East v. PaineWebber, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 506,506
• Citation: 131 Md. App. 302,748 A.2d 1082
• Parties: Carol S. EAST v. PAINEWEBBER, INC., et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

748 A.2d 1082

131 Md. App. 302

Carol S. EAST v. PAINEWEBBER, INC., et al.

No. 506, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 31, 2000.

Benjamin Rosenberg (Shawn J. Sefret and Rosenberg, Prout, Funk & Greenberg, LLP, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Barbara J. Gorinson, Greenbelt, for appellees.

Argued before WENNER, BYRNES and ADKINS, JJ.

WENNER Judge.

Appellant, Carol East (Carol), appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Appellees are PaineWebber, Inc. (PaineWebber), Deborah East (Deborah), and the Estate of Dewey Frank East, Jr. (the Estate).

On appeal, Carol presents us with the following question:

Did the trial court err when it ruled as a matter of law that Appellant, the named beneficiary of the East IRA Account, had waived her right to the proceeds of the East IRA Account by virtue of her execution of the Separation Agreement?

We shall answer in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

Facts

The parties do not dispute the following facts. Dewey Frank East, Jr. (Dewey) and Carol were married on 27 July 1985. Sometime during their marriage, Dewey decided to open an individual retirement account (IRA). He eventually opened an IRA with PaineWebber on 16 April 1986 (the East IRA) by completing an "Adoption Agreement and New Account Form for PaineWebber IRA's" that named Carol as beneficiary. The parties eventually separated and entered into a separation agreement (the Agreement), which was incorporated, but not merged, into a judgment of absolute divorce granted Dewey by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

In the Agreement, Carol and Dewey waived a number of their respective rights, but the provisions of the Agreement pertinent to our discussion of the issue presented are as follows:

Pension Waiver

Each of the parties hereby expressly waives any legal right either may have under any Federal or State law as a spouse to participate as a payee or beneficiary regarding any interests the other may have in any pension plan, profit sharing plan, or any other form of retirement or deferred income plan including, but not limited to, the right either spouse may have to receive any benefit, in the form of a lump-sum death benefit, joint or survivor annuity, or pre-retirement survivor annuity pursuant to any State or Federal law, and each of the parties hereby expressly consents to any election made by the other, now or at any time hereafter, with respect to the recipient and the form of payment of any benefit upon retirement or death under any such pension plan, profit sharing plan, or other form of retirement or deferred income plan.

* * *

Waiver of Estate Claim

Each party releases and relinquishes to the other party and to his or her heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, any and all claims or rights which may now exist or may hereafter arise by reason of the marriage between the parties with respect to any property, whether real, personal, or mixed, belonging to such other party specifically including but not limited to any right arising under the Maryland Marital Property Act. Without limiting the foregoing, each party waives and releases to the other party and to his or her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, all rights to share in any of the property or estate of the other party which has arisen or may hereafter arise, by operation of law or otherwise and specifically including any right, title or interest wife may have in Dewey East Excavating Co., Inc. Specifically, each party waives and releases all right of dower or courtesy [sic], all right to share in the estate of the party under the intestacy laws of any jurisdiction, all right of election to take against any last will and testament of the other party whether executed before or after the execution of this Agreement, and all right to secure administration or to act as executor or administrator of the estate of the other party.

* * *

Property Division

As of the date of this Agreement, Wife acknowledges that all personal property now in husband's [sic] possession belongs to the Husband. To the extent that Wife may have any interest in such property, the Wife for herself, her heirs, representatives and assigns quit claims any and all interest that the Wife may have in such property.

It is undisputed that on 9 July 1993, Dewey remarried. What is disputed is whether Dewey also changed the East IRA's beneficiary. It appears that after Dewey completed and returned the necessary paperwork, PaineWebber lost it. Consequently, PaineWebber faxed Dewey another "Adoption Agreement and New Account Form for PaineWebber IRA's," one of several forms used by PaineWebber for changing a beneficiary. On the very next day, Dewey signed the form and faxed it to PaineWebber. Dewey did not designate a new beneficiary, leaving that part of the form blank. PaineWebber's District Administrator Manager approved Dewey's choice not to designate a beneficiary. Under its terms, if a beneficiary had not been designated at the time of Dewey's death, the IRA's proceeds would be paid to Dewey's estate.

Dewey died on 10 December 1996. On 28 October 1997, Carol filed an action seeking to recover the proceeds of the East IRA. PaineWebber answered, and filed a counterclaim and a cross-claim for interpleader against the Estate. In turn, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. Carol responded with a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that by executing the Agreement she had not waived her rights as beneficiary of the East IRA.

Following a hearing on the pending motions, the trial court ruled from the bench that, by executing the Agreement, Carol had waived her rights as beneficiary of the East IRA, and granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court eventually filed two orders. One awarded the proceeds of the East IRA to the Estate. The other granted PaineWebber's motion for interpleader. In this appeal, Carol does not dispute the interpleader order.

Naturally unhappy with the decision, Carol noted this appeal.

Standard of Review

"The standard of appellate review of a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court was `legally correct.'" Pittman v. Atlantic Realty Co., 127 Md.App. 255, 269, 732 A.2d 912, cert. granted, 356 Md. 495, 740 A.2d 613 (1999); Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990). "In making our analysis, we do not accord deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83, 712 A.2d 24, cert. denied, 351 Md. 286, 718 A.2d 234 (1998). "[A] grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when the movant for summary judgment clearly demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pittman at 269, 732 A.2d 912. "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the motion and response submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. at 270, 732 A.2d 912.

"It is ... clear that under Maryland's summary judgment rule a trial court determines issues of law; it makes rulings as a matter of law, resolving no disputed issues of fact." Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). Trial courts must be mindful that, "[e]ven where the underlying facts are undisputed, if the undisputed facts are susceptible of more than one permissible factual inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, and summary judgment should not be granted." Heat & Power Corp. at 591, 578 A.2d 1202. "[W]hen the moving party has set forth sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the opposing party must show with some precision that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact." King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 112, 492 A.2d 608 (1985). "A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case." Id. at 111, 492 A.2d 608. The party opposing the motion bears the burden of showing that material facts are in dispute. "[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] claim is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment; there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the [opposing party]." Beatty at 738-39, 625 A.2d 1005.

As the facts before us involving the Agreement are undisputed, summary judgment is appropriate. Hence, our task is to determine whether the trial court was legally correct in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

On appeal, the parties are seeking an answer to an age old question—who gets the money? Carol believes the money is hers because she is the named beneficiary. The Estate believes the money is the Estate's for two reasons. First, the Estate believes that by executing the Agreement, Carol waived her rights to the proceeds of the East IRA. Second, the Estate believes Dewey had removed Carol as the named beneficiary. The trial court agreed with the Estate's first contention and granted its motion for summary judgment. As the trial court put it, "I don't think there's any dispute of facts past the separation agreement that we need to address. I think the clear intent of the parties, if you read the agreement as a whole, I'm convinced that the money should be paid over to the estate and the motion for summary judgment should be granted." Thus, it is clear that the trial court did not address the Estate's second contention that Dewey had removed Carol as the named beneficiary of the East IRA. "An appellate court ordinarily should review a grant of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court." Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm'n, 125 Md.App. 579, 587, 726 A.2d 807,cert. granted, 354 Md. 570, 731 A.2d 969 (1999)(footnote omitted). Hence, we may...