In re Oil Spill By the Oil Rig “deepwater Horizon” In the Gulf of Mexico

Decision Date06 October 2010
Docket NumberMDL No. 2179.
Citation747 F.Supp.2d 704
PartiesIn re: OIL SPILL BY the OIL RIG “DEEPWATER HORIZON” IN the GULF OF MEXICO, ON APRIL 20, 2010.This Document Relates to 10–1759.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joseph Lee Waitz, Jr., District Attorney, Terrebonne Parish, C. Berwick Duval, II, Stanwood R. Duval, Duval, Funderburk, Sundbery, Lovell, & Watkins, APLC, Houma, LA, Calvin Clifford Fayard, Jr., Fayard & Honeycutt, Denham Springs, LA, Donald T. Carmouche, John Hogarth Carmouche, Victor Lynn Marcello, Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello, Baton Rouge, LA, Tommy Wood Thornhill, Thornhill Law Firm, Slidell, LA, for Plaintiff.

Paul Matthew Jones, April Leigh Rolen–Ogden, Stuart Theron Welch, Liskow & Lewis, Lafayette, LA, Greg L. Johnson, Robert E. Holden, Sherman Gene Fendler, Stephen W. Wiegand, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants.

ORDER

CARL J. BARBIER, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff State of Louisiana's Motion to Remand, In re: Deepwater Horizon, 10–CV–1156 (Rec. Doc. 304) and Defendant BP's Memorandum in Opposition, In re: Deepwater Horizon, 10–CV–1156 (Rec. Doc. 401).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS

On May 17, 2010, the State of Louisiana filed suit against BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP PLC, BP Products North America, Inc., and BP America, Inc. (collectively Defendants) in the 32nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne, State of Louisiana. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants have killed, caught, taken, possessed or injured fish, wild birds, wild quadruped, and other wildlife and aquatic life in violation of Louisiana State Law. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants owned and operated a Minerals Management Services Mineral Lease in the Gulf of Mexico. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to comply with applicable statutes and regulations governing the exploration and production of minerals or with the regulations governing the removal and remediation of the discharged contaminants. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants' failure to comply with applicable statutes resulted in an April 20, 2010 explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling rig, and the release of oil, other minerals, and contaminants into the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiff further alleged that the oil spill was not timely contained and therefore, oil and other contaminants entered into the waters of the State of Louisiana—inflicting death and injury to Louisiana aquatic life and wildlife.

In its complaint, the State only asserted a cause of action under La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 56:40.1 et seq. and specifically stated, [n]otwithstanding any language in this petition to the contrary, plaintiff does not plead, and will never at any time in the future plead, any claim or cause of action arising under any federal law, and asserts no such claims or cause of action herein.” 10-CV-1759 (Rec. Doc. 1-2, pg. 4, ¶ 16). Nevertheless, on June 17, 2010, Defendants removed this matter to the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that this court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). Defendants also claim that this court has original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's claims arise under federal statutes, namely, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.

Plaintiff has filed the current motion to remand, alleging that this matter was improperly removed. After reviewing the motion and the applicable law, this court finds as follows:

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff argues that it did not allege any federal claims in its complaint and therefore, according to the well-pleaded complaint rule, removal is improper. Plaintiff also argues that no federal statute provides this court with jurisdiction in this matter. Further, Plaintiff argues that even if this court has jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents removal. Alternatively, Plaintiff claims that this case involves general maritime law claims, and therefore, removal is not proper because the claims do not arise under the laws of the United States. Finally, Plaintiff argues that this court should sanction Defendants for improperly removing this matter to federal court.

Defendants argue that § 1349 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) clearly supports this Court's original subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's claims regarding the well-pleaded complaint rule, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and admiralty jurisdiction are frivolous. Therefore, Defendants urge this court to deny Plaintiff's motion to remand and Plaintiff's request for sanctions.

DISCUSSION

Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if a federal court would have original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Once a motion to remand has been filed, the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that federal jurisdiction exists. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir.1995). The jurisdictional facts supporting removal are examined as of the time of removal. Gebbia v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir.2000). The removal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of remand. Manguno v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002).

I. Well–Pleaded Complaint Rule

The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). The rule governs whether a claim arises under federal law so as to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and is based on the theory that the plaintiff is “the master of her complaint.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir.1995)). As such, [a] determination that a cause of action presents a federal question depends upon the allegations of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.” Medina, 238 F.3d at 680. Accordingly, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, when a plaintiff has a choice between federal and state law claims, she may proceed in state court “on the exclusive basis of state law, thus defeating the defendant's opportunity to remove.” Id.

However, the well-pleaded complaint rule only applies to removal based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (statutory “arising under” cases). Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 258, 112 S.Ct. 2465, 120 L.Ed.2d 201 (1992). Although in their notice of removal, Defendants claim that this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Defendants also assert that this Court has original jurisdiction under 43 U.S.C. § 1349. Therefore, although Plaintiff is correct in arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule prevents Defendants from removing this matter on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, there is nothing preventing Defendants from removing this matter based on an assertion of jurisdiction under 43 U.S.C. § 1349. Therefore, if this Court finds that jurisdiction exists pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1349, Plaintiff is incorrect in arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule serves as a bar to removal.

II. OCSLA Jurisdiction Pursuant to § 1349

Defendants assert that this Court has original jurisdiction under § 1349. Section 1349(b)(1) states:

the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, or which involves rights to such minerals, or (B) the cancellation, suspension, or termination of a lease or permit under this subchapter.

43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). The Fifth Circuit has held that the jurisdictional grant contained in § 1349(b)(1) is very broad. Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 154 (5th Cir.1996); see also EP Operating Ltd. P'ship v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563, 569 (5th Cir.1994) (stating that a “broad reading of the jurisdictional grant of section 1349 is supported by the expansive substantive reach of the OCSLA”). In deciding whether § 1349(b)(1) grants a court jurisdiction, courts routinely perform a two part analysis. See, e.g., Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367, 369–70 (5th Cir.1988); Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 154–55; EP Operating Ltd. P'ship, 26 F.3d at 568–69.

First, courts determine whether the activities that caused the injury can be classified as an “operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” and whether that “operation” involved the exploration or production of minerals. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). While the statute does not define “operation,” the Fifth Circuit has broadly defined the term, stating that operation is “the doing of some physical act.” Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 154. The Fifth Circuit has provided further guidance on the interpretation of the term by stating that “operation involves exploration, development, or the production of minerals on the OCS” and by clarifying that [t]hese terms denote respectively the processes involved in searching for minerals on the OCS; preparing to extract them by, inter alia, drilling wells and constructing platforms; and removing the minerals and transferring them to shore.” Id. Given this broad definition of operation, it is clear that Defendants' activities qualify as an operation. Defendants were exploring and producing minerals, namely oil, from the outer Continental Shelf. It is these activities that allegedly caused the April 20, 2010 explosion and the resulting oil spill. For these reasons, this Court finds that Defendants' activities...

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