Keltner v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date26 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 84-1151,84-1151
Citation748 F.2d 1265
Parties16 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1260 Andrew KELTNER, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Jerald J. Bonifield, Belleville, Ill., for appellant.

Edwin L. Lowther, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before BRIGHT, JOHN R. GIBSON and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Andrew Keltner's claim that his injuries following an automobile accident were enhanced because the doors of his Ford van jammed after the collision was rejected at trial by the jury, which returned a verdict for Ford Motor Company. Keltner appeals the judgment entered on the verdict and argues that the district court 1 improperly instructed the jury on comparative negligence, since it was told to allocate the fault causing the occurrence, instead of the fault causing his injuries. He also argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his drinking habits. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

Keltner had purchased a used 1973 Ford Club Wagon van about six months before his accident. In addition to regular doors in front, it had sliding doors on the passenger side and two rear doors, one of which had to be opened from the outside before the other could be opened.

While driving the van on a rainy night on a highway near Brinkley, Arkansas, Keltner collided with the back of a tractor-trailer traveling in front of him and went off the road. Keltner testified that he saw no taillights nor any other sign of the tractor-trailer before the collision. The driver of the tractor-trailer testified that he had followed the Keltner van for three or four miles, at first unable to pass it because it was swerving from one lane to the other. He eventually did pass it and was driving about sixty miles per hour when he felt a "good jar" from the collision. One of the witnesses testified that the van could have been traveling ninety-five miles per hour before the impact.

Keltner testified that after the van came to a stop, he tried but was unable to open the passenger doors, found that the side sliding door was jammed, and was able to open the rear door only three or four inches. Before he was able to escape, approximately thirty percent of his body was burned in a fire resulting from the accident. Both ankles were also fractured. There was conflicting testimony whether the fractures were caused by his attempting to kick the rear door open. His right leg was ultimately amputated below the knee.

Keltner presented expert witnesses who testified that in test collisions the van's doors had jammed and fuel had leaked. There was also expert testimony that an inside latch on the rear door was needed as standard equipment to make the van safe.

Keltner could not remember if he had been drinking the night of the accident but acknowledged it was possible he could have been. Over objection, he stated on cross-examination that around the time of the accident he regularly drank a six-pack of beer four nights a week. A state trooper and a resident physician at the hospital where Keltner was taken testified that he smelled of alcohol there.

The case was submitted on the separate grounds of negligence and of manufacture and sale of a defective product. The jury returned a verdict for Ford.

I.

Keltner argues that the comparative negligence instruction given by the court was in error, since the jury was told to allocate the fault causing the occurrence, instead of the fault causing his injuries. 2 He argues that the instruction does not reflect the law of Arkansas, since it in essence directs a verdict for a defendant in crashworthiness or enhanced injury cases.

We have enunciated a number of principles that guide us in reviewing jury instructions in a diversity case. A party is not entitled "to have the jury instructed in any particular language, so long as the jurors understand the issues and are not misled." Stineman v. Fontbonne College, 664 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir.1981), quoted in Lackawanna Leather Co. v. Martin & Stewart, Ltd., 730 F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir.1984). A district judge has broad discretion in the choice of form and language; "as long as the entire charge fairly and adequately contains the law applicable to the case, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal." Board of Water Works Trustees v. Alvord, Burdick & Howson, 706 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1983), quoted in Lackawanna, 730 F.2d at 1201. In states with pattern instructions, the district court may, but need not, use such instructions. See Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1151 (8th Cir.1984); Hrzenak v. White-Westinghouse Appliance Co., 682 F.2d 714, 720 (8th Cir.1982).

The comparative negligence instruction given by the district court was patterned after Arkansas Model Jury Instruction (AMI) 2115 in which the word "occurrence" is used. By order of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, state courts are to use AMI instructions unless the trial judge finds that they do not accurately state the law. The district court declined to modify the model instruction as Keltner had requested because the model instruction had been prepared by a number of experts in Arkansas law and because it felt that the same request "could be made in every case in which there was an automobile accident when people were injured and requested damages thereafter." Keltner on appeal cites no direct Arkansas authority in support of his contention that the instruction was inappropriate. Since the state courts have not ruled on the issue, we give great weight to the determination of the experienced district judge in this question of state law. Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir.1984); see Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d 642, 648 (8th Cir.1982).

Keltner's basic argument is that "occurrence" in the instruction means the same as "collision" and thereby prevents recovery in a crashworthiness case, since in such a case recovery may be had where the design of the automobile did not cause the collision but nonetheless enhanced the injuries resulting from the collision. We believe, however, that "occurrence" must be given a broader meaning. The term "collision," no doubt, would have narrowed the attention of the jury to the initial impact of the van with the tractor-trailer. However, the plain meaning of the term "occurrence" is sufficiently broad to include not only the collision of the van with the tractor-trailer, but also the travel of the van after impact until it came to rest, including the resulting jamming of the doors.

We also note a certain inconsistency in the alternative instruction offered by Keltner. While Keltner sought to replace the term "occurrence" with the term "injuries" in the first and second paragraphs of the model instruction, his proffered instruction retained the term "occurrence" in the third paragraph. Even if we assume that the model instruction was deficient, we are not sure, given the presence of both terms, that the proposed instruction would cure the deficiency Keltner claims.

The instructions that were given must be evaluated as a whole. The jury was told what elements it needed to find to return a verdict for Keltner. The charges on both negligence and the manufacture and sale of a defective product contained the proposition that the negligence or defective condition "was a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages." 3 Thus, these instructions were worded in the way that Keltner wanted the comparative negligence instruction to be worded. When the instructions are read as a whole, we do not believe that the use of the word "occurrence" on two occasions in the comparative negligence instruction diverted the jury from its proper task, since they made clear that to find for Keltner the jury had to determine that either negligence or a...

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    ...Pulaski Furniture Co., 171 W.Va. 79, 297 S.E.2d 854 (1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir.1984) (based on Arkansas law); Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F.Supp. 1093 (D.Mont.1981) (based on Montan......
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2 books & journal articles
  • § 12.02 HABIT AND CHARACTER DISTINGUISHED
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (CAP) Title Chapter 12 Habit Evidence
    • Invalid date
    ...period, including proof that plaintiff regularly carried a cooler of beer on his truck, established habit); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265,1268-69 (8th Cir. 1984) (cross-examination of plaintiff under Rule 406 to the effect that he drank a six pack of beer four nights a week permi......
  • § 12.02 Habit and Character Distinguished
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Evidence (2018) Title Chapter 12 Habit Evidence
    • Invalid date
    ...period, including proof that plaintiff regularly carried a cooler of beer on his truck, established habit); Keltner v. Ford Motor Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (8th Cir. 1984) (cross-examination of plaintiff under Rule 406 to the effect that he drank a six pack of beer four nights a week perm......

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