Center for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus, 82-2032

• Decision Date: 26 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-2032,82-2032
• Citation: 241 U.S.App.D.C. 268,747 F.2d 1
• Parties: , 241 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,863 CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, Public Citizen, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Hon. Toby Moffett, Sidney Wolfe, M.D., and Russell J. Shew, Petitioners, v. William D. RUCKELSHAUS, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents, General Motors Corp., Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1

747 F.2d 1

21 ERC 1865, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 14

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,863

CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, Public Citizen, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Hon. Toby Moffett Sidney Wolfe, M.D., and Russell J. Shew Petitioners, v. William D. RUCKELSHAUS, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents General Motors Corp., Intervenor.

No. 82-2032.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued May 24, 1983.

Decided Oct. 26, 1984.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Environmental Protection agency.

Frederic Townsend, Washington, D.C., with whom Alan B. Morrison and David D. Doniger, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioners.

William F. Pedersen, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel, E.P.A., Washington, D.C., of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, with whom Carol E. Dinkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert M. Perry, Gen. Counsel, Gerald K. Gleason, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Samuel I. Gutter, Robert A. Weissman, Peter J. Murtha and Maureen Smith, Attys., E.P.A., and Rosanne Mayer, Atty. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondents.

Theodore Souris, Detroit, Mich., with whom Frederick J. Dindoffer and George F. Ball, Detroit, Mich., were on the brief, for intervenor. William L. Weber, Detroit, Mich., also entered an appearance for intervenor.

Before WILKEY, MIKVA and SCALIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SCALIA.

SCALIA, Circuit Judge:

Section 207 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541 (1982) provides that if the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") determines that a substantial number of any class or category of vehicles or engines fail during their statutorily defined useful life to conform to the regulations establishing maximum emission levels, the Administrator shall require the manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity at the manufacturer's expense. The EPA has hitherto implemented this provision by requiring and approving plans that commit the manufacturer to recall and repair the nonconforming vehicles or engines. This case presents the question whether the EPA may implement it instead by approving a plan that commits the manufacturer to "offset" the excessive pollution emitted from nonconforming vehicles or engines by meeting lower than currently permitted emission standards for vehicles or engines to be built in future model years.

I

Until 1970, the EPA enforced motor vehicle pollution restrictions exclusively by testing engine prototypes for compliance with emission standards. Cf. S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d CONG., 2D SESS. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, 397, 429 (Comm. Print 1974) ("Leg.Hist."). The experience of the 1960s showed that many vehicles in actual use emitted pollutants at levels far in excess of the tested prototypes and that the discrepancy grew as the vehicles' mileage increased. Id. at 29-30, 1 Leg.Hist. 429-30. Proponents of stricter clean air requirements concluded it was essential to "require that new cars meet not only the standards on the production line but also the standards in performance. Unless they do, the whole exercise is useless...." 116 CONG.REC. 33,093 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, addressed this problem by adding Sec. 207, which requires the manufacturer to warrant continuing compliance with emission standards during the vehicle's or engine's useful life, directs the EPA to test for such compliance (if technologically feasible), and provides for the remedying of noncompliance as described above.

As part of its in-use surveillance program, the EPA tested 1979 General Motors ("GM") cars with GM engine family 920S2E. All ten test vehicles exceeded the NOx emission standard of 2.0 grams per mile, for reasons which neither the EPA nor GM was able to determine. In December 1980, the EPA ordered GM to submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity. In February 1981 GM submitted a proposed remedial plan that called for recall and repair of the nonconforming vehicles. After some discussions with the EPA, GM submitted in May 1981 an alternate plan covering both the 920S2E engine family and the similar 920S4 family which also showed a 100 percent noncompliance rate for NOx. (The latter was under consideration for a noncompliance order by the EPA, though no formal determination of noncompliance had yet been made.) The new plan proposed not recalling and repairing the nonconforming 1979 vehicles ¹ but engineering 1982 and 1983 engine families to meet a target lower than mandatory NOx standards. The lower emissions from the 1982-83 vehicles would offset the excessive emissions from the 1979 vehicles. GM asserted that this plan would achieve environmental NOx benefits at least equal to the gain that could theoretically be achieved by a recall if all owners brought in their 1979 vehicles for repair, and far greater than what could realistically be expected given the large number of owners who would in fact not do so. GM claimed that the offset plan would save the company $11.8 million and would save 1979 vehicle owners $25.8 million in fuel costs, since the repair remedy originally proposed would have caused increased fuel consumption.

After negotiations with the EPA, GM submitted a final revised offset plan on July 2, 1982. The EPA accepted it on July 29, and published a Federal Register notice of this decision on August 30. 47 Fed.Reg. 38,189 (1982). On September 3, 1982 the Center for Auto Safety and others ² petitioned this court for review of the EPA's decision under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(b)(1) (1982).

II

Petitioners challenge the EPA's action as unlawful on the ground that the offset plan does not remedy the nonconformity of the 1979 vehicles within the meaning of Section 207(c). Nothing but recall and repair of the nonconforming vehicles themselves, they say, is an acceptable remedy under the statute.

As in every case involving statutory construction, "our starting point must be the language employed by Congress." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). Section 207(c) provides in relevant part as follows:

Effective with respect to vehicles and engines manufactured during model years beginning more than 60 days after December 31, 1970--

(1) If the Administrator determines that a substantial number of any class or category of vehicles or engines, although properly maintained and used do not conform to the regulations prescribed under section 7521 of this title, when in actual use throughout their useful life (as determined under section 7521(d) of this title), he shall immediately notify the manufacturer thereof of such nonconformity, and he shall require the manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the nonconformity of the vehicles or engines with respect to which such notification is given. The plan shall provide that the nonconformity of any such vehicles or engines which are properly used and maintained will be remedied at the expense of the manufacturer. If the manufacturer disagrees with such determination of nonconformity and so advises the Administrator, the Administrator shall afford the manufacturer and other interested persons an opportunity to present their views and evidence in support thereof at a public hearing. Unless, as a result of such hearing the Administrator withdraws such determination of nonconformity, he shall, within 60 days after the completion of such hearing, order the manufacturer to provide prompt notification of such nonconformity in accordance with paragraph (2).

(2) Any notification required by paragraph (1) with respect to any class or category of vehicles or engines shall be given to dealers, ultimate purchasers, and subsequent purchasers (if known) in such manner and containing such information as the Administrator may by regulations require.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(c) (1982). Respondents Ruckelshaus and EPA, as well as Intervenor GM, argue that the variants of the word "remedy" in this provision should be understood in what they assert is the word's "common law" sense, denoting the means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or compensated. At common law, they argue, substitutionary relief such as compensation is a basic principle of remedies; and absent evidence of a contrary intent, statutory terms with well defined common law content should be given that meaning.

It seems to us that this argument overlooks the basic principle that, in statutes as elsewhere, a word cannot be construed in isolation from its context. If the common-law meaning that a word has acquired is a specialized one, and if the context of the statute is not the context for which that specialized meaning has been assigned, it would distort rather than effectuate legislative intent to disregard ordinary usage. That is the case here. The "substitutionary" connotation of the term "remedy" for which respondents argue is a specialized one. (When speaking of remedying the problem of international terrorism, for example, one would hardly have in mind the provision of adequate monetary compensation for its victims.) And the common-law context of the specialized meaning is judicial relief for private injury. Since the present statute involves executive rather than judicial action, and is addressed to public needs rather than private entitlements, we think the specialized meaning utterly inapt. Absent evidence of contrary intent, the words in the statute must be presumed to bear their normal meaning of eliminating, rather than merely providing compensation for the effects of, the condition that is to be "remedied." Here that means eliminating the nonconformity...