Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-4157,84-4157
• Parties: 21 Ed. Law Rep. 815 Minnie Ann HENNIGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OUACHITA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1148

749 F.2d 1148

21 Ed. Law Rep. 815

Minnie Ann HENNIGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OUACHITA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-4157.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 7, 1985.

Jack Wright, Jr., Monroe, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

McLeod, Verlander & Dollar, David E. Verlander, III, Monroe, La., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GOLDBERG and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

Minnie Ann Hennigan, as named representative of a class, appeals from the district court's denial of a motion for attorney's fees filed under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. ¹ Clarifying the test applied in this circuit, we hold that a plaintiff who achieves the goal sought in a civil rights suit by voluntary action of the defendant prevails within the meaning of the Act if she demonstrates that the suit caused the defendant to act, unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff's claim had no colorable merit and the defendant made the change gratuitously for reasons unrelated to the potential merit of the suit. We therefore find that the class was the "prevailing party", reverse the judgment, and remand for a determination of the reasonable value of the services rendered by the attorneys for the plaintiff class.

I.

At the time this suit was filed, the City of Monroe, Louisiana, which is located in Ouachita Parish, had an independent school district, with a board elected only by and from residents of the City, but Ouachita Parish School Board members were elected by and from residents of the entire Parish, including the City. Thus, City residents had representation on both boards. This class action was instituted by a group of citizens of the Parish who resided outside the City. They sought reapportionment of the Parish School Board so that members of the Board would be elected only by and from residents of the Parish who did not live inside the city limits of Monroe.

The petition alleged that allowing City voters to elect any members of the Parish School Board improperly diluted the voting power of the residents of the Parish who resided outside the City limits, thus violating the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The class, therefore, sought reapportionment of the Parish School Board pursuant to a provision of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution ² which requires totally separate and independent school boards for the City of Monroe and for the remainder of Ouachita Parish. This provision had never been implemented because shortly after adoption of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution the United States Justice Department had objected to it on the ground that students from the City of Monroe were allowed to attend Ouachita Parish schools and vice versa. This boundary-crossing practice was banned by the district court's 1980 ruling in a school desegregation case, Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board. ³

In addition to seeking enforcement of the Louisiana Constitution, the class also sought reapportionment of the Parish School Board based on the 1980 Census, as required by the Voting Rights Act, ⁴ and any other equitable relief deemed proper by the court. The class submitted a detailed reapportionment plan based on totally separate boards for the Parish and the City of Monroe.

In December, 1982, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the Parish School Board on both the Louisiana constitutional and the 1980 Census reapportionment issues. The court specifically stated, however, that the class still might be entitled to equitable relief under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, "if sufficient facts can be proved."

The court certified the case as a class action in March, 1983. At the certification hearing, the court suggested the possibility of asking the Justice Department to reconsider its earlier rejection of the Louisiana constitutional provision in the light of the district court's holding in Taylor. The court asked representatives of the School Board to communicate with the Justice Department about this possibility. Counsel for the class admitted that, if the Justice Department withdrew its objection to the constitutional provision and the Parish School Board voluntarily implemented it, the claims of the class would be moot. Class counsel also stated, however, that the class would seek attorney's fees even if this happened.

Upon application of the School Board, the Justice Department reconsidered its earlier objections, and granted preclearance of the reapportionment provisions which the Board later put into effect. The class then filed its motion for attorney's fees under the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The district court found the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy "the legal requirements set forth by the governing statutes and the interpretations thereof by the Fifth Circuit," and denied the motion for attorney's fees on behalf of the plaintiff class.

II.

The Act ⁵ limits eligibility for attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in a civil rights action. Federal courts have not agreed on the test for determining who is the "prevailing party." The Fifth Circuit has adhered to a standard that, in part, requires the prevailing plaintiff to achieve success on "the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he has acquired the primary relief sought." ⁶ The First Circuit, in what the Supreme Court has referred to as a typical formulation, has held that the plaintiff must "succeed on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." ⁷ All of the circuit courts have consistently held, however, that a plaintiff may also prevail for Sec. 1988 purposes when the case terminates in his favor by settlement, or when the defendant voluntarily undertakes action that results in accomplishment of the plaintiff's goal even though it moots the case. ⁸

III.

The Fifth Circuit opinions have not articulated a consistent standard for measuring whether a plaintiff whose efforts did not result in a judgment in his favor has succeeded sufficiently to be a prevailing party. The district judge may understandably have been misled, for we have phrased the test differently, in a number of opinions. ⁹ Thus, in Coen v. Harrison County School Board, ¹⁰ we set forth a two-part test: (1) the plaintiff must have obtained the final relief sought in the lawsuit; and (2) his suit must have been a major factor in achieving that result. ¹¹

Another formulation of the standard in Williams v. Leatherbury, ¹² has been even more frequently cited:

[A] plaintiff may still recover attorney's fees if he can show both a causal connection between the filing of the suit and the defendant's actions and that the defendant's conduct was required by law, i.e., not a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless. ¹³

This is consistent with the doctrine developed by the First Circuit in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, ¹⁴ and has been adopted by the majority of circuits. ¹⁵

In our recent decision in Garcia v. Guerra, ¹⁶ the panel majority stated that the plaintiff need demonstrate only that his claim is "not frivolous," meaning that "it is arguably supported by case or statutory law." ¹⁷ Judge Randall, in a concurring opinion, stated that the plaintiff must present only a "colorable" claim to satisfy the legal-obligation inquiry. ¹⁸

Despite their variety, all of our prior formulations of the applicable criteria have certain elements in common. All recognize the initial need to identify the goal that the plaintiff sought to achieve in bringing his civil rights action. Although the opinions have not always identified the precise legal or factual condition that the plaintiff sought to change, all have determined the nature of the benefit the plaintiff hoped to gain, or the burden of which he hoped to be relieved, by bringing the lawsuit. ¹⁹

Using this as a benchmark, the first element that must be established by a plaintiff claiming prevailing party status is whether, as a practical matter, the plaintiff's goal was achieved. This is determined in this circuit by applying the central-issue test. In other circuits, as we have discussed, the plaintiff need "succeed [only] on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing suit." ²⁰

When the plaintiff's goal has been achieved by the defendant's unilateral action, the plaintiff must of course also show that the lawsuit caused the defendant to act, and thus allowed the plaintiff to achieve his desired goal. To demonstrate this causal connection, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his suit was "a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants to end their unconstitutional behavior." ²¹ This means more, however, than merely showing that the event occurred after suit was filed. Here, as elsewhere in the law, propter hoc must be distinguished from post hoc. The inquiry has been described as "an intensely factual, pragmatic one," ²² and courts should carefully consider the chronology of events in order to assess the provocative effect of the plaintiff's lawsuit. ²³

When the plaintiff has shown both that he succeeded on the central issue in the litigation and that the lawsuit caused the defendant to act, he has made a prima facie case that he is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's fees. There is no reason to require the plaintiff to prove, in addition, that the defendant's conduct fulfilled a legal obligation or otherwise to show the defendant's motivation. ²⁴

However, a plaintiff who brings an action that has no colorable, or even reasonable, likelihood of success on the merits is not entitled to recover attorney's fees if the defendant simply complies with the plaintiff's demands and moots the case for reasons...