before an independent decisionmaker, the union was entitled, if not required, to abide by the award"), that there is a duty, Local 1902, Allied Service Division v. Safety Cabs, Inc., 414 F.Supp. 64, 66 (M.D.Fla.1976) (union has duty to prosecute grievance over employer's contributions to employees' health and welfare funds through arbitration and to enforce arbitration decision by legal action), or have ignored the issue altogether after it is raised by a discharged employee, Walden v. Local 71, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 468 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir.1972).

Only one court has discussed the issue in detail and concluded that a union has no duty to appeal an arbitrator's decision. ⁷ In Sear v. Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston, 501 F.Supp. 1350, 1360 (D.Mass.1980), the court ruled that a union's bad faith failure to appeal a fairly conducted arbitration is not a breach of the duty of fair representation. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, but on a narrower ground. "While we need not hold, as did the district court, that a union's failure to appeal could never breach its representational duty, it is obvious that courts ought to allow such actions, if at all, only in unusual instances where unfairness is blatant." Sear v. Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston, 654 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1981). We conclude--based on our understanding of the relevant statute, Sec. 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, ⁸ and the scope of the duty of fair representation--that on the facts presented here, the union owed Freeman no duty at all when it decided not to appeal the committee's decision. ⁹

A union's statutory duty of fair representation is coextensive with its authority under Sec. 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(a), ¹⁰ to act as the exclusive representative for the members of the collective bargaining unit. ¹¹ Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1844, 1851 n. 22, 80 L.Ed.2d 366; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2121, 2125 n. 8, 60 L.Ed.2d 698; Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 481 (D.C.Cir.1983). The scope of the duty of fair representation, however, extends no further. If a union does not serve as the exclusive agent for the members of the bargaining unit with respect to a particular matter, there is no corresponding duty of fair representation. Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir.1980); Kuhn v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 528 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir.1976). "[A] union ... can be held to represent employees unfairly only in regard to those matters as to which it represents them at all--namely, 'rates of pay, wages, hours ... or other conditions of employment.' " International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(a)).

When a labor contract provides, as many do, that the processing of employee-employer disputes under the grievance-arbitration procedure is to be handled solely by the union, individual employees are required to follow the contract's commands; they cannot seek redress on their own. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-653, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616-617, 13 L.Ed.2d 580. Instead, the individual's rights are protected by the union's duty of fair representation. The union is obligated to "serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 910. If, however, a particular form of redress is not relegated to the exclusive domain of the union, an individual employee is free to seek that avenue. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657-58, 85 S.Ct. 614,...