Woods v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 83-8656

Citation749 F.2d 1493
Decision Date08 January 1985
Docket NumberNo. 83-8656,83-8656
PartiesJames B. WOODS, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Susan W. Cox, Francis W. Allen, Statesboro, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Bobby Jones, Metter, Ga., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, CLARK, Circuit Judge, and THOMAS *, District Judge.

GODBOLD, Chief Judge:

This is a suit over fire insurance coverage. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, holding that coverage was voided because of a material misrepresentation by the insured in a sworn proof of loss. We affirm.

On January 17, 1980, plaintiff secured a policy of insurance covering his single-family dwelling in Brooklet, Georgia. On July 9, 1980, he conveyed the property to his mother in fee simple, because he was having marital difficulties and wanted to prevent his wife from making any claim against the house in possible divorce proceedings. Woods continued to live in the house and continued to pay taxes on it and to pay the insurance premiums. His furniture and personal belongings remained in the house. The mother never lived in the house. The policy was renewed February 20, 1981, without Woods disclosing the transfer of title. On January 15, 1982, two days before the policy was to expire, the house was destroyed by fire.

The policy itself required Woods, after a loss, to set forth the interest of himself and all others in the property, as well as any changes in title or occupancy during the term of the policy.

Woods completed a sworn proof of loss form. Under the heading "Title and Interest" he stated that his interest in the property at the time of loss was 100%. He stated that no other person had any interest in the property or encumbrance thereon and since the policy had been issued there had been no assignment of the property or change in the interest, use, occupancy, location, or exposure.

After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer conducted an investigation and found that the property had been conveyed in fee simple to the mother. The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that Woods had no insurable interest in the property and that he had violated the condition of the policy providing: "We do not provide coverage for any insured who has intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this insurance."

The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the misrepresentation was material as a matter of law and that it voided the coverage. The court did not decide whether Woods did or did not have an insurable interest.

Under Georgia law "[i]t is only fraudulent false swearing, in furnishing the preliminary proof or in the examinations which the insurers have a right to require, that avoids the policies." American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Pyle, 62 Ga.App. 156, 165, 8 S.E.2d 154, 160 (1940). American Alliance cited and relied upon Claflin v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 110 U.S. 81, 3 S.Ct. 507, 28 L.Ed. 76 (1884). In that case a merchant represented that he owned certain goods when in fact he did not. The Court first discussed the object of the proof of loss:

The object of the provisions in the policies of insurance, requiring the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts; material to their rights, to enable them to decide upon their obligations, and to protect them against false claims. And every interrogatory that was relevant and pertinent in such an examination was material, in the sense that a true answer to it was of the substance of the obligation of the assured. A false answer as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry, knowingly and wilfully made, with intent to deceive the insurer, would be fraudulent. If it accomplished its result, it would be a fraud effected; if it failed, it would be a fraud attempted. And if the matter were material and the statement false, to the knowledge of the party making it, and wilfully made, the intention to deceive the insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend the natural consequences of his acts. No one can be permitted to say, in respect to his own statements upon a material matter, that he did not expect to be believed; and if they are knowingly false, and wilfully made, the fact that they are material is proof of an attempted fraud, because their materiality, in the eye of the law, consists in their tendency to influence the conduct of the party who has an interest in them, and to whom they are addressed.

Id. at 94-95, 3 S.Ct. at 515.

The Court further held that it was obvious that "it was material to show what title and interest Murphy had at the time of the loss in the property insured. If he had no insurable interest, that certainly would have been a defence [sic]." Id. at 94, 3 S.Ct. at 514.

The fact whether Murphy had an insurable interest in the merchandise covered by the policy was directly in issue between the parties. By the terms of the contract he was bound to answer truly every question put to him that was relevant to that inquiry. His answer to every question pertinent to that point was material, and made so by contract, and because it was material as evidence; so that every false statement on that subject, knowingly made, was intended to deceive and was fraudulent.

Id. at 96, 3 S.Ct. at 516.

In Pooser v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Soc'y, 51 Ga.App. 962, 182 S.E. 44 (1935), the insured made a false statement on the proof of loss indicating that she had conveyed the property away and had no interest in it. The insurer asserted that this false statement voided the policy under the false swearing provisions. The court held that this type of false statement against the insured's interest would not void the policy.

It is important to note that the misstatement in the proof of loss was against Mrs. Pooser's interest. She made a statement which, if true, avoided the policy. The situation is quite different from what it would have been had she failed to make a statement of fact, which, existing, barred her right to recovery. That would have been an error in her interest (instead of against it), and presumably would have been made with fraudulent intent.

51 Ga.App. at 969, 182 S.E. at 48.

In the present case the false statement of Woods was in his interest. If not discovered it would have induced the insurer to pay the policy proceeds to him as owner. If discovered, and assuming coverage remained in effect, the insurance company could at least have interpleaded the proceeds or otherwise protected itself from possible claims by competing claimants. Moreover, the concealed transfer went directly to the issue of insurable interest. Absent an insurable interest Woods would not be covered. The conveyance to the mother was a crucial factor to the insurer in determining its rights and responsibilities under the policy as the Supreme Court pointed out in Claflin.

Woods concedes that the representation was false and that he knew it was. His contention to us is that the materiality of the misrepresentation was a question for the jury that could not be decided as a matter of law by the court on summary judgment. The district court properly determined materiality as a matter of law. "[M]ateriality is a mixed question of law and fact that can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ on the question." Long v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 670 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir.1982). Reasonable minds cannot differ on the materiality of the misrepresentation made here because it went to the core factor of insurable interest, which is not a mere nicety or a matter of administrative convenience. Insurable interest is a keystone of the concept of insurance, safeguarding the insurer against the risk that arises if one who will receive the monetary benefit from loss of the insured property (or life, as it may be) has no interest in the property not being destroyed. Woods's misrepresentation concealed from the insurer the existence of a possible defense of lack of insurable interest. Moreover, an insurer that negligently issues a policy to one without an insurable interest may, in some circumstances, be liable in tort for the proximate consequence of its negligence. E.g., Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696 (1957). The district court did not decide, and we do not need to decide, whether under some theory of equity Woods had such an interest that he might slip by the insurable interest requirement. The insurer was entitled to raise insurable interest as a defense to coverage, and Woods's misrepresentation concealed the defense from the company. At a minimum the insurance company was entitled to be told the facts by Woods and to investigate before it paid the proceeds to one of two possible claimants.

Woods contends that he did not intend to defraud the insurer because his motive was to put the property beyond reach of his wife in divorce proceedings. Claflin rejects this argument. The Court held that the fraud was "not lessened because the motive that induced it was something in addition to the possible injury to them that it might work." Claflin, 110 U.S. at 97, 3 S.Ct. at 516.

Woods relies upon several Georgia cases that concern misrepresentations made in applications for insurance. They arise under O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-24-7 (1982) (previously codified at Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 56-2409 (1977)) which provides in part that "[m]isrepresentations ... [made in an application for insurance] shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless ... material either to the acceptance...

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